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Abstract 
The evaluation of the seismic resilience involves many different fields and therefore requires a 
multidisciplinary approach. As matter of fact, the technical literature needed to develop this 
research topic comes from many different fields and only few scholars have faced the complexity 
arising from the simultaneous adoption of varied backgrounds and competences. Nowadays most 
research in this field regards hospital buildings: this is due to the fact that hospitals play a 
strategic role in the management of the post-earthquake scenario. 
This research is aimed at developing a comprehensive holistic methodology for the seismic 
resilience evaluation of healthcare facilities, taking into account all the aspects that are usually 
considered one by one. More specifically, this work proposes a parallel evaluation of two distinct 
kinds of information, say the physical and the organizational aspects involved in the healthcare 
facility. In order to achieve a comprehensive evaluation of the seismic resilience, for measuring 
both physical and organizational elements  the same parameter has been used, i.e. WKHSDWLHQWV¶
waiting time, which is an objective and significant quantity, compatible with all the investigated 
aspects, and associated with the functionality of the system. 
The works suggests a new methodology, which is based on fragility analyses, and adopts 
several tools. In particular, the use of fragility curves allows to compare non-homogeneous 
information concerning structural and non-structural components; the waiting time, chosen as the 
functionality measure of the system, is measured by simulating the effects of different 
organizational model settings (thanks to a Discrete Event Simulation ± DES ± model).  
This new methodology is applied to a real case-study, i.e. the emergency rooms of the 
emergency department in a hospital situated in Tuscany, which is an integral part of the Tuscan 
healthcare system framework. The evaluation of the seismic resilience for the emergency 
department is developed with reference to a particular patient category (called yellow codes). 
The technique allows to simulate the organizational operations of the hospital, as a direct 
result of the physical features of its (structural and non-structural) elements. A flow chart with 
different scenarios is drawn which takes into account the possible conditions, and therefore the 
functionality, of structural and non-structural components; besides, the technique assesses the 
waiting time under seismic events of different intensities. As a consequence of an earthquake, 
two different cases of room closure are supposed, i.e. the permanent closure and the temporary 
closure. The proposed methodology extends the resilience quantification to a more complex 
dimension including both the physical and the organizational aspects, by translating the physical 
system resilience into operational consequences. Three analytical models (meta-models) are built 
and implemented to represent all possible cases that arise by applying the methodology, in order 
to capture the waiting time for the patients in critical conditions.  
The work not only relies on the adoption of already available tools, but also on the creation of 
new ones. More precisely, new fragility curves have been found for the hospital structure under 
investigation and for some of its non-structural components. A great deal of effort has been put 
on the correlation of all the required information, such as the statistical evaluation of 
organizational aspects associated with the case-study under different scenarios, the effects of 
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physical results on the organizational setup, the correlated functionality curve variation, and the 
final multiple cases of resilience assessment.  
The analysis points out the structural inadequacy of the case study, together with the lack of 
some important knowledge about the seismic behaviour and performance of non-structural 
components.  
Finally, the work proposes possible future applications of the methodology, like the setting of 
optimum emergency plans or the need to enhance specific components of the healthcare facility 
system Accordingly some conclusions are sketched regarding the possible implementation of the 
quality of the service under emergency conditions as well as the testing of  the existing 
emergency procedures.  
 
The main contribution of this study is the research framework, which combines the main aspects 
to be considered in a unique multidisciplinary methodology able to account for all the parameters 
involved in evaluating the seismic resilience of healthcare facilities. The proposed framework is 
an open platform; indeed it can be further improved by including factors and parameters which 
have not been considered yet. This methodology can effectively help hospital managers in taking 
decisions before and during a shock, allowing the optimal use of healthcare resources which are 
subject to various constraints. Given the lack of comprehensive knowledge concerning this 
applicative field, another merit of this work is that of contributing to increase the scientific 
interest in this area, to highlight its potentiality and to prompt further studies.  
Zusammenfassung 
Die Evaluation der seismischen Resilienz umfasst diverse Forschungsfelder und erfordert 
dementsprechend einen multidisziplinären Arbeitsansatz. Dies spiegelt sich auch in der Literatur 
wider, welche aus verschiedensten Bereichen stammt. Nur wenige Forscher haben sich mit der 
Komplexität beschäftigt, die sich aus den verschiedenen Hintergründen und erforderlichen 
Kompetenzen ergibt. Das Hauptaugenmerk der Forschung liegt aktuell auf Krankenhäusern, da 
diese eine strategische Rolle im Management des Post-Erdbeben Szenarios einnehmen. 
Diese Arbeit hat das Ziel, eine umfassende, holistische Methodik für die Evaluation der 
Erdbebenresilienz von Einrichtungen des Gesundheitswesens zu entwickeln. Im Speziellen wird 
die parallele Evaluation zweier verschiedener Informationsarten entworfen, welche zum einen die 
baulichen, zum anderen die organisatorischen Aspekte der betrachteten Einrichtung 
berücksichtigen.  
Um eine umfassende Evaluation der Erdbebenresilienz zu erhalten wurden diese Aspekte 
anhand eines Parameters, der Patientenwartezeit, gemessen. Die Patientenwartezeit ist ein 
Parameter, der zum einen als Zielvorgabe dient, zum anderen ein Maß für die Funktionalität des 
Systems darstellt.  
Basierend auf der Fragilitätsanalyse wird eine neue Methodik präsentiert, wobei einige der 
bereits vorhandenen Methoden übernommen wurden. Fragilitätskurven erlauben den Vergleich 
zwischen nicht-homogener Information über die tragenden und nicht-tragenden baulichen 
Komponenten. Die Auswirkungen verschiedener Organisationsmodelle auf die 
Patientenwartezeit wurde durch eine Discrete Events Simulation (DES) simuliert. 
Die entwickelte Methodik wurde in einer Fallstudie angewendet: Untersucht wurden die 
Räume der Notfallaufnahme eines Krankenhauses in der Toskana, welches ein integraler 
Bestandteil der toskanischen Gesundheitssystems ist. Dabei wurde die Erdbebenresilienz der 
1RWDXIQDKPHIUHLQH3DWLHQWHQNDWHJRULHGLHVRJHQDQQWHQÄ\HOORZFRGHV³, evaluiert.  
Die vorgestellte Methode erlaubt die Simulation der Organisation des Krankenhauses, 
abhängig von den physikalischen Eigenschaften sowohl der tragenden als auch der nicht-
tragenden Elemente. Ein Fließdiagramm verschiedener Szenarien wurde erstellt, welches sowohl 
den Zustand, und damit die Funktionalität, der strukturellen und nicht-strukturellen Elemente als 
auch die Patientenwartezeit bei seismischer Aktivität verschiedener Intensitäten, darstellt. Als 
direkte Folge des Erdbebens werden zwei verschiedene Arten von Raumschließungen postuliert: 
permanente und temporäre Schließung. Die vorgestellte Methodik erweitert die Quantifizierung 
der Resilienz, indem sie sowohl die physischen als auch die organisatorischen Aspekte 
einschließt: Die Resilienz des physikalischen Systems wird auf betriebliche Konsequenzen 
übertragen.  
Drei Analysemodelle wurden erstellt und implementiert um die Wartezeit von Patienten in 
kritischem Zustand für alle denkbaren Fälle zu erfassen. 
Für die Arbeit wurden sowohl vorhandene Methoden verwendet als auch neue entwickelt. 
Speziell wurden neuen Fragilitätskurven für das Krankenhausbauwerk und die nicht-tragenden 
Elemente erstellt. Die Zusammenhänge zwischen den verschiedenen Aspekten wurde intensiv 
untersucht; so wurde die Information über organisatorischen Aspekte der Fallstudie in 
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Verschiedenen Szenarien statistisch ausgewertet, die Auswirkungen baulicher Veränderung auf 
den organisatorischen Ablauf und die damit in Beziehung stehende Variaton der 
Funktionalitätskurve wurden ermittelt und schlussendlich mehrere Einschätzungen der Resilienz 
durchgeführt. 
Die Auswertung der Fallstudie zeigt bauliche Defizite bezüglich der Resilienz auf. Weiterhin 
konnte gezeigt werden, dass es an Information über das seismische Verhalten von nicht-
tragenden Komponenten mangelt.  
Abschließend werden mögliche Anwendungen für die Methodik präsentiert, wie 
beispielsweise das Festlegen optimaler Notfallpläne oder das Erkennen von notwendigen 
Anpassungen der Baustubstanz. Folgen für die Qualität des Services unter Notfallbedingungen 
werden diskutiert und existente Notfallmaßnahmen geprüft. 
 
Das grundlegende Ergebnis dieser Arbeit ist ein Konzept, welches alle Hauptaspekte in einer 
einzelnen multidisziplinären Methodik vereint, die alle Parameter innerhalb der Evaluation der 
seismischen Resilienz der Gesundheitseinrichtungen einschließt. Das entwickelte Konzept ist 
dabei erweiterbar: zusätzliche Parameter und Faktoren, die bisher keine Berücksichtigung 
gefunden haben, können hinzugefügt werden. 
Effektiv kann dieses Konzept Krankenhausmanagern helfen Entscheidungen bezüglich der 
Erdbebenresilienz der Einrichtung zu treffen. So können die Ressourcen des Gesundheitswesens 
effizient eingesetzt werden. 
Ein weiterer Beitrag der vorliegenden Studie ist das Aufzeigen grundlegender Wissensmängel 
in diesem wichtigen Anwendungsgebiet: In dieser Hinsicht ist eines der Ziele dieser Arbeit, das 
Interesse in diesem Feld zu erhöhen und weitere Entwicklungen und Forschung anzuregen. 
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 I 
Glossary 
ܵ = redundancy factor 
a = 
parameter of the first fitting 
for the meta-model 
construction 
a0 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
a1 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
a2 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
ACM = clinic for minor codes 
b = 
parameter of the first fitting 
for the meta-model 
construction 
b0 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
b1 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
b2 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
BC = blue code 
c = 
parameter of the first fitting 
for the meta-model 
construction 
C = capacity 
c0 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
c1 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
c2 = 
sub-parameter of the second 
fitting for the meta-model 
construction 
cm = centimeter 
CT = cross tee 
CT-con  Connections in Cross Tee  
Cu = class of use 
D = demand 
DES = discrete event simulation 
DISCH = discharge 
DTs = downtimes 
E = efficiency 
ECP = 
engineering capacity 
parameters 
ED = emergency department 
EDP = 
engineering demand 
parameters 
EDt = Department Disposition time 
ER = Emergency Room 
FC = fragility curve 
FIFO = First-In First-out 
GC = Green Code 
IDA = incremental dynamic analysis 
IM = magnitude index 
IUSS  
Istituto Universitario per gli 
Studi Superiori 
m = meter 
MESP = 
Maintained for the entire 
simulation period 
MLE = 
maximum likelihood 
estimation 
MMI = Modified Mercalli Intensity 
MPLT = 
multi-dimensional 
performance limit state 
threshold 
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II 
MSA = multiple stripe analysis 
MT = main tee 
MT-Sp  splices in Main tees 
n = number of beds 
n = number of room 
NSC = non-structural component 
NSCroom = 
Non-structural components 
within a room 
NTC = 
Norme Tecniche per le 
Costruzioni 
ύ = median 
OBI = 
Short Intensive Observation 
Rooms 
ORs = Operating Rooms 
OSS = help operator 
PEMAF = 
Emergency Procedures for 
massive inflow of patients  
PFA = peak floor acceleration 
PFs = penalty factors 
PGA = Peak Ground Acceleration 
pj = probability of collapse 
pj  True probability of collapse 
PLS = performance limit state 
Pr F/D = probability of failure/damage 
PrSTR = 
probability of exceeding the 
structural limit state 
PT = pre-hospital time 
PVR = Probability of Exceeding 
Q(t) = Quality of of infrastructure 
Qf(t) = function-based metric 
QQS1(t)  Qualitative functionality 
QQS2(t)  Quantitative functionality 
QS = quality of service 
R = ratio n/m 
R = Resilience 
R-1  ratio m/n 
RC = Red Code 
Rc = Reinforced concrete 
Ri = redistribution of function i 
ri lim = 
dependent response threshold 
parameter (deformation, 
force, velocity, etc.) 
RT = recovery time 
RTPC = 
recovery time probability 
curve 
SC = structural component 
SDCU  same day care unit 
Sf = scale factor 
SLC = Collapse Limit State 
SLD = Damage Limit State 
SLO = Serviceability Limit State 
SLV = Life Safety Limit State 
TOSE = 
technical, organizational, 
social, economic aspects 
TR = return period 
VN = nominal life 
VR = Reference Period 
WC = White Code 
wi = weighting term 
WR = Waiting Room 
WT = Waiting Time 
WTcrit  critical waiting time 
WTmax = maximum waiting time 
YC = Yellow Code 
Į = seismic arrival rate factor 
ȕ = standard deviation 
Ȝ = Arrival rate of patient at the 
hospital (Cimellaro et al.) 
Ȝu = 
Critical arrival rate of 
patient , when the hospital 
reaches its satured conditions 
(Cimellaro et al.) 
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III 
Motivation 
5HFHQW VHLVPLF HYHQWV OLNH /¶$TXLOD  DQG (PLOLD  KDYH VKRZQ KRZ VWUXFWXUDO
buildings are vulnerable to  natural disasters, due to human errors and system failures. Strategic 
structures, particularly those which are considerably significant for a community in case of 
calamity, must guarantee a full operability, especially in the first hours after the disaster (or the 
HPHUJHQF\ 7KHVH ³VWUDWHJLF EXLOGLQJV´ LH KRVSLWDOV KDYH D FRPSOH[ RUJDQL]DWLRQ DQG WKHLU
functionality crucially depends on the functionality of each component. As matter of fact, the 
cascading effects due to a calamitous event, like an earthquake, can make the system ± or the 
whole healthcare framework ± completely dysfunctional, also preventing rapid responses and 
urgent recoveries. To assess the functionality of health care facilities recent research 
FRQWULEXWLRQVKDYHLQWURGXFHGDQHZSDUDPHWHULHWKH³UHVLOLHQFH´DVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHYDULDEOH
for describing the whole system in terms of both structural and functional responses. 
Aim and objectives 
The main purpose of this work is to develop an exhaustive holistic methodology for the seismic 
resilience evaluation of health care capabilities, taking into account all the aspects that are usually  
analysed one by one. 
This comprehensive approach is aimed at proposing proper measures to be used for 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG PDQDJH DOO WKH LVVXHV FRQVWLWXWLQJ WKH ³UHVLOLHQFH´ RI KHDOWKFDUH V\VWHPV
addressing the contribution and benefits of various research activities into a unique framework.  
$FFRUGLQJO\WKHPDLQDLPRIWKLVWKHVLVLVWRGHVFULEHDPHWKRGWRGHILQHWKH³UHVLOLHQFH´7R
this purpose, a preliminary assumption about the resilience measure must be made. The choice of 
such a measure cannot be independent of the way to measure and quantify the safety of the 
structural building and the efficiency of the provided services.  
In order to reduce the structural and functional losses in the investigated systems, preventive 
analyses and strengthening interventions are suitable and precious. An effective preliminary 
investigation, indeed, allows to effectively predict and simulate the effects of earthquakes; 
consequently, it is possible to optimize the available resources and to largely increase the 
functional performance of the system. 
7KLVV\VWHPDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VHQKDQFHPHQWSHUPLWVDEHWWHUFRRUGLQDWLRQDQGDPRUHFRQVFLRXV
management of hospitals: for instance if appropriate decisions are taken before and during a 
shock,  the optimal response of the healthcare system can be achieved, despite the possible 
presence of various constraints. 
Given the wide lack of knowledge regarding the different disciplines involved, this work 
remarkably increases the interest in this area, also encouraging further developments in this field.  
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IV 
Overview 
The work is structured in seven chapters.  
&KDSWHULQWURGXFHVWKHUHVHDUFKWRSLFDQGIRFXVHVRQWKHKRVSLWDOV¶UHOLDELOLW\DOVRSURYLGLQJDQ
overall overview of different legislations for seismic hospital safety in different countries; the 
most vulnerable systems of hospital buildings, on the base of past eartquakes, have been pointed 
out, and the main aspects involved in the functionality evaluation have been introduced. 
&KDSWHULVIRFXVHGRQWKHWHFKQLFDOGHILQLWLRQRI³UHVLOLHQFH´VSHFLDODWWHQWLRQKDVEHHQSDLGWR
the resilience as an evaluation approach to hospital systems. A careful presentation of the state of 
the art is proposed both concerning the general concept of resilience and its application to 
hospital buildings. 
Chapter 3 describes the proposed methodology for assessing the seismic resilience of hospital 
buildings by taking into account physical and organizational responses. As a guideline, a 
flowchart is provided, where the combination of many possible structural, non-structural and 
organizational aspects is sketched.   
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 deal with a case study: the hospital of Sansepolcro. In particular, 
Chapter 4 illustrates the analysis of the hospital, taking into account all the relevant aspects, that 
is: structural (e.g. fragility curves associated with the peak floor acceleration (PFA)), non-
structural (e.g. fragility curves of the suspended ceiling system used in the emergency 
department; fragility curve derivation of the cabinet), and organizational components (e.g. 
organizational model associated with the possible emergency scenarios). 
Chapter 5 reports the results obtained for the organizational part, following the proposed method. 
Since different situations ± regarding the structure, the non-structural component and the 
organizational aspects ± can occur, different scenarios can arise representing the effectiveness of 
the hospital system as a consequence of a seismic event. All tKH SRVVLEOH ³VFHQDULRV´ FDOOHG
³FDVHV´ KDYH EHHQ GHVFULEHG DQG DQDO\VHG $ GLIIHUHQW PHWD-model, describing the whole 
behaviour of the entire hospital system, has been developed for each case, representing a specific 
possible disruption of the medical service. At the end of the chapter, the simplified methodology 
to assess the resilience is presented, together with the necessary steps to build the graphical 
resilience function.  
A discussion of the results of the proposed methodology is presented in Chapter 6, where the 
method presented in Chapter 3 is followed and applied to the case-study, providing an estimation 
of the seismic resilience. Furthermore some applications ± already possible or expected in a close 
future ± are discussed. Namely, the effect of the introduction of redundant elements into the 
system in case of an emergency scenario has been simulated and a study regarding the 
optimisation of the resources is illustrated. Chapter 7 resumes the research outcomes, drawing 
some conclusions. A possible guideline to apply to the proposed method is proposed, and 
possible future developments are presented.  
Finally, the Appendices report all the results discussed in the work.  
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Chapter 1 
The seismic reliability of Hospital 
Buildings in the post-earthquake scenario
Seismic countries have often faced the difficult experience of the post-earthquake scenario. The 
destructive impact of an earthquake is usually measured in terms of life losses and constructions 
collapse. There is, however, another variable that largely affect the impact of the earthquake on 
the community. This quantity is the time needed by the community to recover and revert to its 
main functionalities. In the last years a lot of technical literature1 has been dedicated to this 
complex aspect. Although a comprehensive dissertation on this issue is beyond the aim of this 
thesis, it can be said that an effective emergency plan, together with the functionality of the 
health system, are at the base of the potentiality of a community to recover after a strong 
earthquake. 
This work deals with the analysis of the post-earthquake functionality of hospital systems. As 
matter of fact Hospital buildings are the focus of the entire healthcare system (Viti et al. 2006). 
They play a vital role for the health and life quality of the population even in ³standard´ times, 
since people rely on them for their health and well-being. But in case of emergency they become 
                                                 
1 The technical literature rapidly developed with the last earthquake events: from all the world the needing to a deeper 
comprehension of the hospital system involved several fields at the same time. National agencies started to improve 
codes and prescribe provisions (FEMA, WHO, PEER 2002-2005), while researchers focused their attention on specific 
studies regarding the hospital building. Italian researchers from different University studied the vulnerability of 
hospital ( a Masi et al. 2012), while others started the investigations on non-structural performance (Cosenza et al. 
2014), or the functionality maintenance of hospital in post-earthquake scenario (C. Nuti 1998). In Japan, many 
researches are in more detailed area, such as the seismic risk assessment of lifeline by Kuwata et al. 2008, or the 
Taiwanese  study on the identification of earthquake damaged operational and functional components in hospital 
building by Yao & Tu 2011. All these researches are not focused on a unique comprehensive variable for assessing the 
hospital functionality, actually the most part of researchers are focusing on specific subjects. Only few are the studies 
which take into account all these aspects. Examples are the American MCEER group (Cimellaro, Fumo, Reinhorn, 
Bruneau, 2009) which conducted a research on the quantification disaster resilience of health-care facilities; the New 
Zealand group with C. Jacques, J. McIntosh, S. Giovinazzi, T. Kirsch, T. Wilson, J. Mitrani-Reiser (the research 
developed after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, which caused a big interruption on the whole healthcare framework 
of the Canterbury region). To the latters are dedicated more description into chapter 2.  
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even more crucial. Their extraordinary importance during an emergency is due to many factors 
like:  
- the social function; 
- the strategic role in case of calamity; 
- the high value of content; 
- the complexity of internal sub-systems and functions; 
- the high rate of occupancy and the continuous cycle of activities. 
 
Hospitals are the final point of the rescue chain and, therefore, they represent the focus of the 
disaster response. In case of calamity, especially immediately after earthquakes, they must 
guarantee immediate medical services to the injured population, and protect the patients who are 
not self-sufficient or depend on life support devices. Due to all these reasons the safety of 
hospital buildings is a strategic goal for each community. The efficiency of an hospital building, 
even  after a seismic event, is related to its own organization and coordination, which are based 
on appropriate emergency plans. Any action plan, however, needs a proper, suitable and integer 
building to work. Accordingly tKH³HQJLQHHULQJ´VDIHW\RIWKHEXLOGLQJVXVHGDVKRVSLWDOIDFLOLWLHV 
plays an important role in the post-earthquake strategy chosen by each community. In order to 
guarantee the required efficiency to the hospital building, the role of the hospital in the 
emergency scenario must be known and understood: it is this key-information which ensures 
each function to be performed according to the plan.  
To provide the essential safety requirements ± even those related to the post-earthquake 
scenario - the complexity of the hospital must be analysed and taken into account. Section 1.1 
deals with the complexity of hospital buildings, which involves both spatial organization and 
logistic planning, underlining and investigating  the connections among the main factors. The 
necessity of having a measurable variable for the seismic reliability is explained, and the concept 
of resilience as operative approach to the problem is introduced. Section 1.2 is dedicated to the 
legislation frame that supports the hospital buildings checks: special attention is paid to the 
results achieved by the California State, where the most advanced technical code has been 
produced, and to the Italian technical state of art.  
1.1 The reliability of hospital buildings 
Any hospital is a complex organism, where different functions, goals and competences interplay 
to achieve the expected global efficiency. To achieve the required reliability a hospital building  
must be faced and understood as a complex system consisting of spaces, technical devices and 
people. 
The system can be divided into hospital sub-systems, which in turn can consist of individual 
elements or groups of elements. The management of the functionality of all the elements 
composing a sub-system, and consequently the system as a whole (intended as a hospital), is the 
main need for assuring an acceptable health service both in a global sense and in the punctual 
performance of single elements. Each component has its own role in the cascade-loss of 
functionality of the global system. Precise requirements must be defined for all components, 
connections and interconnections so that a satisfactory control of the whole system can be 
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achieved. As matter of fact, it is not sufficient to assure the stability of the structure or of a single 
element: their behaviour is converted into cause-effect phenomenon that should be easily 
comparable: complex responses from different elements must be compared and harmonized with 
each other in order to guarantee the global response of the hospital. Furthermore the 
identification of each proficiency ensures the efficacy of a management able to pinpoint the 
problem and find the best solution. The following paragraph presents a specific overview on 
hospitals subjected to an earthquake: the main aim is to describe the cause-effect phenomenon 
and the complex interrelation between the several elements the global system consists of. 
When an earthquake strikes, as a result of sudden movements along a fault, it creates a motion 
that travels as waves towards the site of a structure. These waves are transferred to the foundation 
of the structure, passing through the overlying soils at the site. The response of the building 
depends on several properties, which in many cases are very difficult to predict, for instance: the 
material of the structure, the geometry of the structure, the frequency  and the amplitude of the 
ground motion. The structural performance is not sufficient to describe the response of the single 
functions and elements dislocated within the building. As Figure 1.1 shows, the behaviour of the 
EXLOGLQJLVFRPSRVHGRIVHYHUDO³UHVSRQVHV´VWDUWLQJIURPWKHVWUXFWXUDORQHSDVVLQJWKURXJKWKH
non-structural components performance and depending on the organization of the functions 
allocated inside each space. As matter of fact the image represents the need of a multi-
disciplinary knowledge, especially regarding the non-structural components that have a key role 
since the level disposition in a structure determines significantly different acceleration and 
displacement demands at spatially different locations. It is not only worth to underline the 
importance of all these components and networks, but also other aspects which are hard to catch, 
like the personnel¶VEHKDYLRXU DQG WKHSDQLFRI LQMXUHGSHRSOH EHVLGH WKH IDOOLQJRI URDGV DQG
communication connections. The literature and past experiences reveal that healthcare 
discontinuity is common after an earthquake, while it is not very clear which are the causes of 
discontinuity, even under low intensity earthquakes. The overall hospital serviceability depends 
on the performance of multiple elements and interacting systems rather than just on the structure 
remaining standing. Even if the structural components of a building achieve an immediate 
occupancy performance level after a seismic event, failure of architectural, mechanical, or 
electrical components of the building can lower the performance level of the entire building 
system. Moreover,  non-structural components and equipment are usually much more vulnerable 
to seismic events, since they are assumed to not have a structural role. It has been documented 
how the damage of both architectural and mechanical non-structural building components can 
have a strong effect on the safety of occupants, functionality of facilities, and loss of property. 
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Figure 1.1 Overview of the system behaviour including all the aspects having a significant role into the hospital.   
The described overview shows the complexity in assessing and managing the global response 
of a hospital. The cause-effect phenomenon induced by a single element within the hospital 
clearly demonstrates the need of a depth-knowledge of the behaviour of non-structural elements 
and the harmonization of non-structural and structural components. The hospital has not to be 
conceived as a container, but also the contents with all their peculiarities are to be taken into 
account for determining the overall responsH RI WKH ³KRVSLWDO-V\VWHP´ ,Q WKLV VHQVH QRW RQO\
material elements are included, but also the organizational aspects that represent an important 
part of the global response. On these aspects depends the continued and fully operation of 
healthcare facilities after an earthquake, and the consequent prevention of the hospital 
inoperability.  Accordingly the key element to be studied and investigated in order to prevent a 
crisis after an earthquake is the functionality, defined as operability, of the hospital.  
Previous studies on hospital systems (A. Masi et al. 2012; Nuti & Vanzi 1998; Kuwata et al. 
2008; MCEER, 2009), including all their components and elements, remark the complexity of the 
problem. This intricacy is not only due to the various and different elements inside the building, 
but also to the presence of several supervisors at the same time. In fact numerous figures are 
simultaneously in charge: structural engineers for a building project are traditionally focussed on 
the design of the building structure, while architects generally specify non-structural elements 
such as ceiling systems, cladding systems, partitions and architectural finishes. The building 
service and fire engineers specify mechanical services, electrical systems, piping and fire 
protection systems. Finally the design and installation of the seismic bracing system for the non-
structural proprietary elements is typically a responsibility of the contractor and subcontractors. 
Therefore it is essential to provide a performance measure of the global response that will 
eventually be used by policy makers; consequently, the management during the shock will only 
improve ± leading to a prevision of the time needed to restore the hospital ±  in case failures are 
localised, and their effects are determined and solved. This concept, defined as seismic resilience, 
has been introduced a few years ago and resumes the main objective of this work.  
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The knowledge of the response of hospital systems in normal conditions and previsions 
during emergency phases, including all the aspects briefly introduced, is the main goal of this 
work, which intends to hypothesize resilient functions. To this purpose, the functionality of the 
KRVSLWDOPXVWEHSURSHUO\LQYHVWLJDWHGDQG³TXDQWLILHG´ 
The functionality of a hospital is hard to quantify: it cannot be defined according to simple 
engineering units, as it is the case of power grids or water distribution networks, where simple 
and conventional units, such as kilowatts or litres, can be used. As matter of fact such a 
functionality can be defined in different ways, depending on different occurring emergencies, and 
the type and range of mitigation actions that are expected. Moreover, this functionality must be 
related to the amount and the efficiency of the available facilities, which are a function of the 
seismic event itself since the earthquake can largely damage the effective medical facilities.   
In addition to the problems identified for different countries in developing and following a 
unique method for functionality assessment, even within the same country the existence of 
³VLPLODU´ KRVSLWDOV GRHV not guarantee the same functionality and consequently the same 
probability to predict the performance during an emergency. The ability of a hospital to keep its 
functionality can substantially depend on its layout. This may differ very much from case to case 
even for hospitals having similar dimensions, i.e. having the same number of beds, having been 
built in the same period, and is due to many factors, the most frequent one being the later creation 
of new buildings to face the varying and often increasing functional needs.  
This brief introduction to the problem underlines the difficulties to find a unique way to 
represent the overall hospital serviceability, and to resume it into a single methodology. The only 
possibility to include and represent several field and aspects is that of relying on a single 
parameter that can be eventually used by policy makers, such a parameter is seismic resilience.  
 
 
1.2  Knowledge and legislation development on seismic reliability of 
hospital buildings 
All seismic regions of the world have experienced the inconvenience of healthcare interruption 
due to seismic events. Many of these countries, therefore, have tried to provide proper guidelines 
to prevent further losses. Technical developments flew into seismic codes that produced 
guidelines for structural and non-structural elements in order to ensure the continuity of hospitals 
service care. Researchers, engineers and decision makers have been pushed to investigate  the 
causes of different failures; their studies are mostly based on the observation of previous 
experiences: what went wrong in the seismic response of a hospital and why the hospital building 
could not be properly used after the seismic event.  
As a consequence, many countries have set a seismic technical code which includes specific 
and proper provisions concerning the design of hospital buildings. Nevertheless, even now most 
codes focus exclusively on structural components and when non-structural elements are 
considered, they are limited to architectural, mechanical and electrical components (FEMA 
2007); although these constitute the most important elements for a hospital design, they are not 
sufficient by themselves to ensure a fully efficiency. The economic losses due to non-structural 
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components have been two or three times greater than the cost of replacing collapse buildings or 
structures (Taghavi & Miranda 2003). Even recently, despite more requirement are needed and 
new steps into the international codes have been done, the damage to non-structural elements has 
determined the majority of the losses also leading to the hospital closure: this happened in Italy ± 
O¶$TXLODDQG5HJJLR(PLOLD± and in New Zealand (2010). 
After an earthquake the importance of non-structural components is, in effect, far away from 
being of minor importance, both in economic and serviceability terms. For most buildings non-
structural elements and building contents make up around 50%-70% of the total building cost 
according to Taghavi & Miranda (2003), as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Building type–cost breakdown  Figure 1.3 De-aggregation of expected loss, by component, 
for a 10 storey reinforced concrete office building  
The economic consequences can be primarily attributed to: (i) the direct economic losses 
associated with the repairing damage within a structure; (ii) the direct losses associated with the 
loss of income due to business interruption; and (iii) the indirect losses associated with the loss of 
income due to business interruption.  
The documented experiences prompted politicians and authorities to develop and implement 
new techniques in order to improve the existing codes and to apply a more careful legislation 
regarding the complex system integrated into a hospital facility. 
1.2.1 The USA as a leading country in the seismic legislation for hospital subjected to 
earthquakes: the Northridge experience and further efforts by other countries 
The evolution of design philosophy and design provisions in building codes started with the need 
by government officials, design professionals and healthcare providers in California for a general 
UHFRJQLWLRQRI WLPHFRGHV$IWHU WKH6DQ)HUQDQGRHDUWKTXDNH WKH ILUVW³KRVSLWDO6HLVPLF
6DIHW\$FW´ZDVGHYHORSHGZLWKDIRFXVRQVWUXFWXUDODQGQRQ-structural resistance; in fact since 
March 7, 1973, the design, maintenance and constructiRQ RI &DOLIRUQLD¶V KRVSLWDOV KDYH EHHQ
governed by special statutes, regulations and design standards aimed at ensuring the hospital 
functionality after major earthquakes. The main goal was to ensure safety to vulnerable patients 
in an earthquake, to maintain the functionality of the facilities after such a disaster and therefore 
to protect the inpatient population and to provide the necessary service for injured person in the 
community.  
OFFICE HOSPITAL HOTEL
62%
48%
70%
20% 44%
17%
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Non-structural Contents Structural
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After 1973 all Californian hospitals, have been built, remodelled or re-designed according to 
these stringent requirements.  
In the 1994 Northridge earthquake, several facilities built prior to the HSSA2 experienced 
structural and non-structural damages had to be evacuated. Actually, non-structural damages 
affected both old and new hospitals (with the latter built in accordance with the stringent HSSA 
law/requirement). This event clearly showed that in many cases the non-structural components 
and systems did not conform to WKH ³IXQFWLRQDOLW\´ VWDQGDUGV which had to ensure  a good 
performance during major earthquakes.  
Requiring seismic evaluation the Act was amended by Senate Bill 1953, after the Northridge 
earthquake; in case hospitals were found to have structural or non-structural vulnerabilities, 
retrofits or replacements were required. Accordingly, the legislation in California has been 
developed on the base of lessons learned from previous experience and reflect the complexity of 
hospital systems.  
 
  
Figure 1.4 Example of suspended ceiling damages during the 1994 Northridge earthquake (FEMA).   
The California legislation SB3 1953 is very important even for the new approach to the 
seismic design: codes and instructions are the result of previous experience as well as of the 
awareness of the complexity of hospital systems and clearly demonstrate the aXWKRULWLHV¶
strictness in ensuring the  continuity  of medical care in case of calamity. 
                                                 
2 Hazardous Substance Account Act (HSAA) creates a number of subaccounts in the General Fund that are 
administered by the director of DTSC. The stated purposes of HSAA are threefold: (i) to provide for response authority 
for releases of hazardous substances that pose a threat to the public health or environment, (ii) to provide compensation 
for out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost wages or business income resulting from injuries caused by exposure to 
hazardous substances, and (iii) to make available adequate funding to meet federal requirements that California pay 10 
percent of the cleanup costs. HSAA. 
3  Senate Bill 1953 (SB 1953) was introduced on February 25, 1994. It was signed into law on September 21, 1994 and 
filed by the Secretary of State on September 22, 1994. The bill was an amendment to and furtherance of the Alfred E.
Alquist Hospital Seismic Safety Act of 1983 (Alquist Act). SB 1953 (Chapter 740, 1994), is now chaptered into statute 
in Sections 130000 through 130070 of the Alfred E. Alquist Hospital Facilities Seismic Safety Act, and part of the 
California Health and Safety Code. The regulations developed as a result of this statute are deemed to be emergency 
regulations and became effective upon approval by the California Building Standards Commission and filing with the 
Secretary of State on March 18, 1998. 
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Other countries, such as Turkey, understood the importance of this need and started 
conducting comprehensive retrofitting activities to reduce the vulnerability and enhance/improve 
the performance of their infrastructures including hospitals, schools and bridges (IPDED 2010). 
As a consequence to previous risk and events, new techniques were developed and implemented, 
like the implementation of base isolation to protect structural and non-structural components 
from failures. Despite significant improvements in techniques and practices, during the 2008 
Sichuan earthquake (China) many newly built schools and hospitals collapsed, mainly due to 
poor design and poor structure quality.  
Also in Italy inadequate detailing and design irregularities were the main FDXVHRIWKH³QHZ´
/¶$TXLODKRVSLWDOWRVXIIHUVHYHUHGDPDJHafter the 2009 earthquake (EEFIT 2009).  
 
  
Figure 1.5 Damage to the ceiling during the l’Aquila Earthquake. 
The lesson learnt from past experience clearly indicates that preventive care has largely paid off 
in subsequent emergencies and it needs to be planned and implemented through a continuous 
process. Code implementation can be done by enforcing designers and architects to follow the 
law, but it can also be achieved by spreading awareness. For example, Taiwanese authorities 
make use of awareness and legislation to push architects and contractors to design and construct 
resilient buildings; one of the interviewees stated that currently architects and contractors are 
more willing to comply with seismic detail and willing to pay more attention to what structural 
engineers suggest. 
Accordingly seismic resistance codes for hospitals are needed which could provide guidelines 
for the structural and architectural elements (for new and existing buildings), the  continuity of 
utility supplies and the stability of equipment. The efficiency of these codes depends on the 
method they are developed on and the effectiveness of their implementations. Codes should be 
based on scientific evidence (i.e. field investigation, theory and best practice) and should take 
into account the local culture of construction method as well as experiences on past earthquakes 
and, most importantly, they must be provided with implementation and enforcement strategies. 
The existence of a reference model has certainly encouraged the renewal process of other 
countries; however, the particular features of the construction techniques, the properties of the 
soil, the building maintenance and management policy of each country as well as different 
economies, resulted in an inability to slavishly follow the USA model, despite the increasing 
CHAPTER 1 The seismic reliability of hospital buildings in post-earthquake scenario 
 
9 
awareness to face calamities with methods and codes ad hoc. As a matter of fact there is a 
worldwide amount of public buildings, originally designed without seismic criteria, that  are  
currently  located  in  places  classified  as  seismic zones. For example, in  Italy,  the  National 
Department of Civil Protection (DPC) estimates that there are about 7¶ SXEOLF EXLOGLQJV
GHVLJQHGZLWKRXW VHLVPLF FULWHULD DQGQHDUO\¶RI WKHPDUHSODFHG LQ DUHDVKDYLQJ HLWKHU
medium or high seismic hazard (Dolce et al. 2006); crucially, many of these buildings are 
hospitals. 
Although the incredible achievements of the Californian community, current guidelines are 
still insufficient to assess a satisfactory level of security for hospital subjected to earthquakes. 
Despite the harmonization between structural and non-structural components is developing, it is 
still far away from being a daily practice: indeed no attempt to practically relate the structural 
damage with the organizational aspects has been proposed so far. Accordingly an integration 
between legislation and tools able to include all the aspects involved into medical disruption 
(both for the physical part and the organizational planning) is urgently needed. In this framework 
seismic resilience represents the unique all-embracing measure. This new idea suggests a new 
approach that must be studied in-depth and could allow the inclusion of new methodologies into 
hospital codes based on the concept of hospital functionality and grouping all the above described 
aspects. 
1.2.2 Italian code development on hospital safety 
In Europe, and specifically in Italy, the current state of affairs regarding the prevention of 
hospital safety is not so advanced as in California. In Italy public buildings, including hospitals, 
showed poor performance during past earthquakes. For example, during the Mw 6.4 1976 Friuli 
and the Mw 6.9 1980 Campania-Basilicata earthquakes, the healthcare system suffered severe 
and extensive damages. Specifically, the 1980 earthquake caused the complete collapse of the 
6DQW¶$QJHORGHL/RPEDUGL+RVSLWDO5&VWUXFWXUH-storeys) and serious damage to the Curteri 
Hospital at Mercato San Severino.  
Until 1986 the Italian design for hospital was not supported by any specific code about 
seismic events, when the design of seismic action was amplified of 40% compared to ordinary 
buildings, through the introduction of the coefficient of importance, related to the building 
function. In the following years only few and punctual research projects were financed for the 
protection of new and existing hospitals. This effort interested some specific regions, without a 
comprehensive and extensive project for realizing a new specific code for  the protection of 
hospital buildings.  
It must be noted that in Italy the safety conditions of hospital buildings is particularly difficult. 
Many hospitals are located into existing buildings, often historical constructions, with all the 
problems related to them. Although there are some exceptions ± big healthcare located into 
appositely made new buildings ±  their date project results to precede the newest code due to the 
duration of the construction practice. For instance, it was necessary to wait until 2002 for the 
SXEOLFDWLRQ E\ WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI +HDOWK DQG ,QIUDVWUXFWXUHV RI WKH ³JXLGHlines for improving 
HDUWKTXDNHVDIHW\DQGIXQFWLRQDOLW\RIKRVSLWDOV´ZKLFKZDVIROORZHGE\DVHFRQGHGLWLRQ7KHVH
guidelines define levels of protection for both the limit state of damage (with the purpose of 
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immediate usability) and the limit state of protection of human life and protection from collapse. 
These levels are much higher than those of common building constructions: for the latter only the 
protection against the collapse (with a modest request in verifying the damage of functionality 
levels) is defined. 
In 2003, after the publication of the order of civil protection number 3274, hospitals were 
defined structures essential for the civil protection, even not taking into account their functional 
DVSHFWV 'HVSLWH WKHVH QHZ UHTXLUHPHQWV GXULQJ WKH  /¶$TXLOD HDUWKTXDNH WKH FRPSOHWH
evacuation of the most part of local hospital complex was needed;  in addition, in the last 2012 
Emilia earthquake the hospitals lost their care capacity due to the loss of equipment and failure of 
non-structural components. 
Recently the new seismic codes have provided  more adequate methods and techniques to 
achieve the seismic risk mitigation of both new and existing strategic buildings, where 
considerations concerning the structural performance against collapse risk prevail. Moreover, the 
new seismic code aims at limiting damage to non-structural components through the limitation of 
inter-storey drift values, whereas no specific provisions about content restraining (e.g. medical 
equipment) are provided.   
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Chapter 2 
Seismic resilience: definition, 
peculiarities and metrics 
A unique and univocal definition of resilience is not easy to find since this concept is commonly 
used in many different fields, ranging from the environmental research to materials science and 
engineering, also including psychology, sociology and economics. Moreover, in recent years the 
definition of resilience has been strongly developed and reinforced even in the medical field. 
Consulting a dictionary it is possible to find a definition which concerns both strength and 
IOH[LELOLW\ PRUH VSHFLILFDOO\ UHVLOLHQFH FDQ EH LV GHILQHG DV ³WKH FDSDFLW\ WR FRSH ZLWK
XQDQWLFLSDWHG GDQJHUV DIWHU WKH\ KDYH EHFRPHPDQLIHVW OHDUQLQJ WR ERXQFH EDFN´ (Wildavsky 
1991) RU ³WKH DELOLW\ RI D V\VWHP WR ZLWKVWDQG VWUHVVHV RI µHQYLURQPHQWDO ORDGLQJ¶ >«@ D
IXQGDPHQWDOTXDOLW\IRXQGLQLQGLYLGXDOJURXSVRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGV\VWHPVDVDZKROH´ (Horne 
& Orr 1998).  
A proper and more suitable definition of resilience, however,  requires to know the scientific 
field we are dealing with and the limits within which the term resilience applies. As matter of 
IDFW³UHVLOLHQFH´FDQEHLQYHVWLJDWHGDWDQ\VFDOHRIDV\VWHPUDQJLQJIURPWKHVPDOOHVWHOHPHQWV
constituting a specific sub-system up to the most general system that has to be limited as well. 
For instance, the concept can be applied to a specific material to a finite element (e.g. a column 
or a beam in the engineering field), to coupled elements (e.g. a structural concrete frame) or even 
to an entire community. Accordingly defining the scope of resilience and its purpose, focusing on 
the specific system involved, are the main priorities of the discipline.  
According to the engineering approach the definition of resilience presumes the existence of a 
system to be investigated and the occurrence of an event that disturbs the normal state of this 
system. In this framework even resources and skills employed to face new situations and 
operating conditions are included. 
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2.1 General measure of resilience and definitions 
2.1.1 Resilience in a system 
There are two main approaches to define and evaluate resilience. The first approach is related to 
the definition provided by Bruneau et al. (2003), i.e. the ability of the system to reduce the 
chances of a shock, to absorb a shock if it occurs (like the abrupt reduction of a performance) 
and to recover quickly after a shock (to re-establish its normal performance). This definition 
relies on the assumption that a unique measure, which is time-variable, is representative of the 
quality of the system. The performance can change in a range and the restoration of the system is 
expected to occur over time. The representative measure of the system functionality must depend 
on all the factors affecting the system. Therefore if the object under investigation is a system, the 
first step to take is the definition of its parts, the comprehension of the relevance of each part in 
the whole system and the unit-element to be considered as the smallest one to assess. If the parts 
of the system do not have the same measurable quantity, a common property to be measure must 
be found. The more complex the system is, the more difficult it becomes to find a conjoint 
measure to evaluate since such a measure must be representative of the behaviour of the whole. A 
revised definition can be provided for the seismic resilience of those systems where the 
performance is characterised by multidimensional measures, which are interconnected and 
depend on the level of performance desired. In effect in a measurable (complex or simple) 
system, the performance can be measured in terms of different quantities and can change, 
gradually or drastically, depending on the event and its nature. A reduction in performance can 
concern all or some of the quantities assumed as a reference. The evaluation of performance 
reduction/loss is obviously affected by such a choice. External events can create abrupt changes 
in performance and can be followed by different restorations to achieve fully satisfactory (or 
acceptable) levels, depending on the employed elements. The cascading loss of the system can be 
approached in different ways. 
The second approach to the problem relies on the assumption that the system is to be 
perceived as a series of interconnected sub-systems. Accordingly a fault-tree analysis can be used 
to measure the reliability and the safety level of complex engineered systems: their functionality 
can be related to the state of each sub-system and component they depend on.  
The analysis of the performance of a system implies the analysis of each sub-system and their 
correlation, otherwise it needs a unique value which is sensitive to all the involved components 
and which can represent the functionality of the whole system.  
In this work, the object under investigation is the hospital, the quantity to be measured is its 
functionality and the event that disturbs the object is an earthquake. In order to establish a 
common frame of reference, scholars have analysed the fundamental concepts of resilience in 
order to unify the adopted terminology and to restrict its application to healthcare facilities. 
Definition 1: Resilience is defined as a normalized function indicating capability to sustain a 
level of functionality or performance for a given building, bridge, lifeline, networks or community 
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over a period of time TLC (life cycle, life span etc.) including the recovery period after damage in 
an extreme event.  
Definition 2: The recovery time TRE is the time necessary to restore the functionality of a 
community or a critical infrastructure system (water supply, electric power, hospitals, etc.) to a 
desired level below, same or better than the original, allowing proper operation of the system.  
Definition 3: Disaster resilient community is a community that can withstand an extreme event, 
natural or man-made event, with a tolerable level of losses and can take mitigation action 
consistent with achieving that level of protection (Mileti 1999, p.5). 
Definition 4: Coupled Resilience is defined as the normalized function indicating capability to 
sustain a level of functionality or performance for a given building, bridge, lifeline, networks or 
community over a control period of time TLC (life cycle, life span etc.). 
 
In this frame it is possible to recognize the community seismic resilience (Bruneau et al. 2003) as 
the ability of social units to mitigate hazards, to contain effects of disasters when they occur, and 
to carry out recovery activities in a way that minimizes social disruption and mitigates the effects 
of future earthquakes.  
In case of earthquakes, the effect of resilience should be that of reducing loss of life, injuries 
and other economic losses; more generally speaking, it means that resilience has to guarantee the 
minimization of a reduction in the quality of life due to an earthquake. Seismic resilience 
comprehends all those strategies and instruments which are exploited during and after an 
earthquake in order to restore as soon as possible the levels of pre-disaster functioning (or other 
acceptable levels). 
Inside the community, various institutions, organizations and elements within the environment 
contribute to resilience: among them some are essential to the community due to their functions 
in the aftermath of earthquake disasters. These critical facilities include water and power 
lifelines, acute-care hospitals and organizations being responsible for the emergency management 
at the local community level (Bruneau et al. 2003).  
Due to the lack of detailed loss-of-function assessments it is very difficult to draw a realistic 
picture of what can be expected during an emergency. Therefore to give support to  hospital 
administrators, planners and emergency personnel to manage the emergency phase is a true 
challenge. 
These functions are essential for the overall community resilience since they enable 
communities to respond, provide for the well-being of their residents and put into action recovery 
activities in case an earthquake strikes. For this reason hospitals are crucial for the community 
resilience: the recovery activities start immediately after an earthquake and hospitals provide 
emergency care for injured victims. The recovering activity, together with power and water 
lifelines, constitute the backbone of a resilient community. The necessity of a continuous 
operation and rapid restoration of these service is an essential condition for the community to 
quickly recover.  
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2.1.2 The hospital system 
If the hospital ± given its complexity ± is considered as a system it is worth to indicate the sub-
systems HYDOXDWHG DQG ZLWKLQ WKHP WKH ³XQLW-HOHPHQW´ WR DVVHVV 0RUHRYHU WKH FRQQHFWLRQ
among the different parts cannot be neglected: the intricate nature of hospitals necessarily leads 
to cascading problems and interrelations which are difficult to estimate. Therefore it is essential 
to have an adequate awareness of the problem. 
$V LQWURGXFHG LQ &KDSWHU  ³KRVSLWDO-V\VWHPV´ FDQ EH GLYLGHG LQWR WZR ELJ EUDQFKHV WKH
physical system and the organizational one. As Figure 2.1 shows, within the first branch it is 
possible to distinguish two main groups: the structural part (constituted by the structural 
elements) and the non-structural part  (constituted by all the non-structural elements). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The main parts (or aspects) of hospital systems. 
$OOWKHEUDQFKHVDUHLQGLVSHQVDEOHIRUDJRRGSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH³KRVSLWDO-V\VWHP´VLQFHWKHODFN
of one of them compromises the global performance of the hospital.  
In addition, each branch is composed of single elements or groups of elements which the 
performance of the main part depend on. The hospital performance, indeed, does not only 
depends on structural resilience, but also on non-structural components, like medical technology 
and organizational aspects (e.g. emergency planning and technical maintenance). As matter of 
fact the quantification of physical resilience is not enough to assess critical facilities like 
hospitals; therefore the need to include organizational resilience as part of the whole has pushed 
researchers to find closer ties between these two aspects (i.e. structural ones and non-structural 
ones).  
This brief description introduces the high complexity of the problem which also induced 
different scientific approaches. Over time many different approaches have been developed and 
many aspects have been neglected: for instance, researches carried out by medical scholars miss 
relevant engineering or architectural aspects, and vice versa (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed 
account regarding the authorities involved).  
2.2 Approaches hospital assessments 
In addition to the current different methodologies which have been developed for the assessment 
of the seismic risk in hospitals, many others have been dedicated to the definition and assessment 
of the resilience of the structure, considering all the aspects playing a critical role in the 
functionality of the system. 
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The most common deficiency, according to these methodologies, is the lack of knowledge 
about one of the three parts (structural, non-structural or organizational) constituting the 
³KRVSLtal-V\VWHP´$FWXDOO\ WKHVHDSSURDFKHV WHQG WRHYDOXDWH VHSDUDWHGDVSHFWVRI WKHKRVSLWDO
performance, while resilience involves all of them, as shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2 - Resilience as the ideal intersection of different fields. 
Despite the numerous approaches that can be found in the literature (Maxwell 1984; McCabe et 
al. 2010; Thompson et al. 1996), a more comprehensive view taking into account both the 
physical structure (including structural and non-structural elements) and the service provided to 
patients and personnel does not exist (given the difficulties in comparing and linking different 
scientific fields). As a consequence a satisfactory representation to assess the seismic resilience 
of healthcare facilities is hard to achieve since some methods are good at representing the 
organization of the system, but reveal to be inadequate with real data, while others are more 
effective with real data, but inadequate to properly describe the complexity of the hospital 
system.  
Technical aspects and organizational aspects remain divided since they do not share a 
common value to measure their effects during an emergency phase. Even the recent earthquakes 
&KULVWFKXUFK  O¶$TXLOD  KDYH UHYHDOHG WKH NH\-importance of considering all three 
aspects, without neglecting any of them, since the impairment of one single aspect can cause a 
whole loss of functionality. Imagine, for instance, the consequences of a low earthquake: the 
hospital structure is completely safe and undamaged and the personnel is ready to care patients, 
however with contents overturned, damaged of fault down the global performance of the system 
would be totally unsatisfactory despite the positive response of the majority of the sub-systems. 
Similarly if both structural and non-structural components show a good behaviour, but 
emergency procedures for the hospital staff are missing, or previsions for the organizational 
response in case of emergency are lacking, the hospital response would be unsatisfactory as well.  
2.2.1 First steps in hospital assessment 
In the past years, the scholars dealing with the seismic impact on the physical structure of 
healthcare facilities mostly focused on two of these three aspects, that is: structural and non-
structural elements. The structural vulnerability has been identify by the WHO (2006) and  the 
Federal  Emergency  Management Agency (FEMA 2007) as depending on three factors: the level 
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to which the seismic  hazard  forces  have  been  addressed  in  the  structural  system,  the  
quality  of  the construction and the materials employed, and the architectural and structural 
shape of the building.  
Moreover, much research on structural and non-structural systems in hospitals regards  
specific physical components, specific seismic events, or specific regions. Questionnaires 
completed by the coordinators of disaster hospitals, security staff, facilities managers and the 
heads of major hospital departments, were used by Myrtle et al. (2005) to identify the non-
structural systems considered critical to the functionality of the hospital in different stages of an 
emergency. In a case study in Florence, Miniati & Iasio (2012) developed a system for the rapid 
evaluation of hospitals affected by the earthquake, including both structural and non-structural 
elements. Masi et al. (2012) carried out an analysis of the seismic risk level for hospitals in the 
%DVLOLFDWDUHJLRQ,WDO\WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHEXLOGLQJVWRFNRIWKHUHJLRQ¶VKRVSLWDOVDQG
the  expected  structural  and  non-structural performance under different levels of peak ground 
acceleration. Uma & Beattie (2010) identified the critical non-structural elements for hospital 
performance observing the performance of these elements in recent events and specifically in 
relation to the New Zealand code. DavenportµV ZRUN  IRFXVHG RQ WKH 1HZ =HDODQG¶V
building code, with regard to its specifications regarding the structural  and  non-structural  
design  for  seismic  hazards  over  time. 
As evident all these works deal with physical aspects also including non-structural 
components to evaluate the performance of the system by gathering information from past events 
of post-earthquake assessing. Excluding  the  above mentioned physical  impacts ± which are 
³REMHFWLYH´DQG³PHDVXUDEOH´± WKH³KXPDQ´DVSHFWDQGWKHLPSDFWRIGLVDVWHUVRQSDWLHQWVDQG
hospital personnel, despite their relevance for guaranteeing healthcare facilities, have been almost 
completely neglected or not included in a global assessment. 
Actually organizational aspects, in terms of preparedness of the staff and the impact that a 
disaster has on the hospital personnel and patients, have been the subject of many studies. The 
Institute of Medicine and the office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response were 
particularly concerned with the state of the Emergency Department during the emergency 
operations and the changes it undergoes during the critical phases. In particular, the Institute of 
Medicine (IoM 2006) identified some of the vulnerability-keys to individuals, which include: a 
lack of surge capacity, variable levels of emergency training and lack of adequate protection for 
hospitals and their staff from hazards (i.e. chemical and infectious agents that may be part of the 
disaster). Similarly, the office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR 
2013) underlined the crucial capacity that must be considered in the creation of an emergency 
plan. It includes: healthcare system preparedness, healthcare system recovery, emergency 
RSHUDWLRQ FRRUGLQDWLRQ IDWDOLW\ PDQDJHPHQW LQIRUPDWLRQ VKDULQJ PHGLFDO VXUJH UHVSRQGHU¶V
VDIHW\ DQG KHDOWK DQG YROXQWHHU¶V PDQDJHPHQW $ VRFLDO QHWZRUN DQDO\VLV ZKLFK PRGHOV WKH
coordination between the Emergency Departments of different hospitals was used by Hossain & 
Kit (2012) WRH[DPLQHWKHHIIHFWRIJURXSLQWHUDFWLRQRQSDWLHQWV¶WUHDWPHQW$PRGHORISDWLHQW
care including the transportation of patients to healthcare facilities and the response of these 
IDFLOLWLHV DIWHU WKH SDWLHQWV¶ DUULYDO ZDV SUHVHQWHG E\ Fawcett & Oliveira (2000). All these 
examples, however, assume that the hospital facilities are not affected by damages, resulting in 
partial or total loss of critical functions.  
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Recently many researchers have applied fault-tree analyses to characterise the risk of an 
individual facility losing functionality due to earthquake damage (Porter & Ramer 2012), or to 
SUHGLFWWKHRYHUDOOV\VWHP¶VUHVSRQVHWRDKXUULFDQH (Unanwa et al. 2000). Jacques et al. (2014) 
created a framework for assessing the loss of function of facilities conditioned on disaster 
impacts to different branches. 
These methodologies include models taken from the complex system theory such a reliability 
analysis (Setola 2007; Kuwata & Takada 2007; Yao 2000; Lupoi et al. 2008), from the input-
output analysis Leontief model (Haimes & Jiang 2001; Haimes, Horovitz, Lambert, Santos, Lian, 
et al. 2005; Haimes, Horovitz, Lambert, Santos, Crowther, et al. 2005), from the network flow 
modelling (Lee et al. 2003), and the dynamic simulation (Arboleda et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
together with numerical seismic analyses on buildings, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
has recently developed many guidelines concerning the rapid assessment of the seismic impact 
for hospitals in developing and developed countries.  
As shown by Ardagh et al. (2012) in their description of the 22 February 2011 earthquake in 
New Zealand that affected the Christchurch Hospital, in case of calamity there are many 
difficulties to face, included the interruption of utility systems (e.g. power and communication), 
damaged facilities (e.g. collapse of ambulance bay), fluctuating staff, and the fear of patients that 
the building would collapse. Accordingly to choose a method of analysis the main hurdle is the 
ability to combination all the features as well as the definition of a measurable parameter. 
2.2.2 Integrating approaches in assessing hospital resilience 
To portray a realistic and all-comprehensive behaviour of the system is a true challenge since 
there are only few methods able to assess the hospital vulnerability including the physical 
aspects, the structural and non-structural performance, the personnel systems and their impact on 
patient care. The main difference with respect to previous approaches is the definition of what 
has to be taken into account for hospitals: authors started to adopt a comprehensive outlook 
regarding the  functionality of hospitals in terms of performance by abandoning the separate 
analysis of vulnerable parts (structural, non-structural and organizational) in favour of more 
comprehensive assessments.  
An example is provided by the Hugo framework (WHO 2006, UN/ISDR 2005), which 
includes strategies and guidelines for mitigating the impact of disasters. The result of these 
guidelines is the Safe Hospital initiative, which offers a set of metrics for structural, non-
structural and administrative vulnerability of hospitals. Another procedure to assess these 
vulnerabilities has been provided by the World Health Organization (WHO 2006) by using the 
health facility vulnerability evaluation (HVE) that relies on the rapid qualitative assessment of 
the structural, non-structural and personnel aspects by field-specific experts. Although it is a 
unique form, the interconnections between physical and organizational aspects are extremely 
limited due to the non-disciplinary consulting during the post-event assessment. Yavari et al. 
(2010) proposed a metric for assessing post-disaster functionality on the base of four major 
interacting systems of hospitals: structural, non-structural, lifelines and personnel. Their 
framework accounts for all the combinations of damage to these four systems to assess the 
overall hospital functionality, but due to the lack of available data the authors did not include the 
personnel system in their case study. A complex combination of systems analysis and empirical 
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data from rapid seismic vulnerability assessment was associated by Miniati & Iasio (2012) to 
evaluate weaknesses in a hospital system. This analysis accounts for damage to structural and 
non-structural systems, as well as organizational factors (i.e. staffing levels, emergency plans, 
redundancies in equipment, etc.), but the model, based on experts opinions to establish 
interdependencies into the hospital system, is not validated dealing with historical events. 
McCabe et al. (2010) GHVFULEH WKH ³UHDG\ZLOOLQJ DQG DEOH´ IUDPHZRUNZKLFK DSSURDFKHV WKH
damage through its effects on the ability and willingness of providers to respond to an 
emergency; however, it does not take into account physical damage.  
Physical damages and loss of equipment certainly have a great impact on the functionality of 
the structure especially because they can cause the interruption of the normally provided service. 
However, the extent of the damage, as well as the service disruption, is difficult to predict and, 
consequently, to measure. It is necessary to formally link the two aspects (physical and 
organizational) in a model able to take into account this connection, comprehensive of systems 
and supplies damage, the impact on personnel and redundancies availability. The first integration 
RI ³RUJDQL]DWLRQDO UHVRXUFHV´ ZDV LQWURGXFHG DW WKH 0XOWLGLVFLSOLQDU\ &HQWUH IRU (DUWKTXDNH
Engineering Research (MCEER, Bruneau et al. 2003), and can be also conceptualized in four 
interrelated dimensions.  
Among the physical aspects, resourcefulness is defined as the capacity to identify problems, to 
establish priorities and to mobilize resources when there are conditions threatening to disrupt 
some elements, the system, or other units of analysis, applying material or human resources. 
Moreover, these aspects are underlined and better defined in two dimensions of the resilience: the 
organizational aspect and the social one. These two aspects can be combined to define some 
specifications and other interconnections with physical characteristics.  
2.2.3 Properties and dimensions of resilience 
Properties and dimensions of seismic resilience have an important role in the system definition 
and in the correct comprehension of the resilience.  
As described in the literature, the four main properties which govern the problem are:  
- robustness;  
- redundancy;  
- resourcefulness; 
- rapidity.  
 
These properties have different connotations depending on the reference system applied. It is 
easy to understand that different systems, having different natures, differ from each other as 
regards these properties; but even in systems of the same nature, i.e. healthcare facilities, these 
properties can play from case to case a very different role. For instance, a singular hospital differs 
very much from a hospital network. 
The first property, robustness, is the strength, or the ability of systems, elements, and other 
units of analysis to withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering degradation or 
loss of functionality. Redundancy can be defined as the property of elements, systems, or other 
units of analysis to be substitutable, i.e. capable of satisfying functional requirements in the event 
of disruption, degradation, or loss of functionality. Resourcefulness is the capacity to identify 
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problems, applying material and/or human resources in order to face problem. This property can 
be conceptualized as the ability to apply material (i.e., monetary, physical, technological, and 
informational) and human resources to meet established priorities and to achieve goals. Finally, 
the last property, i.e. rapidity, is the capacity to meet priorities and to achieve goals in a timely 
manner containing losses and avoiding future disruption.  
 
Figure 2.3 Properties of resilience: robustness, rapidity and resourcefulness. 
Moreover, resilience has been conceptualised as encompassing four interrelated dimensions:  
- technical;  
- organizational;  
- social;  
- economical. 
 
As Table 2.1 shows, these four dimensions (TOSE) refer to complete different single measures of 
performance. The first dimension, i.e. the technical one, refers to the ability of physical systems 
to display acceptable/desired levels of performance when subjected to seismic forces (due to an 
earthquake shock). The organizational dimension of resilience refers to the capacity of 
organizations to manage critical facilities. This dimension, in case of disaster, is strictly 
correlated to the others, because it leads to the achievement of a greater robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness and rapidity.  
The social dimension of resilience acts to reduce the consequences due to the losses in critical 
services. This dimension involves communities and governmental jurisdictions. The economic 
dimension works in a similar way, with the main aim of reducing both direct and indirect losses 
resulting from earthquakes. 
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Table 2.1 Seismic resilience dimensions in a single hospital 
Dimension/Property Technical Organizational Social Economic 
Robustness Building codes and 
construction procedures 
for new and retrofitted 
structures 
Emergency Operation 
Planning 
Social vulnerability 
and degree of 
community 
preparedness 
Extent of regional 
economic 
diversification 
Redundancy Capacity for technical 
substitutions and 
³ZRUN-DURXQG´ 
Alternate sites for 
managing disaster 
operations 
Availability of 
housing options for 
disaster victims 
Ability to substitute 
and conserve needed 
inputs 
Resourcefulness Availability of 
equipment and 
materials for restoration 
and repair 
Capacity to improvise, 
innovate and expand 
operations 
Capacity to address 
human needs 
Business and industry 
capacity to improvise 
Rapidity System downtime, 
restoration time 
Time between impact 
and early recovery  
Times to restore 
lifeline services 
Time to regain 
capacity, last revenue 
 
2.3 Seismic resilience in healthcare facilities: metrics 
In 2007, Bruneau & Reinhorn, explored the operational and physical resilience of acute care 
facilities, without recognizing a simple engineering unit for their key-dimension, but basing their 
approach on the measure Q(t). This measure is assumed to vary with time, and it is defined as 
representative of the quality of an essential system in the community. The performance can 
change in a range from 100 to 0 (in percentage), where 100% represents no degradation in 
service and 0% means no service available. If an earthquake strikes at the time t0, the measure 
Q(t) can be affected by reduction; restoration of the system is expected to occur over time, until 
time t1, when the measure Q(t) is achieved again.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Measure of seismic resilience – conceptual definition 
Analytically Q(t) is a non-stationary stochastic process and each part is a piecewise continuous 
function. Resilience can be measured by the size of the expected degradation in quality 
(probability of failure) over time (time to recovery). The return to 100% pre-event level may 
depend on several factors. These complexities must be taken into account depending on the 
specific system. According to the general definition by Bruneau et al. (2003), resilience can be 
expressed mathematically as shown in (Eq.2. 1: 
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 (Eq.2. 1) 
The measure of the quality of the service is expressed through a loss function expressed as a 
function of the earthquake intensity and the recovery time. Losses are divided in two groups: 
structural losses and non-structural losses. The recovery process is oversimplified by using 
recovery functions that can fit the more accurate results obtained with the model by Miles & 
Chang (2006). The result is a complicated Multidimensional Performance Limit Threshold 
(MPLT) that aims at providing a quantitative definition of resilience in a rational way on the base 
of an analytical function that may fit both technical and organization aspects. The latter are, 
however, considered as a function of the conceptual community recovery model without any link 
with the punctual physical losses, or with direct association with the studied facility. The MPLT 
is represented by the equation in (Eq.2. 2, where ݎ௜݈݅݉ is the dependent response threshold 
parameter (deformation, force, velocity, etc.) that is correlated with damage, while ݎ௜݈݅݉ǡ Ͳ is the 
independent capacity threshold parameter and Ni represent the interaction factors determining the 
shape of the n-dimensional surface: 
 
ܮሺݎ௟௜௠ሻ෍൬
ݎ௜݈݅݉
ݎ௜݈݅݉ǡ Ͳ
൰
ே೔
െ ͳǡ
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 (Eq.2. 2) 
This model can be used to determine the fragility curve of a single non-structural component, or 
to obtain the overall fragility curve for the entire building including its non-structural 
components. This function allows the inclusion of diơerent mechanical response parameters 
(force, displacement, velocity, accelerations, etc.) and permit to combine them in a unique 
fragility curve. The organizational aspects are not directly included in the function: they are 
intrinsically considered by the recovery community model.  
Later, following the same approach, Bruneau & Reinhorn (2007) identified fragility curves 
distinguishing different possible cases. This further research better underlines the importance of 
non-structural components into a resilience framework; a flow chart of the procedure to achieve 
seismic resilience for a single hospital is defined, with respect to the physical dimension level, in 
Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5 Flow chart regarding the procedure to achieve seismic resilience for a single hospital (Bruneau M. and 
Reinhorn A., 2007) 
Until now a real link between physical and organizational aspects has been missing in the 
resilience metric, as well as the definition of the quality of the service provided by the system. 
$ ILUVW SXQFWXDO GHILQLWLRQ RI ³IXQFWLRQDOLW\ RI WKH KRVSLWDO´ ZDV SURSRVHG in 2009 by 
Cimellaro et al. who described it as the quality of service (QS) obtained  by summing up the 
partial functionalities within the facility. The qualitative functionality takes into account a new 
parameter, that is, the waiting time of patients (see par. 3.1.1 for more details), and a quantitative 
functionality which corresponds to a function of the losses, defined as the total number of 
patients being not treated vs. the total number of care requiring patients. The work is based on the 
same flow chart displayed in Figure 2.5, using socio-economics information in order to generate 
the knowledge base for the organizational dimension and to translate the functionality of the 
system into operational consequences to mathematically obtain the recovery function.  
This work is focused on the non-structural components, which are a possible cause of  
resilience reduction. The adopted approach assumes a unique factor (the monetary one) to be 
taken into account among all the quantities involved in the seismic performance. 
A meta-model, i.e. an hybrid simulation combined with analytical modelling, is also 
introduced (Cimellaro et al. 2009) as being able to describe the dynamic nature of the hospital. In 
this kind of model, which uses a double exponential function (Paul et al. 2006), the relevant 
parameters are:
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- n (number of beds);
- OR (number of Operating Rooms); 
- and E (descriptive of the efficiency of the hospital). 
 
This last parameter is given by the ratio between the number of surgeries per OR in a day. This 
parameter is not descriptive of the dynamic organizational system of the hospital when an event 
occurs. As matter of fact the work relies on the assumption that the organizational behaviour of 
the hospital is not affected by potential physical structural damages.  
In 2010 a performed-based meta-model for healthcare facilities was developed (Cimellaro et 
al. 2010) the resilience metric is clearly divided between physical and organizational aspects, re-
evoking the MCEER approach (as illustrated in Figure 2.6); the qualitative functionality of the 
structure is still divided from the quantitative one.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 Resilience framework according to the MCEER approach 
7KHOLQNEHWZHHQWKHVHWZR³ILHOGV´LVUHSUHVHQWHGE\³SHQDOW\IDFWRUV´3)V that are given for 
each structural and non-structural component by the linear combination of the conditional 
probabilities to have certain levels of damage. The total penalty factor affecting all the 
organizational parameters of the hospital results from a linear combination of the individual PFs 
using weight factors obtained as the ratio between the cost of each component and the overall 
cost of the building. 
 
Another approach to translate empirical data into loss functionality and to ultimately quantify the 
hospital resilience was suggested by Jacques et al. (2014). This metric uses a fault tree analysis 
based on three main contributing factors that represent the overall multidisciplinary system: staff, 
Seismic resilience of hospitals   
 
24 
structure and stuff. This model introduces a new resilience metric based on the functionality of 
these facilities. The fault tree analysis of the hospital is composed of these sub-systems; each 
branch is associated with a sub-system, representing a part of the total loss. The branches 
associated with staff include the availability of medical staff, support staff, and backup plans for 
staffing during an emergency. The branches associated with structure account for damage to all 
physical spaces and support infrastructures associated with critical hospital services. Power, 
water, inpatients wards, means of egress, etc. below of this branch. To conclude the framework, 
the branches associated with stuff account for the loss of supplies and damage to equipment.  
Accordingly the non-VWUXFWXUDO FRPSRQHQWV DUH LQFOXGHG ERWK LQ WKH ³DUFKLWHFWXUDO RQH
FRPSRQHQWV´RIWKHstructure and in the staff branches. Within the fault tree to assess the partial 
or complete loss of function, three different kinds of event are distinguished: top events, basic 
events, and intermediate events.  
By definition these events have a different impact on the fault tree and they also include 
distinct elements.  
Top events are associated with the complete loss of life-saving (or emergency) surgery inside 
the hospital, as well as with the failure or reduction of critical services, like emergency 
department, surgery, intensive care unit, in-patient ward, obstetric ward, laundry, kitchen, etc. IN 
case of top events the failure regards all three aspects, i.e. staff, structure, and stuff. Intermediate 
events are system-states that contribute to the top-level event, for instance: the failure of utility 
infrastructure, damage to surgical wards, loss of supplies. Basic events are the lowest level 
events, all matching the data collected using the field study surveys. They include structural and 
non-structural damages, geotechnical failure, damage to municipal water, wastewater, power and 
communications systems, as well as damage to their backup systems, damage to or loss of 
supplies and equipment, and failure to report by hospital staff (Jacques et al. 2014). For analysing 
basic events, scholars use field data, determining all fault trees as deterministic like the 
propagation of populated field data. In order to obtain the probability of losing functionality of 
hospital services, the probability of failure for basic events should be used, and the propagation to 
the tree branches should be considered.  
The loss of hospital functionality is captured as a weighted sum of the loss of critical hospital 
services, with the resilience metric described by the (Eq.2. 3, and defining ܳ௙ሺݐሻ as the function-
based metric where n is the total number of functions considered, wi is the weighting term 
representing the importance of function i, Li is the loss of function i (ranging from 0-RU³QR
ORVV´ WR ³WRWDO ORVV´ DQG Ri is the redistribution of function i (ranging from 0- RU ³QR
UHGLVWULEXWLRQRIKRVSLWDOIXQFWLRQV´WR³FRPSOHWHUHGLVWULEXWLRQRIKRVSLWDOIXQFWLRQV´ 
 
 ܳ௙ሺݐሻ ൌ
σ௡ݓ௜ሺͳ െ ൫ͳ െ ܴ௜ሺݐሻ൯ܮ௜ሺݐሻሻ
σ௡ݓ௜
 (Eq.2. 3) 
 
The term Qf(t) addresses the quality of care by examining the loss and redistribution of n critical 
clinical and support services in a hospital.  
 
The fault tree analysis proposed Jacques et al. (2014) is compatible with the mathematical 
definition by Bruneau et al. (2003) proposing to measure the variation in hospital functionality 
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over time. These studies demonstrate how the four elements of resilience can be updated by 
earthquake reconnaissance data collected with survey tools designed by the authors and available 
as an appendix in (Mitrani-Reiser et al. 2012a). It is worth to note the relevance that properties 
and dimensions have into the resilience metric, whichever methodology is applied. All the 
components of resilience must be included into the metric and each of them has an irreplaceable 
role. Therefore to measure resilience a multi-disciplinary approach is needed: this was stressed, 
indeed, by FEMA (2007) as a necessity in U.S. design guidelines for improving the safety of 
hospitals. No resilience metric is definitely able to capture the complex interaction of all the 
important systems constituting a functioning hospital. On the one hand, difficulties come from 
lack (or accuracy) of data from past earthquakes as well as from the impossibility to compare or 
complete the proposed metrics. On the other hand, the lack of direct links between the physical 
damages and the personnel aspects results in discrepancies between the methodologies applied.  
The need to provide a unique resilience measure, i.e. a comprehensive methodology able to 
include all the aspects which are normally studied individually and suitable for quantifying the 
resilience of healthcare facilities/systems, cannot be neglected by researchers. Notwithstanding 
the significant progress made on seismic performance assessment of hospitals, more research is 
needed to fully understand relationships adaptable to predictive purposes in healthcare systems in 
various scenarios, and in the coupling between physical damages, non-structural performance, 
organizational response and their effect on loss of function. 
Despite the numerous efforts to quantify seismic resilience with its parameters, there is not 
enough information regarding the modelling and the measure of the organizational aspects of 
resilience. Indeed, an organizational resilience model is needed, that can be able to determine the 
response of the community to hazardous events, and evaluate the real loss in terms of healthy 
population and quality of care provided. Direct links between the two aspects are necessary, and 
a particular attention should be paid to the non-structural components whose performance can 
compromise the global resilience of the hospital system as a whole. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology proposed in the study 
This section proposes a methodology to estimate the resilience associated with the closure 
(temporary or permanent) of different rooms. This methodology highlights the significance of an 
holistic procedure taking into account the role of all the components of the hospital in its whole 
functionality, mainly using the comparison between structural and non-structural fragility curves 
to assess different cases. Moreover, a road map to identify the necessary steps to evaluate the 
resilience of healthcare facilities is presented as a guide-line. Connections between structural 
aspects and organizational aspects are identified in the closure of the emergency rooms, and 
estimated with a waiting time curve, representing the functionality parameter for the hospital. 
The changes displayed by the resilience curve in different segment are attributed to several 
characteristics of the non-structural failures and to the number of the elements involved, as well 
as their extension and redundancy.  
This framework to quantify resilience can also help in the decision process for providing 
effective seismic mitigation, or the planning process to efficiently guide response and recovery. It 
also shows how the recognized components of resilience, such as fragility, performance limits, 
response and their interconnections, may substantially alter the response of the physical system. 
The latter is translated into a more suitable changing organizational response, which can 
effectively modify its capacity enhancements. 
3.1 Tools used in the study 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are currently no effective methods to adequately control 
complex systems like hospitals, also leading to the estimation of their resilience. Many different 
approaches can be followed, but none of them can be really applied, since they require 
instruments and tools which are not, or only partially, available. Some of them though permitting 
to take into account the complexity of the organization system are not sufficiently reliable once 
applied to real data; other procedures, which fit better the existent data,  does not allow a proper 
and adequate description of the complexity of hospital systems.  
In what follows all the tools needed for a method able to estimate resilience for the case study 
have been applied. Before determining the tools, however, some assumptions must be made 
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about the target of the analysis. First of all, the vertical axis of the resilience curve of an hospital 
must be defined. 
Following Bruneau et al. (2003), the methodology uses a quantifiable idea of functionality, 
H[SUHVVHGE\DPDWKHPDWLFDOIXQFWLRQ7RDQDO\WLFDOO\³PHDVXUH´WKHIXQFWLRQDOLW\DPHDVXUDEOH
quantity must be found which is suitable to represent the hospital functionality. The adequacy of 
the selected quantity must be checked at each step of the methodology. 
It is worth to note that the choice of the quantity assumed as the efficiency measure of the 
system necessarily affects the results of the analysis: therefore such a preliminary choice must be 
related to the goal of the research. 
In this work the estimation of the seismic resilience of the hospital aims at providing 
improvements and advantages for the people working into the hospital, for the hospital 
management and for the medical staff. Even if the intermediate stages of the methodology deal 
with engineering quantities, the final output must be as much as possible oriented towards the last 
operators.  
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the problem multiple tools with different variables, often 
not comparable with each other, and numerous steps are needed. The final goal of this research is 
to take into account all the essential aspects (according to the technical literature) and to link 
them into a cause-effect chain, in order to measure the global hospital functionality by means of a 
unique measurable quantity that can comprehended and used even outside the engineering field. 
Specifically, the selected tools used for the current work are i) the waiting time to measure the 
hospital functionality, ii) the fragility curves to measure the performance of structural and non-
structural components, and iii) the recovery time probability curves to measure the effects of the 
physical system.  
3.1.1 The waiting time  
The key issue to determine the resilience of a system is to ³SHULPHWHU´WKHSUREOHPWRIDFHDQGWR
find a parameter to measure it. Even for hospitals it is necessary to find a single parameter to use. 
The complexity of defining the functionality of a hospital, where multiple aspects are involved, 
requires the parameter ± as an expression of the functionality of the hospital - to be unique and 
representative of the entire process of assessment. As for a healthcare system the parameter to be 
used necessarily concerns the final actors of the entire system, say, the patients. 
Many studies define the functionality in terms of service quality. This choice is supported 
even by common sense since the hospital functionality is a function of the service quality. 
Therefore the quality of the service is the main parameter for describing the hospital 
functionality: if a measure of service quality is found, it can be assumed as reliable to measure 
the functionality of the healthcare facility. Till now much research  has been dedicated to identify 
a measurable parameter for the quality of the service. The connection between quality of service 
and functionality has been largely investigated in the technical literature (McCarthy et al.,2000; 
Maxwell, 1984) where even the asset of the hospital buildings is driven by the goal to maximize 
the functionality. 
According to Vieth & Rhodes (2006), the quality of care is affected by the level of crowding 
in the emergency department, which is directly related to the waiting time (WT).  
CHAPTER 3 Methodology proposed in the study 
   
29 
The waiting time (henceforth, WT) is defined as the time patients spend into the emergency 
department before receiving the first medical treatment. The same  parameter is chosen by 
McCarthy et al. (2000) as an indicator of the quality of the service. Furthermore, among the many 
factors guaranteeing hospital functionality, considering both technical and organizational aspects, 
the waiting time represents one of the most comprehensive factors since it also constitutes a good 
indicator for both normal and emergency conditions. In normal condition, indeed, this key-factor 
allows to measure the satisfaction of the patients (Thompson et al. 1995; 1996), including those 
housed in the hospital (Richards et al. 2006).  
Di Bartolomeo et al. (2007) choose the pre-hospital time (PT) and the emergency department 
disposition time (EDt) as possible process indicators of trauma care, considering the time to 
receive medical care as an essential component of the survival chain. 
Besides, WT also represents the main parameter to evaluate the response of the hospital 
during hazardous event operating conditions (Cimellaro et al. 2010), because in an emergency 
such a response is directly correlated to the number of (treated) outpatients.  
Cimellaro, Reinhorn and Bruneau (Cimellaro et al. 2010) define the hospital functionality as 
the combination of the qualitative functionality related to the quality of the service (QS) and the 
quantitative functionality related to the losses in the health population.  
More specifically, the QS is described through a linear combination of two functions, ܳொௌǡଵሺݐሻ 
and ܳொௌǡଶሺݐሻ, shown in equations (Eq.3. 1 and (Eq.3. 2  in function of the waiting time of 
patients:  
 
 
ܳொௌଵሺݐሻ ൌ
݉ܽݔ ቀ൫ܹ ௖ܶ௥௜௧ െܹ ሺܶ௧ሻ൯ǡ Ͳቁ
ܹ ௖ܶ௥௜௧
 ǡ ݂݅ɉ ൑ ɉ 
 
(Eq.3. 1) 
 
ܳொௌଶሺݐሻ ൌ
ܹ ௖ܶ௥௜௧
݉ܽݔሺܹ ௖ܶ௥௜௧ǡܹ ሺܶ௧ሻሻ
 ǡ ݂݅ɉ ൐ ߣ (Eq.3. 2) 
In this procedure the authors divide the waiting time (WT) from the critical waiting time (WTcrit) 
DWWKHKRVSLWDOLQVDWXUDWHGFRQGLWLRQVZKHQȜDUULYDOUDWHRISDWLHQWVDWWKHKRVSLWDOLVequal to 
Ȝu (the critical arrival rate of patients, when the hospital reaches its saturated conditions). 
Accordingly the quantitative functionality of the hospital is defined as a function of the patients 
being treated and not as a function of the waiting time.  
Moreover, during an emergency phase, the waiting time is an essential factor for the survival 
organization and the consequent decisions to make: not only the organization of a single hospital, 
but also that of the entire survival chain in the hospital network,  rely on the number of available 
beds for injured patients. Therefore, in order to provide an higher availability of treatments and a 
short waiting time all the emergency procedures inside the single healthcare structure must be 
activated in terms of addition resources and beds (involving the premature discharge of those 
patients having enough stable conditions). Besides, as the unique value of the quality of the 
system, the waiting time is influenced by various other factors that add to it additional intrinsic 
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meanings. These factors are: hospital staffing characteristics, arrival time, gender, age, triage 
category etc.  
 
In this work the notion of functionality is related to the quality of the service, that is directly 
connected to the waiting time of patients, both in normal and in emergency situations. This is a 
suitable choice to consider the hospital both in normal scenarios and in emergency phases. Even 
when the emergency is due to a seismic event and to the consequent arrival rate (see Chapter 4) 
WT represents an effective measure of the system functionality since a strict relationship between 
entries and waiting time can be found.  
 
As mentioned above, WT is the parameter used for the evaluation of the quality of the healthcare 
system, which in turn is the characteristic used to express the functionality of a hospital. The 
discrete event simulation model allows to register the waiting time experienced by patients in 
different circumstances and scenarios (for more details see the following paragraphs).  
In the wide literature on the subject, WT is defined as the time spent by patients in the 
emergency room (ER) before receiving care; more specifically, according to the Italian medical 
dispositions, WT is the time patients wait from the acceptance to the triage-desk until they 
receive first-aid treatments (this applies to all categories of patients, i.e. all colour codes, see 
Ch.4) . First-aid treatments can be provided by doctors and nurses: if a major code patient cannot 
wait XQWLOWKHGRFWRU¶VDUULYDOWKHQXUVHFDQEHUHTXLUHGWRVWDELOL]HKLVKHUYLWDOSDUDPHWHUV  
'XULQJ WKH VLPXODWLRQ IRU DQ\ FDVHVFHQDULR:7 VWDUWV IURP WKH SDWLHQW¶V DUULYDO LQWR WKH
emergency department (ED) without receiving the colour from the triage. This choice is due to 
two main facts: the a priori colour-code assignment (following the statistical trend calculated 
from the data provided by the hospital database) of the model and the lack of triage in case of an 
emergency scenario. As matter of fact, during an emergency phase, the triage is not performed 
inside the emergency department: it is carried out by another special section (that is activated 
only during emergencies) in order to filter out patients and save time. Output data from the 
organizational model are always estimated in terms of WT. When the scenario changes, WT 
decreases or increases depending on the environmental changes (in terms of resources, arrival 
rate, closure of rooms, etc.). WT data are the last input included in the methodology, and are 
representative of all changes occurring in the performed model (scenario), which are derived 
from: probability functions, a semi-probabilistic failure/collapse result from non-structural 
components, downtimes hypothesis and choices of temporary/permanently closure of the 
physical system. In conclusion, WT results to be an adequate measure of the system functionality 
as it is intrinsically representative of all the previous steps of the method.  
3.1.2 Fragility curves 
Fragility curves (Fragility Curves, FC) have been historically defined as representative 
instruments of cumulative distribution functions. Fragility curves are therefore the expressions of 
probabilities that in principle, can be directly obtained from laboratory tests, analytical studies 
entailing simulations, and post-disaster observations of damage.  
A fragility curve describes the probability of reaching or exceeding a limit state at a specified 
level of excitation (Badillo-Almarez et al. 2007). A fragility function can be defined as the 
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cumulative distribution function of the capacity of an asset to resist an undesirable limit state. 
Capacity (C) is measured in terms of the degree of environment excitation at which the asset 
exceeds the undesirable limit state. For example, a fragility function could express the uncertain 
level of shaking that a building can tolerate before it collapses. The chance that it collapses at a 
given level of shaking is the same as the probability that its strength is less than that level of 
shaking.  
In other words, a fragility curve defines the conditional probability of the seismic demand (D) 
placed upon the structure exceeding its capacity (C) for a given level of Engineering Demand 
Parameters (EDP)3. In principle, the development of fragility curves would require the synergistic 
use of the following issues: professional judgment, quasi-static analysis, damage data associated 
with past earthquakes or testing, and numerical simulations of the seismic response. In seismic 
terms, fragility curves indicate the probability for a certain system, subject to an assigned input 
(see Ch.4  for more details), to exceed a given limit state.  
3.2 Evaluation of building response by accounting for structural and 
non-structural components 
Structural fragility curves can be built for different limit states (indicating the probability of 
exceeding the specific thresholds) expressed in terms of a selected parameter.  
Fragility curves can be generated for both structural and non-structural elements, using  
different approaches. In particular, non-structural fragility curves consist of acceleration-sensitive 
components and drift sensitive components. Accordingly the structural and the non-structural 
acceleration/drift sensitive elements can be assessed separately using their respective fragility 
curves. It is worth to note that only the elements being sensitive to the same parameter can be 
compared, say acceleration or drift.  
Different approaches can be adopted, depending on the way the fragility curves are defined 
and constructed. Cimellaro et al E GHYHORSHG ³PXOWLGLPHQVLRQDO´ IUDJLOLW\ FXUYHV E\
including different performance parameters in the same analysis. This approach is very smart and 
synthetic, but it does not lead to an easy comprehension of the role of each parameter in the 
global performance of the system.  
This work, makes use of single-parameter fragility curves in order to simplify the process. As 
a consequence only the elements which are known can be really assessed and compared ± in 
terms of performance ± with the structure. However, a knowledge implementation about non-
structural elements and their fragility evaluation is needed since data are currently missing in this 
respect. 7KH SUHVHQWHG PHWKRGRORJ\ LV YHU\ VLPSOH DQG FRQVWLWXWHV D NLQG RI ³SLRQHHULQJ´
approach: although relying on the elastic behaviour of the system, it can be easily implemented in 
case further data are available. This approach permits an easy comparison of the performance 
                                                 
3 Engineering Demand Parameters (EDPs) are structural response quantities that can be used to predict 
damage to structural and non-structural components and systems. Usually for expressing the Demand (D) 
are used the force, deformation, or other degree of loading to which the asset is subjected: an example is 
the peak ground acceleration in an earthquake. For defining the Capacity (C), instead, are used variables 
such as drift, acceleration, or other descriptive measures.  
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displayed by different components and reveals to be suitable for the constant innovation of 
architectural elements. Thanks to this procedure the road map for each component can be drawn 
and even modified if, as it is often the case, some changes occur in the setting of the system.  
3.2.1 Seismic fragility 
In performance-based seismic design, the overcoming of the performance limits related to each 
limit state indicates a not-acceptable condition according to the safety requirements stated by the 
Code. 
If the intensity of the ground motion is expressed as a single variable (e.g. the peak ground 
acceleration or the mapped maximum earthquake spectral acceleration at short periods, etc.), a 
seismic fragility curve is defined as the conditional probability of failure expressed as a function 
of the ground motion intensity (Der Kiureghian 2005). Ideally, the assessment of the fragility 
curves should employ as much objective information as possible. Actually, this cognitive process 
is affected by many uncertainties arising from imperfections in the mathematical models, from 
measurement errors, and from the finite size of observed samples. 
Fragility curves can be generated in an empirical or analytical way. Empirical fragility curves 
can be developed by using collected data about the structure (for instance, regarding  previous 
earthquakes) or experimental data obtained from laboratory tests. Analytical fragility curves can 
be developed with the use of statistical data obtained by applying accurate mathematical models 
that represent certain physical phenomena.  
Fragility curves can be used to present both structural and non-structural components, systems, or 
buildings. For this reason, fragility curves are used as one of the main tools in the presented 
methodology: they allow to make comparisons between two elements having different properties, 
roles and response parameters.  
The relationship between structural and non-structural fragility curves is the first step of the 
method-chain and represents the first information regarding the physical system which is needed 
for assessing the final waiting time of patients. The use of fragility curves in the current 
procedure introduces a probability approach in the deterministic fault tree analysis presented by 
Jacques C. C. et al. (2013). 
3.2.2 Comparing fragility curves 
Fragility curves are conceived as instruments related to the overall capacity and demand for all 
the elements of the building; as a consequence, they collect a number of data involving all the 
systems the hospital consists of. 
First, there needs to be full awareness of available data. It may be, for instance, that for 
different components, be they structural or not, there is data available which refers to different 
seismic input intensities. The assumed seismic input must be carefully calculated and coherently 
detected for all the elements evaluated at a time, i.e. simultaneously taken into account.  
Another important factor is the position of the non-structural element in the structure: the 
position strongly affects the acceleration/drift experienced by the element. Usually the difference 
between the ground floor response spectrum and that displayed by another floor cannot be 
neglected. Accordingly, to compare two fragility curves it is necessary having the same x axis by 
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considering the peak floor acceleration (PFA) instead of the classic peak ground acceleration 
(PGA). 
3.2.3 Recovery time probability curves 
Recovery time probability curves (Recovery Time Probability Curve, RTPC) have a fundamental 
role in the proposed methodology. They show the time needed to restore the represented element, 
giving important information about the downtimes the structure suffers from after a failure or 
damage.  
Fragility curves and recovery time probability curves need to be correlated: unfortunately this 
correlation crucially relies on experience. According to Yao & Tu (2012) whose work refers to 
the response of Taiwan hospitals during the Chi-Chi earthquake, the correlation between the 
recovery time probability curve and the fragility curve of an element is possible if they both are 
expressed in terms of Time (days) versus PGA (g). This is shown in Figure 3.1: 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 Fragility Curve and associated Recovery Time Probability Curve of the same element (Yao and  Tu,  2011). 
<DRDQG7X¶VSURSRVDOUHOLHVRQWKHKRVSLWDO¶VUHSRUWVDIWHUWKHshock, i.e. downtime losses and 
their causes. Recovery time probability curves are derived mathematically and are not related to a 
specific factor: they depend on the available data; these data, however, are fundamental for future 
research developments.  
A similar database on fragility curves, and consequently on recovery time probability curves, 
does not exist in Italy. To fill this gap a range of time, grouped in 12 hours, can be hypothesized 
as the downtime (DTs) during an emergency concerning the non-structural fragility curves. The 
range time of the supposed downtimes are specifically described in Ch. 4, where different groups 
of DTs are used to simulate damages and failures like closures. If empirical data are missing, the 
downtime must be hypothesized. Recent experience has shown that dysfunctions to non-
structural components usually cannot be solved within the first 12 hours after the event. For 
instance, the prompt intervention of operators, due to difficulties to reach the affected area, the 
complications related to other non-structural components failures and their interconnections, is 
rare. In this work, for the downtime ranges classification, the possibility to represent non-
structural components downtime as the sum of single DTs related to all the possible non-
structural component-failures which can occur in a single room is suggested.  In effect, due to the 
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impossibility to solve all failures at the same time it is possible to assume the sum of the 
downtimes associated to non-structural failures, considering it as the worst case. The same 
procedure was adopted by Yao & Tu (2012), more details on downtime ranges are described in  
Ch.4. 
3.3 The resilience evaluation 
Each aspect of a hospital system (structural building components, non-structural components and 
hospital personnel) should be assessed as a part of the overall system. The main challenge for a 
resilience metric is to conceptualise a healthcare facility that accurately represents components 
and subsystems interdependencies, component and subcomponent failures, associated losses and 
consequences for the organizational system. To connect all these elements, a unique value 
representing the functionality of the system must be assumed.  
The method presented in this chapter focuses on the fragility curves of structural and non-
structural components: the comparison of these curves permits to establish which are the most 
relevant elements able to decrease the associated resilience curves by evaluating the number of 
emergency rooms closed after a shock. After having adopted a flow chart (cf. the following 
paragraphs) and made working hypotheses regarding the interaction between structural and non-
structural components (Bruneau & Reinhorn 2007), the missed link between physical resilience 
and organizational resilience is defined. Using the described tools, it is possible to fill the gap 
between physical dimension and organizational dimension (see Figure 2.3) and to better define 
the interaction between fragility analysis and organizational model, symbolized by penalty 
IDFWRUVFI0&((5DSSURDFKDQG&LPHOODUR¶VDSSOLFDWLRQ 
The proposed methodology allows to include all the aspects, be they technical and 
organizational, taken into account in the literature, and to directly connect them in a cause-effect 
chain. Following this procedure the organizational output data derived from scenarios defined by 
technical aspects can be directly linked to the process and be assessed by a statistical tool (cf. Ch. 
4) associated with the data collected in the statistical database of the hospital.  
Accordingly the data associated with a realistic period have been combined with the 
information resulting from face-to-face interviews with the hospital personnel and the 
organizational aspects have been statistically assessed. It is worth to emphasize that the 
measurement of the waiting time is intrinsically affected by possible technical causes 
representing a threat during an earthquake.. 
Choosing the mathematical application by Bruneau et al. (2003) where the waiting time is 
assumed as the measure of the system functionality, a logical path/route characterised by a cause-
effect chain is defined. 
In a sense it can be said that this methodology takes inspiration from the fault tree analysis 
suggested by Jacque et al. (2013) as a consequence of its cascade process, where the basic 
elements (cf.  par. 2.3) propagate their effects to the flow chart and only one element can threaten 
a total failure of the functionality of the hospital; in addition, this method makes a distinction 
between several levels of elements. In particular, it aims at adopting the best aspects from the two 
main procedures available in the literature, also simplifying the mathematical model (deriving 
from the multi-dimensional performance limit state threshold - MPLT), using fragility curves in 
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order to have an accessible tool, and expressing the results in terms of waiting time, which is the 
common denominator within a healthcare facility.  
With respect to the four properties described by Bruneau (2003), this methodology takes into 
account: i) robustness, i.e. capacities and demands of structural and non-structural components, 
evaluated through fragility curves and considered in the organizational model as opened/closed 
rooms; ii) redundancy, i.e. the possibility to count on redundant elements; iii) resourcefulness, 
i.e. hospital personnel and recovery capacity (beds, rooms, transferability of patients, etc.), and 
iv) rapidity, i.e. the time needed to restore the system assessing the waiting time acceptable 
threshold during the simulations.  
Assembling properties and dimensions of seismic resilience, as shown in  Table 2.1 the 
resilience metric proposed not only explores the technical and the organizational dimensions, but 
also the above mentioned four properties and, in addition, considers the social dimension in 
relation to robustness, due to the method used for the seismic arrival rate (cf. Ch. 4). The 
economic dimension, which is left aside in this work, can be easily added in further 
improvements.  
A schematic flow chart of the methodology is illustrated step by step in Figure 3. 2 . 
 
 
Figure 3. 2 A step by step outline of the proposed procedure 
Fragility curves of structural and non-structural components, associated with their recovery 
probability curves and resilience curves are assessed in order to hypothesize the consequences on 
the physical system (in terms of closed/opened rooms). Thanks to the different system responses, 
waiting time curves are derived for each patient entering the hospital. Then resilience is definitely 
evaluated.  
In this way the organizational response of the system results from the combination of 
structural and non-structural resilience. This technique allows the estimation of the organizational 
operations of a hospital as a direct result of the physical size of the (structural and non-
structural)elements. Accordingly the resilience quantification is generalised from the physical 
dimension level to the organizational dimension level by translating the physical system 
resilience into operational consequences. For convenience, the all methodology is schematically 
represented in the following figure, where the main steps are symbolized throw shapes and 
captions, described below. During the explanation of the methodology, the same symbols will be 
defined. 
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Figure 3. 3 Flow chart of the methodology, schematically represented.  
 
A first step towards the above objectives is the definition and quantification of engineering 
performance and related resilience. As illustrated in Figure 3. 4 , and represented in Figure 3. 3 
with the  different levels of integrity can be assumed as acceptable thresholds in a building. 
In general, three limit states are defined:  
 
- Serviceability limit state;  
 
- Damage limit state;  
 
- Life Safeguard Limit State/Collapse Limit State;  
 
Names and associated return periods (TR) of the limit states are slightly different from code to 
code depending on the country. Therefore a connection/association with the return period years 
and associated peak ground acceleration is indispensable. In general, the first limit state is 
identified as the serviceability, which must guarantee the full functionality of the service. After 
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the damage limit state, as far as this study concerns, medical service is no longer guaranteed. 
Therefore, in this context, the relevant thresholds are the first two. A different structural fragility 
curve can be associated to each limit state, and a consequent resilience curve can be derived (see 
Figure 3. 4 ). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 4 Structural fragility curves associated with different limit states 
 
3.3.1 Serviceability and damage limit state VS non-structural components 
The first case presented here is the linear-elastic response of structural elements (cf. Figure 3. 5). 
When the response of the structure does not reach the fragility curve associated to the 
serviceability limit state, no damages occur to the structure. The serviceability limit state 
threshold is identified to include the non-structural elements behaviour that has not been 
identified yet in the international codes; therefore, an evaluation of non-structural components is 
always necessary.  
An effective method to account for non-structural components is to represent their 
performance by means of  fragility curves. In most cases they are built for the collapse limit and 
do not have a damage limit to be considered. Recent earthquakes have shown that healthcare 
facilities are usually closed even in case no structural damage has occurred. In effect, the collapse 
of non-structural components can occur at accelerations or drifts (depending on the EDP) 
differing from the threshold of non-linear elastic structural response. As a consequence it is 
extremely important to not underestimate their performance. 
 
1 
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Figure 3. 5 Area of the structural linear response before the Serviceability Limit State 
 
A comparison between structural and non-structural fragility curves is necessary to understand 
the behaviour of the entire system. Generally speaking, the structural fragility curves vary 
depending on the investigated limit state; on the contrary, the fragility curves regarding non-
structural components are fixed. 
In the case shown in Figure 3. 6 , the comparison is made with reference to a singular 
structural limit state and different non-structural fragility curves. Comparing the structural 
fragility curve associated with the serviceability limit state, the non-structural components 
resilience with a linear-elastic structural response is represented. 
In the first case (a) the two fragility curves do not cross each other and the non-structural one 
(indexed by a continuous line) is shifted to the right of the structural fragility curve (indexed by a 
traced line). The organizational aspects are not subject to modifications and the resilience 
fragility curve is still linear: no loss of functionality is registered. It is possible to assume the 
structural fragility curve as a good threshold for describing the full operational condition.  
In case (b) the two fragility curves cross at one point, corresponding to a parameter 
(acceleration or drift), beyond which a non-structural damage/collapse occurs before the 
structural threshold corresponding to the serviceability limit state. It is necessary to verify, fixing 
a referring PGA, the downtime associated to the corresponding probability of failure/exceeding. 
In this case a punctual assessment is needed (for more details see the next paragraph): thereafter 
the resilience organizational aspect will be modified for the determined non-structural loss.  
It is worth to note that in the figure underlying, in the x-axis are specified both the EDP 
(Engineering Demand Parameter) referred to the structural fragility curve, and the ECP 
(Engineering Capacity Parameter) referred to the non-structural fragility curve. In order to 
compare them at the same time (non-structural and structural fragility curves) it is possible to 
indicate the capacity of the structural system as the demand of the non-structural components. On 
the base which fragility curves we are referring to, a EDP or a ECP will be taken into account.  
1a 
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Figure 3. 6 Comparison between structural and non-structural fragility curves: (a) the two curve do not cross each 
other and the failure of the non-structural component occurs after the threshold associated to the chosen structural 
limit state (on the left); (b) the two curves cross each other for a determined EDP (in the middle); (c) the non-
structural fragility curve is all shifted on the left: the non-structural failure (collapse) occurs for EDP minor than the 
establish structural threshold (on the right). 
In the third case (cf. Figure 3. 6 c), a non-structural damage/collapse occurs before reaching the 
structural limit state. In this case the referring threshold becomes the non-structural one, in terms 
of down-time and number of elements involved, associated to their recovery time probability 
curves. Is it worth to note that this scenario ± for which the non-structural behaviour is unknown 
and the reference threshold is underestimated ± is the most frequent one. A linear-elastic response 
of the structure occurs also in the region between the Serviceability Limit State and the Damage 
Limit State. In this area, until reaching the Damage threshold for the structure, the response is 
still linear-elastic.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Area of the structural linear response between the Serviceability Limit State and the Damage Limit State. 
As in the previous case, the interaction between structural and non-structural fragility curves 
displays four different scenarios about the rooms¶ enclosure.  
a) b) c) 
1b 
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In a hospital the damages that compromise its functionality are considered to depend on the 
failure of non-structural components. When the non-structural fragility curve is on the right of the 
VWUXFWXUDORQHVWUXFWXUDOGDPDJHVRFFXUFDXVLQJSHUPDQHQWFORVXUHRIWKHHPHUJHQF\URRPVøQ
this case the structural damage governs the whole dramatically affecting waiting times and, 
consequently, the resilience curve. The percentage of damage extension can be rudely evaluated 
as the associated probability of exceeding the threshold in the total area of the structure. When 
the curves intersect each other both non-structural failures and structural damages occur, with 
two possible cases of closures: temporary and permanent. This state of affairs requires a more 
careful evaluation, as discussed in the following paragraphs.  
In the last case, when the curve of the non-structural components is on the left of the structural 
one, the hospital functionality is governed by non-structural failures. Assuming that the structural 
damages govern the permanently closures, the hospital will experience only temporary closures 
depending to their associated recovery time probability curves. Similarly to the case presented 
before, the resilience curve changes as a function of the specific non-structural failure.  
3.3.1.1 Resilience due to non-structural components failures 
Figure 3.8 shows how rooms closure affects the waiting time curve. This happens even when the 
structure is not damaged, since the failed non-structural elements can jeopardize the 
organizational aspects: patients can experience long queues due to limited spaces available.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 3.8 The number of closed/down rooms effects the waiting time curve, in terms of WTmax (peak) and size of the 
bell curve.
The greater the arrival rate is (number of entries during an emergency), the higher is the peak of 
the waiting time curve (WTmax) (Figure 3. 9 a): the number of patients influences the 
organizational response and, eventually, the vertical segment of the resilience curve (Figure 3. 9 
b).  
The higher the number of down rooms is, the more is the time required to bring the system 
back to its initial state. The size of the bell curve increases (Figure 3. 9 c) and consequently the 
resilience curve increases as well, with a change of the section from the peak of functionality loss 
to the system restoration (Figure 3. 9 d).  
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Figure 3. 9 Different non-structural components can determine changes in the waiting time curve (in the WTmax –a-, 
and in the size of the bell curve – c- ) and, consequently, changes in the resilience curve (measure of decreasing –b- 
and time necessary of re-establishing –d-). 
According to recent studies and direct experiences during earthquakes, to know the damages 
associated to the failures of non-structural components seems to be of crucial importance. In 
effect these damages can result in significant economic losses, i.e. temporary/partial/total loss of 
operation/functionality (downtime), patient and/or staff injuries, and, in some cases, even loss of 
life. The variable decrease of the resilience vertical segment at the time t0 depends on various 
aspects: 
- importance of the non-structural components;  
- location and extension of the rooms,;  
- conditioned functionality; 
- interconnection with/dependence on other elements. 
The time needed to re-establish the initial condition (or at least a satisfying condition) is 
related to:  
- the number of failed non-structural components (NSC);  
- redundancy elements; 
- the time necessary to remove the failed NSC in case it is unessential for the care service. 
To better quantify the time required for a satisfactory recovery, the Recovery time associated 
to each non-structural component must be known. The first step concerns the evaluation of a 
single room, comprehensive of all its non-structural components.  
a) b) 
c) d) 
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To quantify the effects of a possible state of damage (including the complete failure) of non-
structural components in a room, it is important to know the behaviour, the function and the 
extension of each single non-structural component in the room. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Different non-structural component fragility curves for a single room 
 
Referring to their fragility curves, it is possible to choice for each room a certain PGA and 
evaluate the associated Probability of Failure/damage for all its non-structural component (see 
Figure 3. 11 ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 11 Fixing a referring ECP (e.g. acceleration) it is possible to evaluate the failure probability for each NSC. 
 
Accordingly for each non-structural component (NSC) it is possible to determine the Probability 
of Failure/Damage PrF/D as follows: 
2a 
2 
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ܰܵܥଵ ՜ ܲݎி ஽Τ భ
(Eq.3. 3) 
 
 ܰܵܥଶ

՜ ܲݎி ஽Τ మ (Eq.3. 4) 
 
ܰܵܥ௡

՜ ܲݎி ஽Τ ೙ (Eq.3. 5) 
Moreover, it is possible to associate each non-structural component with a factor a, the latter 
being equal to 0 or 1 depending on the possibility to have a redundancy referred to the specific 
component. Thus if a NSC is replaceable or its failure does not result in an interruption of the 
service, a is equal to 0 and the component is not taken into account inside the room.  
Figure 3. 12 shows the effects of the redundant component on the POF representation. Non-
structural componenWVZKLFK DUH FRQVLGHUHG ³LQ SDUDOOHO´ E\ RWKHU VFKRODUV DUH FRQVLGHUHG DV
redundant in the current approach and therefore they are not evaluated together with the other 
room elements since they are replaceable in a short time. Conversely, if a non-structural 
component is placed in series and it fails, also the other non-structural elements linked to it must 
be considered failed: they are perceived as a system where the failure of the most fragile element 
makes the whole system fail. As illustrated in (Eq.3. 6, a factor can be 0 or 1:  
 
ܰܵܥ௡

՜ ܲݎி ஽Τ ೙ כ ᖤ௡ (Eq.3. 6) 
with:  ᖤ =1 when the element is redundant or connected in parallel; 
ᖤ =0 when the element is not redundant or is connected in series with the others. In this 
case the elements which are connected in series with this element are considered failed in 
case the first fails.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 12 Non-structural components really implicated in a resilience room. 
 
2b 
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ܰܵܥ௥௢௢௠ ൌ ܰܵܥଶ ൅ ܰܵܥଷ ൅ ܰܵܥହ ൅ڮ൅ ܰܵܥ௡ (Eq.3. 7) 
As illustrated in Figure 3. 13 , the installation of non-structural components compromises the 
HQWLUHV\VWHPWKHWHUP³V\VWHP´KHUHUHIHUVWRWKHJURXSRIQRQ-structural components that are 
linked together, both in series and in parallel). On the one hand, if NSC1 fails, also the other non-
structural components linked in series with it will fail and, consequently, the entire system will 
fail; on the other hand, if NSC4 or NSC5 are redundant, i.e. they can replace each other, and one 
of them fails, the other non-structural components connected with them, will not necessarily fail.  
The knowledge about the mutual relationship among different systems is essential for a good 
planning, for the management of the single non-structural component, and for the prevention of 
big jeopardy.  
 
 
Figure 3. 13 Non-structural component realized in series and in parallel into a generic room.  
According to  Yao & Tu (2012), it is possible to derive the Recovery time probability curves 
from the fragility curves of the components, and to associate each of them, for a specific PGA, to 
the corresponding downtime (cf. (Eq.3. 8). 
 
ܰܵܥ௡

՜ ܲݎி ஽Τ ೙ כ ܽ௡

՜ܴ ௡ܶ (Eq.3. 8) 
Then it is possible to assess a total recovery time as the sum of the obtained partial recovery 
times, as displayed in (Eq.3. 9: 
 
ܴ ଶܶ ൅ ܴ ଷܶ ൅ ܴ ହܶ ൅ ܴ ௡ܶ ൌ ܴ ௧ܶ௢௧ (Eq.3. 9) 
This procedure can be used to evaluate the Recovery Time needed for the non-structural 
components in a room. In this case the structure is assumed to have undergone no damages.  
This technique whose main purpose is to assess the downtime associated with an individual 
emergency room, can be extended to several rooms and, consequently, to an entire Emergency 
'HSDUWPHQW7KHUHIRUH LW LV H[WUHPHO\ LPSRUWDQW WR UHFRJQL]H WKH ³PRVW IUDJLOH´ QRQ-structural 
component in order to prevent a total loss of functionality deriving from its failure. Some 
VLJQLILFDQW H[DPSOHV IURP UHFHQW HDUWKTXDNHV DUH WKH FROODSVHRI WKH ³(PHUJHQF\'HSDUWPHQW´
signal in front of the entrance causing the complete block of the hospitaO/¶$TXLOD  the 
fall of the roof onto the parked ambulance, with the consequent block of all rescue missions (S. 
Fernando 1971). As evident, the collapse of a singular non-structural component can affect the 
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2bi 4a 
entire resilience of the hospital: this is the reason why particular attention must be paid to the 
assessment of non-structural elements. 
3.3.2 Physical system response and related waiting time and resilience curves 
This section offers a more detailed analysis of the cases discussed above in order to check the 
effects of the different physical system scenarios on organizational aspects. These cases indicate 
that the comparison of structural (dotted line) and non-structural (full line) fragility curves 
SHUPLWVWRLGHQWLI\WKH³JOREDO´IUDJLOLW\FXUYHLQUHGWRHVWDEOLVK± by following the illustrated 
procedure ± the downtime of the rooms, the waiting time and the resilience curve.   
3.3.2.1 Linear elastic structural response 
The following paragraph refers to the structural limit state defined in Figure 3. 5. In case of a non-
structural component curve entirely on the right of the structural fragility curve (Figure 3. 14 , a), 
the associated resilience curve (Figure 3. 14 , d) is linear and no structural damages are registered 
(Figure 3. 14 , b). In this case the organizational model is not changed and the correlated 
organizational aspects are the same as under normal conditions (i.e. in a normal scenario when no 
earthquakes strike). The waiting time under normal conditions does not vary and it meets the 
hospital standards (Figure 3. 14 , c). In this case the structural fragility curve governs the global 
behaviour of the hospital system. 
Even if an earthquake strikes, the consequences will not disturb the system: the performance 
displayed under normal conditions remains unvaried. If the emergency procedures are activated, 
they are not determined by failures or closures of rooms. The waiting time value will increase, 
depending on the organizational protocols. 
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5a 6a 
  
  
 
Figure 3. 14 Area of the structural linear response (a); schematic plan of a hospital with all functioning rooms (b); 
waiting time associated to a normal scenario (c) and resilience curves (d). 
The second case occurs when the fragility curves cross each other (Figure 3. 15 , a). The new limit 
curve is an envelope of the two, and the closure of the rooms is a direct consequence of the more 
restrictive limit (Figure 3. 15 ,b). As in the previous case, the associated waiting time depends on 
the number of closed rooms and on their downtime, and the consequent resilience curve is still 
associated only with non-structural failures. In this case it is essential to consider the referring 
peak floor acceleration (PFA) and the consequent percentages of non-structural and structural 
failures. This specific case is discussed in more detail in the following paragraph. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. 15 Comparison between structural and non-structural fragility curves (a); schematic plan of a hospital with 
some permanently closures (red) and temporary closures (yellow) of the rooms (b) 
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The last case is represented by a non-structural component fragility curve located on the left of 
WKH VWUXFWXUDO RQH WKH ILUVW EHFRPHV WKH QHZ ³)XOO2SHUDWLRQDO/LPLW 6WDWH´ Figure 3. 16 , a), 
despite the structural response. Only non-structural failure occurs in the system (Figure 3. 16 ,b) 
resulting in a temporary closure of the rooms to the related recovery time. The associated waiting 
time depends on the number of closed rooms and their downtimes: the relative resilience curve 
depends on non-structural failures. 
The weakest element fragility curve is taken into account as a new limit for determining a 
complete functionality, also depending on the role it assumes into the emergency room and the 
probability for it to compromise other essential non-structural components for the emergency 
procedures.  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
Figure 3. 16 Comparison between  structural and non-structural fragility curves (a); schematic plan of a hospital with 
all functioning rooms (b); waiting time associated to a normal scenario (c) and resilience curves (d).  
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3.3.2.2 Non-linear inelastic structural response 
The following paragraph refers to the structural limit state defined in Figure 3.7 (named as the 
³E´ ODEHO into methodology flowchart in Figure 3. 3). Non structural components cases are 
discussed above, in relation to the structural limit state. 
By fixing a certain PGA, it is possible to represent this case as a partial closure of the ER, 
depending to the associated probability of damage which is calculated as a percentage of the 
entire area covered by the emergency rooms.  
Eventually also the resilience curve shape will change, in particular regarding the length of the 
descending trait and in the scale of the trait after the shock time (represented as t0 in Figure 2.4).
 
In case of non-structural components failure, fragility curves cross the damage limit state but still 
appear in the grey area (see Figure 3.7), without crossing the next structural fragility curve. 
Accordingly it is possible to fix a PGA of reference in order to establish two main cases.  
The first one occurs when the probability of failure for the non-structural component (or the 
curve representing the most fragile NSC) is lower than the probability of exceeding the damage 
limit state (PrSTR), as shown in Figure 3. 17 . In this case it is possible to assume the PrSTR as the 
closed percentage area of the Emergency Room, and the Recovery time probability function 
associated with the Probability of Failure of non-structural components (PrF/D n) as the temporary 
time of emergency room downtime. Accordingly the damage the structure suffers from is 
assumed as equal, in terms of surface, to the percentage of probability of exceeding of the 
damage limit state. For instance, with a fixed PGA (green dotted line in Figure 3. 17  and Figure 
3. 18 ) if the PrSTR is 0,72 the damaged area of the Emergency rooms will cover its 72%. Then the 
non-structural components recovery time will be added to the ER damaged area percentage. 
 
 
Figure 3. 17 Crossing structural and non-structural fragility curves: having fixed a certain PGA the probability to fail 
for non-structural component (PrF/Dn) is lower than the probability of exceeding the damage limit state (PrSTR). 
The same procedure can be followed when the probability of failure for non-structural 
components is higher than the probability of exceeding the damage limit state, as shown in Figure 
3. 18 . 
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Figure 3. 18 Crossing structural and non-structural fragility curves: having fixed a certain PGA the probability to fail 
for non-structural component (PrF/Dn) is higher than the probability of exceeding the damage limit state (PrSTR). 
With respect to the structural damage fragility curve and its comparison with the non-structural 
ones, the three cases previously presented are further discussed. A reference non-structural 
fragility curve is taken into account.  
The first case corresponds to the downtimes/interruption of the room(s) due to non-structural 
failure according to the fragility curves comparison. As matter of fact if the non-structural 
fragility curve is entirely to the left of the structural one (Figure 3. 19  a) only temporary 
downtimes occur (according to the recovery time probability curve of the non-structural 
component), represented in Figure 3. 19  b with yellow shape cross.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. 19 Comparison between  structural and non-structural fragility curves (a); temporary closure of the rooms 
(b). 
In case of crossing fragility curves, the above mentioned procedure must be applied to evaluate 
the damaged area and the consequent recovery time of NSCs. Accordingly both structural 
downtime (permanently in the damaged area) and non-structural downtime equal to the 
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2bi 
associated recovery time, due to non-structural failure (Figure 3. 20 a) will occur. The waiting 
time curve is affected by both systems and the resilience curve presents a disruption as a result of 
both structural and non-structural effects (Figure 3. 20 b, represented with cross shape in yellow 
for temporary, and in red for permanently closures).  
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. 20 Comparison between  structural and non-structural fragility curves (a); schematic plan of a hospital with 
some permanently closure (red) and temporary closure (yellow) of the rooms (b). 
If the intercepted fragility curve is only the structural one, the room downtime can be calculated 
by associating the percentage of the damage with the total area of the emergency rooms (Figure 
3. 21 ). In this case the inoperability will result in a permanent downtime.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 21  Comparison between  structural and non-structural fragility curves (a); schematic plan of a hospital with 
some permanent closures (b). 
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The fragility curves related to the other limit states are representative of the thresholds associated 
with the damage level until the collapse of the structure (Figure 3. 23 a). In between these two 
thresholds, several different types of damage can occur.  
The organizational aspects strictly depend on the loss of integrity of the structure. Following  
Bruneau & Reinhorn (2007) it can be assumed that, in case of structural damage, the resulting 
probability of losses will increase, with a corresponding higher loss of non-structural resilience, 
possibly up to a total loss. In case of non-linear-inelastic structural response, the corresponding 
impact of structural damage on the fragility and resilience curves of non-structural components is 
rather unknown. As a consequence, it is useful and more precautionary/preventive to figure out a 
total loss of non-structural components as soon as any structural damage occurs (a structural 
damage threshold is achieved). Subsequently, the structural damage will determine the non-
structural losses.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. 22 Corresponding shift in non-structural seismic resilience curve in case of non-linear-inelastic structural 
response. 
 
This is translated into the organizational model of the hospital as the permanent closure of some 
areas (in this specific case a different number of emergency room, i.e. ER) because of the direct 
relationship between  waiting time and treated patients. With structural damage, in effect, are 
opening of the emergency room is not guaranteed and the structure will need restoration after the 
shock-days. Therefore the waiting time of the hospital in case of an emergency is affected by the 
number of closed (down) emergency rooms; besides, it can vary depending on the intensity of the 
seismic arrival rate. In principle, it is possible to suppose a permanent closure of the rooms 
depending on the length of the emergency phase. In this respect it is worth to specify that in this 
ZRUNWKHWHUP³SHUPDQHQWFORVXUH´LQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHOHQJWKRIDQHPHUJHQF\SKDVHUHIHUVWR
a timespan of three days. 
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Figure 3. 23 Area of structural damages (a); permanently closure of several Emergency Rooms (b) and consequently 
increasing of WT registered (c) for the patients treated with a general decreasing of functionality of the system (d).  
Figure 3. 23  shows the structural fragility curves ranging between the damage and the final 
collapse. In this case, several different forms of structural damage can occur, with a consequent 
closure of emergency rooms. Those cases affect the waiting time curve, which can decrease or 
increase both in terms of pick and size of the bell. Of course this implies a variation of the WTmax 
and of the time necessary to restore the original functionality. 
3.3.3 ,QWHJUDWLQJFRPSRQHQWV¶UHVLOLHQFH 
7KH³URDGPDS´LQ Figure 3. 3, where all steps are identified through labels, allows to represent 
the resilience of all components (from the structural to the singular non-structural ones) and, 
therefore, to determine all the essential mutual dependencies. The same road map is represented 
below, from Figure 3.24 to Figure 3.28, focusing on different steps of the procedure, in order to 
better explain the logical passages.  
1c 4c 
5c 6c 
c) d) 
a) b) 
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Figure 3.24 shows the importance of distinguishing different thresholds for the structural 
components, from which the procedure changes the results. Consequently, each non-structural 
component can significantly change the organizational behaviour of the entire hospital (Figure 
3.25). The identification of the most essential non-structural components can be of great help not 
only for making appropriate management choices, but also as a decision tool enhancing the 
seismic resilience of healthcare systems.  
This approach emphasizes the pivotal/fundamental need of information regarding the fragility 
of non-structural building components in terms of capacity and recovery time. It is worth to note 
the importance of comparing the structural performances with the non-structural ones, especially 
considering that even in case an immediate occupancy performance level (serviceability limit 
state) is achieved after a seismic shock, the failure of non-structural components can cause the 
total interruption of the medical services.  
First, the possibility to simulate the organizational response to variable losses of emergency 
rooms in terms of numbers and downtime, results in an essential method to check and identify 
critical points and elements. Secondly, such a method allows the association of a singular 
resilience curve with every component, depending on the recovery time probability function 
related to non-structural components, and their further combination to estimate a resilience curve 
in different scenarios. 
Furthermore, it is relevant to distinguish the physical aspects from organizational ones; 
depending on the hospital plan and staff organization, on the base of the number (due to 
structural damages) and downtime closure (due to non-structural recovery time probability 
functions) of the rooms, the system will display different responses to the shock. Emergency 
plans, staff preparation and human resources crucially influence the hospital behaviour. 
Nevertheless thanks to the organizational model it is possible to statistically estimate the 
organizational response in terms of waiting time; besides,  multiple scenarios can be tested. 
To estimate the resilience of the healthcare facilities, the knowledge of the system, the hospital 
plan, the hospital staff preparedness, the non-structural element and extension are the major 
elements to be taken into account together with their associated recovery time fragility functions 
(after a punctual assessment of the structure).  
This method can be used for a singular room, for comparing a non-structural component with a 
determined structural limit state, but can also be applied to the entire hospital campus. 
Last but not least, this approach improves and completes the methodologies presented in the 
literature (see Ch. 2 for more details) in that it statistically quantifies the organizational aspects 
by means of a unique value, i.e. the waiting time. With respect to the probabilistic approach 
proposed by Cimellaro et al. (2008), this methodology can not only simplify the procedure, but 
also permit a better management of each single non-structural element to identify the resilience of 
the system. 
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Figure 3. 24 Methodology roadmap, with focus on the structural assessment and limit states. 
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Figure 3. 25 Methodology roadmap, with focus on the non-structural steps for the assessment of physical aspects. 
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Figure 3. 26 Methodology roadmap, with focus on different cases of the linear elastic structural response. 
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Figure 3. 27 Methodology roadmap, with focus on different cases of the non-linear inelastic structural response. 
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Figure 3. 28 Methodology roadmap, with focus on different cases of the inadequate structural response.  
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Chapter 4 
Case study: the Sansepolcro hospital 
4.1 Physical aspects of the Sansepolcro hospital 
The Valtiberina Hospital complex4 is situated in the Sansepolcro town, in the province of Arezzo, 
Tuscany (Figure 4. 1). According to the regional healthcare service this hospital is categorized as 
D³WKLUGFDWHJRU\KRVSLWDO´GXHWRLWVFDSDFLW\DQGWKHSRSXODWLRQVXSSRUWHG 
This campus has a complex configuration with two main sticks, having a roof terrace, 
pointing downstream, and connected through other perpendicular units. The whole hospital, 
located at the bottom of a hill, consists of four levels following the slope of the land, and is 
surrounded by parks and gardens. The main façade ± in stone and exposed concrete ± looks 
towards, the valley and is characterized by the alternation of windows and balconies, an d the 
emergency department access that consists of two vehicle ramps. A little portico located at the 
left side of the complex constitutes the main entrance to the hospital. The hospital is variously 
articulated, both for the structural and functional relationship between the different structural 
units 
                                                 
4 This work is the result of an agreement stipulated in March 2012 between the University of Florence and the Tuscany 
5HJLRQ DQG FRQWULEXWHV WR WKH 5HVHDUFK 3URJUDP ³9DOXWD]LRQH GHO 5LVFKLR 6LVPLFR GHOOH 6WUXWWXUH RVSHGDOLHUH LQ
7RVFDQD´³$VVHVVPHQt of the seismic risk in healthFDUHIDFLOLW\LQ7XVFDQ\´7KHUHVHDUFKVWDUWHGZLWKWKHPDWHULDO
mechanic characterization and the static stability of the hospital complex according to the Italian Code (NTC2008). 
The documentation was found at the civil engineering office of Arezzo (Italy) and at the hospital archive of 
Sansepolcro (AR). 
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Figure 4. 1 Geographical location of the Sansepolcro hospital: national view (left), regional view (middle), satellite 
view of the complex (right). 
4.1.1 Summary description of the building complex 
The hospital is characterized by around 50000 cubic meters and is constituted by 18 independent 
structural units. These structural units, occasionally divided from each other by ground/floor-to-
roof joint on average of 10 cm size, have been built in consecutive ages: the original  project was 
outlined in 1962 and completed in 1979; then numerous restorations and reorganizations 
followed.  
 
 
Figure 4. 2 Inner space of the emergency department (ED): corridor. 
All the various blocks have a reinforced concrete (Rc) frame structure, except for the last 
extension (in Rc walls and steel structure), which overlaps an existing building still remaining 
independent. The various structural units have an average of three or four floors, with another 
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upper floor without infill walls, which is often equipped with special spaces for contents and 
medical equipment.  
The site morphology determLQHV WKH ³VORSH GLVWULEXWLRQ´ RI WKH FRPSOH[ ZLWK D KHLJKW
difference of up to almost two floors, between the basement of the Emergency Department access 
DQG WKH ³PRUJXH´ VWUXFWXUDO XQLW 7KHPDLQ HQWU\ RI the hospital is located at an intermediate 
height on the long side of the structural unit (cf. Figure 4. 2, nr. 3). The administrative and 
reservation services are located into the newest building (cf. Figure 4. 2, nr. 12 ). 
The structural units designated for the recovery service are located around the two courts, 
ZKLOH WKH ³VHUYLFH VWUXFWXUDO XQLW´ PRUJXH HPHUJHQF\ GHSDUWPHQW WHFKQRORJLFDO V\VWHP DUH
situated in a marginal position. The building which allocates the thermal systems is identified as 
structural unit nr.11 and is connected by a tunnel (exclusively for the medical personnel) to the 
basement level of another building. On the contrary, the morgue building is connected by a 
bridge-corridor to the rest of the hospital complex. 
4.1.2 Geological framework 
The study area belongs to the Tuscany layer and as such follows the Northern Apennines 
evolution. The land consists of Arenarie of Monte Cervarola sandstones. The local lithologies 
consist of alterning turbidites (fine-grained sandstones) interbedded with silty marls. The 
maximum thickness varies between 1000 and 1500 meters and its age can be related to 
Aquitanio-Langhiano period. In the area under consideration it is clearly observable a sequence 
of about 10 meters showing irregular alternation of silty marls and sandstones in layer of variable 
size. 
 
 
Figure 4. 3 Geological overview: plan (left) and section(right). The blue colour identifies Arenarie of Monte Cervarola 
sandstones area, while the grey colour identifies the layout of alternation of turbidities sandstones and fine silt marl 
4.1.3 The emergency department 
The investigated structural unit named n°15, is a two-story building with a dimension of 
approximately 19.5x12 meters located in the south part of the building complex. It consists of 
reinforced concrete frames with two spans of 5.88 meters and 2.88 meters length in direction X 
(Figure 4. 5), and three frames (primary ones) in direction Y, measuring 6.0 meters, 3.22 meters 
and 10.06 meters in length. Columns have different section sizes at different levels: in the 
basement floor they are 0.35x0.35 meters except for the four central columns having a dimension 
of 0.40x1.2 meters decreasing in section as it goes above to the ground level; on the first floor the 
columns are all 0.30x0.30 meters (Figure 4. 4).  
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The primary beams on the first floor have section size of 0.3x0.6 meters, except those at the 
ground floor which are larger in size and have a different configuration. The heights of the first 
and second floors are 3.7 meters and 3.4 meters respectively.  
 
 
Figure 4. 4 Outdoor space of the structural unit n°15: the basement. 
The main entrance to the ground floor is set back with respect to the perimeter of the building. 
The first floor allocates a portion of emergency department area: the vehicular access is 
guaranteed by two ramps. On the southern front there are also terraces built with cantilever slabs. 
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Figure 4. 5 Architectural plan extracted from the hospital (in shadow the Emergency Department). 
4.1.3.1 Structural details of the emergency department 
The plan view of the two floors and the two architectural sections of building n°15 can be seen in 
Figure 4. 6: column members are shown in solid black and beam members are outlined with 
black. The dotted line represents the overhang of the balcony. All dimensions on the plan 
drawings are given in meters.  
The hospital structure features a hollow-EULFNVODELWµODWHURFHPHQWR¶RQWKHILUVWIORRUDQG
roof level. The slabs were constructed in situ with the beam members. Both slabs have a 
thickness of 20 centimetres. Furthermore, the first floor slab has a 4 centimetres thick layer of 
concrete on top of it; therefore the first floor slab has a total thickness of 24 centimetres 
 
X 
Y 
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Figure 4. 6 Plan overviews of the ground and first floor of the emergency department (ED). 
Column section details can be found in Figure 4. 8 (for the ground level) and Figure 4. 9 (for the 
first level). The transverse reinforcement for the beam and column members varies in size from 6 
millimetres, 8 millimetres, to 10 millimetres spaced at 200 millimetres; but exact transverse 
reinforcement sizes for every member are unknown. To solve this issue a uniform transverse 
reinforcement size of 8 millimetres spaced at 200 millimetres intervals was assumed for all 
members. Concrete cover to longitudinal bars is 40 millimetres for columns and 30 millimetres 
for beams (Przelazloski 2014). Details for the beam section and reinforcement are shown in 
Table 4. 2. 
X 
Y 
X 
Y 
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Figure 4. 7 Elevation sections of the emergency department (ED). 
Table 4. 1: Column section and reinforcement details for the case study building 
Column section Dimensions (cm) Longitudinal reinforcement Transverse reinforcement 
1 40 x 102 18 ݊24mm ݊8 at 200mm 
2 35 x 35 4 ݊16mm + 4 ݊14mm ݊8 at 200mm 
3 30 x 30 8 ݊14mm ݊8 at 200mm 
4 30 x 30 4 ݊12mm ݊8 at 200mm 
 
 
Figure 4. 8 Column details of the ground storey of ED. 
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Figure 4. 9 Column details of the first floor of ED.
Table 4. 2: Beam section and reinforcement details for the case study building 
Beam 
section 
Dimension 
(cm) 
(Depth x 
Width) 
Top 
longitudinal  
reinforcement 
Bottom longitudinal 
reinforcement Transverse 
reinforcement 
A 100x24 12 ݊20 4 ݊20 ݊8 at 200 mm 
B 100x24 4 ݊20 8 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
C 100x20 12 ݊20 8 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
D 30x60 8 ݊20 8 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
E 30x60 6 ݊16 2 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
F 30x60 2 ݊16 4 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
G 40x130 6 ݊16 2 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
H 40x130 2 ݊18 + 6 ݊20 2 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
I 35x65 2 ݊18 9 ݊18 ݊8 at 200mm 
K 35x65 2 ݊14 +2 ݊16 2 ݊14 ݊8 at 200mm 
L 40x130 2 ݊14 2 ݊14 + 2 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
M 40x130 12 ݊20 4 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
N 40x130 4 ݊20 8 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
P 40x130 8 ݊20 4 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
Q 40x130 10 ݊20 3 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
R 40x130 3 ݊20 7 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
S 40x130 7 ݊20 3 ݊20 ݊8 at 200mm 
T 40x130 4 ݊24 + 7 ݊20 4 ݊24 ݊8 at 200mm 
V 40x130 3݊20 8 ݊24 ݊8 at 200mm 
Z 40x130 7 ݊24 + 3݊20 4 ݊24 ݊8 at 200mm 
W 30x60 2݊24 + 2݊16 2 ݊14 ݊8 at 200mm 
J 30x60 2݊14 2 ݊14 + 2 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
AA 15x50 2݊16 4 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
BB 30x50  2݊14 + 2݊16 2 ݊14 ݊8 at 200mm 
CC 48x24 3݊16 3 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
DD 35x24 3݊16 3 ݊16 ݊8 at 200mm 
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Material strengths and deformation limits are presented in Table 4.1. Concrete compressive stress 
was determined through the use of destructive (crushing cylindrical core samples) and non-
destructive (ultra-sonic) tests. Data sets from both types of tests were used in calculating the 
concrete compressive stress. Steel yield stress was determined through tensile tests on bar 
samples. Testing procedures were done as specified in the Italian standard NTC 2008: Norme 
Tecniche per le Costruzioni. Other material properties are unknown but established  within  the  
guidelines  provided  by  the  NTC  2008  or  assumed  based  off  typical values.  Material  
properties  not  verified  through  testing  are  marked  with  an  asterisk  (*)  in Table 4.1. 
Table 4. 3: Material proprieties for building 
Median concrete compressive strength (fcmed) (MPa) 35.7 
Concrete modulus of Elasticity* (Ec) (GPa) 32.22 
&RQFUHWH&RPSUHVVLYH6WUDLQDW3HDN6WUHVVİco) 0.002 
 
Median steel yield stress (fymed) (MPa) 412 
Median steel ultimate stress* (Ec) (GPa) 473.8 
0D[LPXPVWHHOVWUDLQİcu) 0.12 
 
The seismic masses are shown in Table 4. 4. The masses were calculated according to the 
specifications provided by the NTC 2008.  
Table 4. 4: Seismic masses of building n°15. 
Level Translational Seismic 
 Mass (metric ton) 
Rotational Seismic  
Mass (metric ton-m2) 
Ground Storey 226 9826 
First Floor 139 6029 
4.2 Structural assessment of the Sansepolcro emergency department 
A  three  dimensional  Ruaumouko  model  was  developed  for  the  two  stories concrete  frame 
hospital structure in Sansepolcro in cooperation with the Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori 
(IUSS) of Pavia, Italy (Przelazloski 2014; Pianigiani et al. 2014). Beams and columns have been 
modelled with line elements with concentrated plastic hinges at their ends. Due to the age of the 
structure and concerns about the construction practices, the effects of the transverse 
reinforcement in terms of confinement has been neglected both in beam and column deformation 
capacities. The behaviour of the joints columns have been modified to take into account the joint 
shear mechanism. 
4.2.1 Structural fragility curves for the collapse limit state 
After a modal analysis and pushover analyses carried out on the structure, the model was 
analysed using incremental dynamic analysis (IDA) for two sets of records of ground motion 
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(FEMA and Site Specific set). The IDA has been done until the achievement of the collapse 
condition, which is the physical situation that involves either excessive deformations leading and 
approaching collapse of the structural component under consideration or the structure as a whole, 
as relevant, or deformations exceeding pre agreed values. It involves of course considerable 
inelastic (plastic) behaviour of the structural scheme and residual deformations. The data from 
the IDA results were equipped with a lognormal distribution to build fragility curves. The first set 
is the  same  time  history  contained  in  the  FEMA  P695  document  [FEMA  P695,  2009].  
This record set consists of 22 pairs of ground motions, so a total of 44 time histories and 
therefore 44  IDAs. Each record is normalized by their peak ground velocity via the factors given 
by Table A-4D of the FEMA P695 document [FEMA P695, 2009]. The second record set to be 
used in the IDAs is a record set that was developed specifically for the site of the hospital 
structure [Christovasilis, 2013]. The ground motion set consists of four subsets of 22 pairs of 
records each. The  time histories in each of the subsets correspond to a different probability of 
exceedance in 50 years; the four probabilities considered are 22%, 10%, 5%, and 2%. The 
records in these subsets were matched to the conditional mean spectra of the site at a fundamental 
period of 1 second. A period larger than the actual natural period of the structure was  deemed 
reasonable as it accounts for a fundamental period shift (lengthening) as the structure deforms. 
The four subsets of records each have a different median spectral acceleration at the natural 
period of the building, which is higher for lower probabilities of exceedance. As a result, to fully 
cover the range of spectral acceleration for the IDAs, each subset needs to only be scaled slightly  
up  or  down.  The  advantage  of  this  procedure  this  is  to  reduce  the  uncertainties associated  
with  the  use  of  large  scale  factors  on  the  time  histories.  
Figure 4.11 shows how the fragility curves assessed for the structural collapse and referred to 
the ground level must be assessed for both the right limit state and the right level where the non-
structural component to be compared with is allocated.  
 
 
Figure 4. 10  Schematization of the behaviour of a structure during an earthquake. 
Figure 4. 11 shows that the curves are relatively similar in value with the FEMA fragility curve 
tending to give lesser collapse probabilities. The site specific set seems to have some impact on 
the fragility curve results. However, considering that this is a probabilistic assessment, the 
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difference in fragility curves is not absolute and it can be affected by the uncertainties in 
modelling and assessment as well as by the record selection. Without considering the differences 
between the two curves, from an assessment standpoint, they both represent undesirably high 
collapse probabilities.  
 
 
Figure 4. 11 Comparison of Site Specific set fragility curve and the FEMA fragility curve. 
4.2.2 Structural fragility curves for other limit states 
The estimation of structural fragility curves performance, for different limit states, is a 
fundamental step within the procedure. Actually the most common way  to proceed is to assess 
the collapse fragility curve at the ground level; in this case the collapse limit state is not 
significant (as the research is referred to the functionality of the hospital), but it is necessary the 
comparison between curves related to the serviceability limit state (called SLO in Italy) or to the 
damage limit state (called SLD in Italy). Therefore even the structural fragility curves must be 
estimated at the right limit state and at the right level (floor) associated to the non-structural 
element position.  
For this reason the median peak floor total acceleration of each floor has been extracted in 
order to allow a comparison between the median peak total acceleration of the floor taken into 
account and the relative fragility curve associated to different limit states. The latter are 
calculated in relation to the maximum drift allowed, which in the Italian code is equal to 2/3 of 
the 5๥ of the height of the floor. This limitation is established for the serviceability limit state, for 
allowing to the non-structural components to be functional even under seismic actions. The 
acceleration of the floor is reported as the total acceleration and it is correlated to the control 
node in the model, which is close to the centre of the floor plans. This is a good representation of 
the total acceleration of the whole floor. Moreover, the median peak floor acceleration is 
established only using record results with no structure collapse. For a better comparison, the 
ground motion intensity used to build the graph is the median spectral acceleration of the ground 
motion set used in the analysis, scaled to the median spectrum for a period of 1 second. 
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Figure 4. 12 shows the collapse fragility curve and the median peak floor acceleration of each 
floor: more specifically the graph related to the FEMA record set is on the left and the graph 
related to the Site Specific record set is on the right. 
Figure 4. 12 Multiple graphs with the median peak floor total acceleration of each floor versus the ground motion 
intensity from the incremental dynamic analysis (FEMA record set on the left and Site Specific record set on the right). 
Figure 4. 13 Multiple graphs with the median peak floor total acceleration of each floor versus the associated damage 
limit state fragility curve (FEMA record set on the left and Site Specific record set on the right). 
Figure 4. 14  Multiple graphs with the median peak floor total acceleration of each floor versus the associated 
serviceability limit state fragility curve (FEMA record set on the left and Site Specific record set on the right). 
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Plotting on the graph the fragility curves related to other limit states ± as illustrated in Figure 4. 
13 and Figure 4. 14 (e.g. serviceability limit state and damage limit state) ± it is possible to derive 
the fragility curve of peak total floor acceleration for each floor. As matter of fact reading the 
acceleration on the vertical axis on the left related to the green and blue curves, the associated 
percentage of exceeding probability is given (related to a certain limit state). By plotting at the 
end the peak total floor acceleration versus the percentage chance of exceeding a chosen limit 
state, step by step it is possible know all the points. Figure 4. 15 shows the steps for assess the 
fragility curves by proceeding point by point. 
The figure representing the fragility curve for the collapse limit state of the structure with the 
plotted acceleration for the first and the second floor, shows to find one point. Starting from the 
percentage chance of exceeding the collapse limit state, the corresponding median spectral 
acceleration of the ground motion is found; the latter point corresponds to a certain peak total 
acceleration for a determined floor of the structure. In this way, the median spectral acceleration 
is common to the two points with which is possible to build fragility curves where the percentage 
chance of exceeding a certain limit state is referred to the peak floor acceleration.  
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Figure 4. 15 Necessary steps for the derivation of the x-value and y-value from the collapse fragility curve and the peak 
total floor acceleration given by no structure collapse of the first and second floors.      
In this process the y1-value begins the new y-value for the new curve, while the y2-value the new 
x-value of the point. It is possible because the two plots have a common value, and it is assumed 
that to a referring percentage chance of exceeding the limit state corresponds a peak a value of 
the peak total floor acceleration. 
In this sense, for the new fragility curves associated to different floors, a certain number of 
³FRPPRQ´SRLQWVDUHDVVHVVHGDQGWKHQILWWHG 
 
Figure 4. 16 shows the peak total top-floor acceleration fragility curve related to the 
serviceability limit state for both records, while Figure 4. 17 shows the graphs related to the 
damage limit state.  
 
x2 
y2 
y1 
x1 
CHAPTER 4 Case-study: the Sansepolcro hospital 
 
73 
Figure 4. 16 Peak total top floor acceleration data for the serviceability limit state (FEMA record set on the left and 
Site Specific record set on the right). 
  
Figure 4. 17 Peak total top floor acceleration data for the damage limit state (FEMA record set on the left and Site 
Specific record set on the right). 
These new acceleration points refer to the floor acceleration on the second floor of the building, 
where some acceleration-sensitive non-structural components will be evaluated. In effect in order 
to compare the capacity of the non-structural elements, it is obligatory to assess the real 
acceleration on the floor where they are allocated. The points derived for the top-floor, associated 
with both the FEMA and Site record set, and for the serviceability limit state (SLO) and the  
damage limit state (SLD) are to be fitted in order to have a continuous fragility curves.  
4.2.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) fitting procedure 
In order to account for the non-constant variance of the observed fractions of collapse, a more 
appropriate fitting technique is the one relying on the method of maximum likelihood (Baker 
2014). This procedure is used where different ground motion groups (in this work for the 
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Multiple Stripe Analysis MSA) are defined as input for the IDA. The procedure is fully explained 
into Chapter5. 
Such a procedure has some implications, for instance: it is QRWQHFHVVDU\WRJHWDQ³intensity 
measure (IM) DWFROODSVH´IRUDJLYHQJURXQGPRWLRQLWGRHVQRWDOZD\VJHWLQFUHDVLQJIUDFWLRQV
of collapse with increasing IM and, above all, it is not essential to perform analyses at high 
enough IM levels for it getting 100% collapse. The latter reason is very important because the 
peak floor acceleration points are registered for record which did not give a collapse. Therefore 
WKHPDLQREMHFWLYHLVWRILQGڧ (median) DQGȕ (standard deviation) to define the fragility function 
that has the highest probability of having produced the observed data. Assuming n independent 
REVHUYDWLRQVRI³FROODSVHRUQR-collapse:  
 
ܲ൫ݖǡ௝ ܿ݋݈݈ܽ݌ݏ݁ݏ݅݊ ௝݊݃ݎ݋ݑ݊݀݉݋ݐ݅݋݊ݏ൯ ൌ ቀ
௝݊
ݖ௝ቁ݌௝
௭ೕሺͳ െ ݌௝ሻ௡ೕି௭ೕ (Eq.4. 1) 
where  ݌௝is the true probability of collapse at ܫܯ ൌ ݔ௝ (from the unknown fragility function). 
Substitute in the fragility function for ݌௝ in the previous equation:  
 
ܲ൫ݖǡ௝ ܿ݋݈݈ܽ݌ݏ݁ݏ݅݊ ௝݊݃ݎ݋ݑ݊݀݉݋ݐ݅݋݊ݏ൯ ൌ ቀ
௝݊
ݖ௝ቁቆ
ሺݔ௝ ፽ሻΤ
ߚ ቇ
௭ೕ
ሺͳ െ ፽ቆ
ሺݔ௝ ፽ሻΤ
ߚ ቇሻ
௡ೕି௭ೕ (Eq.4. 2) 
To consider multiple IM levels, takes the product of these probabilities for each IM level 
(assuming independence of collapse realization from level to level). This gives a likelihood 
function: 
 
ܮ݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀ ൌෑቀ ௝݊ݖ௝ቁቆ
ሺݔ௝ ፽ሻΤ
ߚ ቇ
௭ೕ
ሺͳ െ ፽ቆ
ሺݔ௝ ፽ሻΤ
ߚ ቇሻ
௡ೕି௭ೕ
௠
௝ୀଵ
 (Eq.4. 3) 
It is possible to find the best estimates of ፽ and ߚ by maximizing this likelihood function. The 
parameters which maximize this likelihood function will also maximize the log of the likelihood, 
DQGQXPHULFDOO\LWLVW\SLFDOO\HDVLHUWRRSWLPL]HWKLVORJOLNHOLKRRGIXQFWLRQ´ 
 
൛፽ǡ෡ ߚመൟ ൌ 
፽ǡ෡ ఉ෡
ෑቀ ௝݊ݖ௝ቁቆ
ሺݔ௝ ፽ሻΤ
ߚ ቇ
௭ೕ
ሺͳ െ ፽ቆ
ሺݔ௝ ፽ሻΤ
ߚ ቇሻ
௡ೕି௭ೕ
௠
௝ୀଵ
 (Eq.4. 4) 
The information on the right hand side of this formula is all readily available from dynamic 
analysis results, and the optimization to determine the maximum value is performed in this case 
with the Excel program (the values for the MLE procedure compared with the traditional values 
are into Appendix e).  
The following figures represent the fitting for the second floor acceleration data derived from 
the median peak floor total acceleration of each floor versus the associated damage limit state 
fragility curve graphs (Figure 4. 12-Figure 4. 14). 
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Figure 4. 18 Peak total top floor acceleration fragility curve for the serviceability limit state (FEMA record set on the 
left and Site Specific record set on the right). 
  
Figure 4. 19 Peak total top floor acceleration fragility curve for the damage limit state (FEMA record set on the left 
and Site Specific record set on the right). 
4.3 Non-structural components  
The non-structural components within a facility are all those parts of a building that do not lie in 
the primary load-bearing path of the building itself and are not part of the seismic resisting 
system (Figure 4. 21). The number and the complexity of non-structural systems and components 
of a building far outnumber its structural components. 
They are connected to the floors of the building, which are not, however, part of the carrier 
system. The list of non-structural components is nearly endless and is constantly evolving as new 
technologies alter our built environment. Many agencies and organizations have scheduled and 
organized non-structural components depending on the building typology, outlining three main 
categories: 
a) architectural components; 
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b) building utility systems; 
c) building contents. 
 
Figure 4. 20 The basic structural system (left) and the non-structural components (right). Picture extrapolated 
from FEMA 
The first category includes: partitions and ceilings, windows, doors, lighting, interior or exterior 
ornamentation, exterior panels, veneer and parapets. The second group includes: mechanical and 
electrical equipment and distribution systems, water, gas, electric and sewerage piping and 
conduit, fire suppression systems, elevators or escalators, HVAC systems and roof-mounted solar 
panels. The latter category comprises: computers and communication equipment; cabinets and 
shelving for record and supply storage; library stacks; kitchen and laundry facilities; furniture; 
movable partitions; lockers; and vending machines. An example of grouped NSCs is fully 
presented in Appendix a. 
Non-structural components are far from being of minor importance, both in economic terms 
and in terms of continued service: past experiences like the earthquakes of Christchurch in 
)HEUXDU\  DQG /¶$TXLOD LQ 1RYHPEHU  VKRZHG WKDW D VLJQLILFDQW SRUWLRQ RI WKH
functional interruption can be attributed to non-VWUXFWXUDO FRPSRQHQWV DQG FRQWHQWV¶ GDPDJH
resulting in a safety hazard also hampering the safe movements of evacuating occupants and of 
rescuers entering the building. Such damages to non-structural components can occur at seismic 
intensities which are much lower than those leading to a structural damage. Nevertheless they can 
lead to similar hazards, especially due to the multiple effects that earthquake ground shaking 
causes on non-structural components, for instance: inertial or shaking effects causing sliding, 
rocking or overturning; the building deformation interconnected with the failure of non-structural 
components; the separation or pounding between separate structures which may damage non-
structural components crossing each other; the interaction between adjacent non-structural 
components like the change of their original location (this is particularly relevant for hospitals 
since the architectural disposition is frequently modified and the building can undergo further 
restoration over time).The latter characteristic is crucial for the performance evaluation of non-
structural components in terms of fragility curves. Figure 4. 22 shows the schematic 
representation of the elements which have been taken under consideration in this study. 
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Figure 4. 21 Schematization of the behaviour of the ceiling of a building during an earthquake. 
Compared to structural components and systems, there is much less information available and 
giving specific guidance on the seismic design of non-structural building components for 
multiple-performance levels. 
4.3.1 Identified non-structural components within the emergency department 
(ED) of the Sansepolcro hospital 
Among the many non-structural components which generally contribute to the hospital 
functionality, this study identifies some particularly important elements of the emergency 
department. The general architectural plan in Figure 4. 23 show the most important elements, 
while specific non-structural components are pinpointed in the following architectural plans and 
photos. 
 
 
Figure 4. 22 Non-structural components location into the emergency department. 
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It is evident that the massive presence of non-structural components may jeopardize the 
emergency department in all its extension. Within the general location of non-structural 
components, the infill-walls are not taken into account; although they are considered as 
secondary elements, they are able to influence the seismic behaviour of the structure. Therefore 
in an accurate analysis they may be introduced as part of the structural model. The non-structural 
elements taken into account here are (see also the following Figures Figure 4. 24 - Figure 4. 27):  
- Surgery Lamp;  
- Multi-parameters monitor;  
- Electrocardiogram;  
- Microscope; 
- Endoscope;  
- Defibrillator;  
- Surgical Aspirator;  
- Pulmonary fan;  
- Autoclave; 
- Cabinets;  
- Technical cabinets; 
- Electronic control units; 
- Suspended ceiling system. 
 
   
Figure 4. 23 Non-structural components inside the emergency room: Surgery Lamp, Multi-parameters monitor, 
Electrocardiogram, Microscope, Endoscope, Defibrillator, Surgical Aspirator, Pulmonary fan, Autoclave, cabinets. 
CHAPTER 4 Case-study: the Sansepolcro hospital 
 
79 
   
Figure 4. 24 Non-structural components: technical cabinets. 
   
Figure 4. 25 Non-structural components: electronic control units. 
  
 
Figure 4. 26 Non-structural components: suspended ceiling system. 
The latter non-structural component extends for all the emergency department area, and it was 
chosen as the main case study for the non-structural part in the emergency department. 
Suspended ceiling can lead many failures in case of an earthquake: for instance during the 1987 
Whittier Narrows earthquake as well as during the most disruptive recent earthquake in New 
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Zealand (2010) most of the building had to be evacuated due to damages related to this non-
structural element5.  
4.3.1.1 Suspended ceiling system into department 
This section mainly compares WKHFDSDFLW\RIWKLVXQLW¶VFHLOLQJVZLWKGLIIHUHQWOHYHOVRIVHLVPLF
demand in order to evaluate the healthcare facilities response to earthquakes. This procedure 
relies on data obtained from tests performed at the Canterbury University in Christchurch, and 
guidelines for installators provided by the construction agencies. This expedient was obligatory 
given the lack of data on this kind of component. 
Despite several studies on this subject, neither robust fragility data for suspending ceiling 
systems nor proven strategies to increase the seismic strength of suspended ceiling systems have 
been provided. Till now most research on suspending ceiling has focused on the full scale testing 
of this system on shake tables, while very little research has been accomplished regarding the 
capacities of individual sections within the ceilings. To the first category belong the tests carried 
out by Anco Engineers Inc. (1983), Shephard & Shepphird (1990), and Amstrong World 
Industries Inc. in 1993. Analytical shake table studies were conducted by Yao (2000), Badillo-
Almarez et al. (2007), Gilani (2008), Matsuoka et al. (2008), and Magliulo et al. (2012) who by 
means of a performance analysis studied the behaviour of non-structural components under 
seismic actions. In 2012 Ryu et al. performed a full scale dynamic testing on different surface 
size of ceilings at the University of Buffalo (within the UB-NEES program).Other researchers 
such as Hoehler et al. (2012) developed fragility functions, while laboratory tests on singular 
components of suspended ceiling system to derive fragility curves were carried out by Paganotti 
(2010). 
7KLV VHFWLRQ PDLQO\ FRPSDUHV WKH FDSDFLW\ RI WKLV XQLW¶V FHLOLQJV ZLWK GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV RI
seismic demand in order to evaluate the healthcare facilities response to earthquakes. Despite the 
fully extension of the suspended ceiling system in the area, only some specific rooms of the 
emergency department are considered: 
- the Emergency Room (ER), where severely injured patients are located; 
- the Short Intensive Observation Room (OBI), where patients needing in-depth 
examination can wait without being disturbed. 
 
In the following paragraph the compositions and the characteristics of the suspended ceiling 
system are defined. 
4.3.1.1.1 Suspended ceiling system composition 
Suspended ceilings typically consist of a grid system, hanger or bracing wires, perimeter supports 
and lay-in tiles. The grid system investigated in this study is made up of hot-dipped galvanized 
inverted T-sections that form square or rectangular shaped frames for supporting the tiles. They 
are two main categories: main tees and cross tees. Main tees come in higher capacity and bigger 
                                                 
5 Much current literature (Tally ,1988; EERI, 1990;Griffin & Tong 1992; Freeman et al. 2001; FEMA 2004; Lo et al. 
2004; Chrstopoulos et al. 2001; Magliulo et al. 2012; Paganotti 2010) discusses ± with plenty of concrete examples ±  
the most common damages that occurred during recent earthquakes. 
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length, while cross tees provide the transverse restraint for the main tees. The ceiling systems can 
EH HLWKHU ³SHULPHWHU IL[HG´ VXUURXQGLQJ FRQILQHPHQW RU ³IORDWLQJ´ QRW FRQQHFWHG WR WKH
perimeter but supported by means of diagonal bracing wires to the top floor). In the first case 
inertial forces on the ceiling are transferred to perimeter connections, whereas in the second 
system braces provide the resistance. The seismic force ± which depends on the weight of the 
ceilings and the horizontal earthquake acceleration ± activates a horizontal in-plane diaphragm 
action in both directions; while the vertical component of an earthquake excitation causes an out-
of-plane vertical force (transverse to the plane of the ceiling). 
The lengths of the rooms are indicated in Figure 4. 28, which also shows the direction of 
suspended ceiling elements, the main tees (MT) and the cross tees (CT).  
 
Figure 4. 27 Dimensions and direction of main tees (MT) and cross tees (CT) in different rooms 
The area of major interest is the ER Room, both due to its the size and its functions. The areas 
and perimeters of the rooms are listed in Table 4.5. Since the ER and OBI rooms are located at 
the same level of the building, their seismic demands are the same. However, due to their 
difference in size, the overall capacity of the ceilings in different rooms will vary. It is expected 
that the capacity of the ceiling in the ER room will be lower than in the OBI rooms, making the 
first more vulnerable during an earthquake.  
Table 4.5 Size of the different rooms in the Emergency Department
ZONE 
AREA 
[M2] 
PERIMETER 
[M] 
STRUCTURAL UNIT AREA 189.8 62 
EMERGENCY ROOM 
(without toilet) 
53 32 
OBI ROOM1 (without toilet) 14 18 
OBI ROOM2 (without toilet) 14.5 18 
OBI ROOM3 (without toilet) 18.5 14
X 
Y 
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Due to the dearth of information about the components and the characteristics required for the 
derivation of fragility curves, assumptions have been made about the directions (MT and CT) and 
the type of elements used. It is to be noted that the assumptions made regarding the capacity of 
the system investigated has a considerable impact on the outcome. The onsite observations show 
that the characteristic of the ceiling components installed in the hospital display a satisfactory 
proximity to the ceiling system studied by Paganotti (2010). Further evidence by closely 
reviewing the actual size and mechanical properties of the ceiling components is required to 
establish their actual capacity. 
4.3.1.1.2 Description of the suspended ceiling used 
The installed ceiling is defined as a sub-ceiling, having a cavity space between the fixing base 
and the basic ceiling. The system used in the hospital is perimeter-fixed, provided by Knauff and 
consisting of different elements as shown in Figure 4. 28. The primary structure is composed of 
different elements: suspension flanges, spiral suspensions and regulation springs. The hanger 
wires are fixed through a hole in the bulb of the section and wrapped around themselves, spaced 
in accordance with the manufacturer and project conditions required. A metal grid (distribution 
class) is suspended from the underside of the floor above and is made up of long and short 
intermediate tees. The panels installed in the hospital have a dimension of 0.59x0.59x0.018 
meters and weigh 4.56 kg each. These elements are modular and removable and hide the space 
between the metal grid on which they are seated and the floor above. 
 
N.1: tees PP 24/38 (primary tees) 
N.2: tees IC 24/38 (short 
intermediate tees) 
N.3: tees IL 24/38 (long 
intermediate tees) 
N.4: suspensions: suspension 
flange (FS); spiral suspension 
(SS42 90); suspension x PP 
(SPP), regulation spring (MRU). 
 
 
Figure 4. 28 Schematic ceiling components installed in the emergency department. 
4.3.1.2 The cabinet non-structural component 
No many data are available for assessing non-structural components and the generation of their 
fragility curves is the rare product of a complex laboratory and analytical work. However, thanks 
to the work by Cosenza et al. (2014), another non-structural component could be added to this 
study: the cabinet. 
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Cosenza et al.  carried out several experimental tests on hospital building contents and 
established the limit states for a typical healthcare room. In particular, their experiments assessed 
the influence of the distance  between the cabinets and the wall. This study takes into account the 
last analytical manipulation representing the fragility curve of a cabinet, considering variations in 
mass and space between the cabinet and wall (Figure 4. 31).  
To realistically complete the present case study, these data can be included as representative 
for the cabinets. 
4.3.2 Seismic vulnerability of suspended ceiling system 
To assess the performance of the ceilings, the capacity of the suspended ceiling systems installed 
needs to be compared with the seismic demand on the floors of the hospital building. Due to the 
scarcity of available data, assumptions have been made regarding the capacity of the system. 
Following quantitative comparisons, the system elements used in the hospital have been 
compared in terms of size and material. Since the components of the system provided from the 
hospital resulted of same size and material,  it has been concluded that the ceiling system used in 
the emergency area is similar to the suspended ceilings manufactured in New Zealand, which 
were tested in a previous study at the University of Canterbury (Paganotti 2010). Therefore, it has 
been concluded that the fragility curves resulting from these experiments could be used to 
represent the capacity of the ceilings in the current study.  
The ceilings located in the ER area were designed on the base of the guidelines provided by 
the manufacturers of the system, and the allowable size of the main and cross tees were checked. 
Fragility curves were then derived for the most critical components of the system ± Rivets on 
both tees (R3.2mm), connections in Cross tees (CT-con) and splices in Main tees (MT-Sp) ± with 
floor acceleration as the intensity measure. Since the system is considered a failure as soon as any 
of its components reaches its capacity, it is possible to assume that the weakest element governs 
the capacity of the whole. Accordingly an envelope curve, as shown in Figure 4. 29, was drawn 
on the far left side of the graphs: this curve indicates the overall fragility of the ceilings. The 
enveloping fragility curves were compared with the demand acceleration resulting from the 
numerical analyses of the hospital. For the ER Room, the envelope is considered as the curve of 
the weakest element (see Figure 4. 29), while for the OBI Room, where the curves of the 
elements cross each other, an overall failure envelop is derived from the individual component 
fragility curves (see Figure 4. 30). 
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Figure 4. 29Fragility curves of the elements and envelop curve for the ER Room: rivets of the main tees 
(ER_T/T1SP); main tees(ER_T1r); cross tees(ER_C/T1) and rivets of the cross tees(ER_T1/MTR).  
 
Figure 4. 30 Fragility curves of the elements and envelop curve for the OBI Room: main tees (OBI_T1R); rivets of the 
main tees(OBI_T/T1SP); cross tees (OBI_T1MTr); rivets of the cross tees (OBI_C/T1con); and envelop curve 
(OBI_envelop). 
4.3.3 Seismic vulnerability of cabinet elements  
The cabinet non-structural component is considered for the overturning limit, due to the lack of 
data in other damage limit states, and because the change of position does not cause big problems 
into the emergency room. Other damage limit states could be considered for example in the 
pharmacy, where medicine faults can cause greater consequences. Figure 4. 31 illustrates the 
fragility curve derived by Cosenza et al.  which for the present work have been assumed as 
reliable data. 
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Figure 4. 31 Last fragility curves analytically derived from the laboratory tests at the University of Naples (Cosenza E. 
et al.) for the sample cabinet non-structural component. 
4.4 Organizational aspects of the case study 
The emergency department is one of the most critical areas/functions of a hospital. For this 
reason, in order to provide the highest possible level of service to the community with the 
available resources, it is important to maximize the efficiency and the use of the emergency 
department. Accordingly the main aim is to carry out an investigation using the Discrete Event 
Simulation (DES) model, which permits to statistically verify the behaviour of the hospital by 
performing several cases of organizational setting and occurring events.  
4.4.1 Computer simulation use 
The use of computer simulations has been recently increasing, both regarding the design and the 
operational aspects of healthcare facilities. One of the reasons leading to this development is the 
desire to maintain a high level of quality of the services together with the decrease of the 
associated costs. In addition, thanks to the improvement of the software used, , the limitations of 
computational simulation models for practical applications of heath care, is no longer an 
insurmountable constrain.  
Simulations are statistical experiments that allow us to model in detail the internal operation 
RIDKRVSLWDO7KLVNLQGRIHYDOXDWLRQSHUPLWVWRDQVZHU³ZKDWLI´TXHVWLRQVEHIRUHPDNLQJDQ\
real change; in this sense, computer simulations also allow the optimal use of healthcare 
resources subjected to various constraints.  
A large amount of studies in healthcare industry are the result of such simulations. Cote 
(1999) developed a simulation model for performance evaluation in an outpatient clinic. He 
investigated the influence of examination room capacity and patient flow on four performance 
measures: room usage, room queue length, occupancy of the examining rooms and patient flow 
time. Cahill & Render (1999) used computer simulations to analyse the flow of patients through 
the intensive care unit (ICU), telemetry and medical floor beds, and to assess the effects of the 
planned phased construction. Weng & Houshmand (1999) made use of computer simulations to 
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find the best staff size able to maximize the patient throughput and to minimize patient flow time 
and cost. Fitzpatrick et al. (1993) used a simulation model to assess the performance of different 
scheduling for operating rooms based on throughput, waiting time, and facility utilization. 
Iskander & Carter (1991) developed a simulation model to simulate the operations of the same 
day care unit (SDCU) and to evaluate the system performance under various patient load 
conditions. The model was used to successfully identify the facility needs at the SDCU in order 
to optimize patient care and accommodate projected growth in patient volumes. 
4.4.2 Organizational modelling approach 
The objectives of this study ± which relies on the Discrete event simulation model ± are: (1) to 
assess the level of the emergency department chosen as the case study in normal condition; (2) to 
determine the impact of a patient inflow due to a seismic shock; (3) to assess the influence of 
increasing resources following the existing emergency plans; (4) to assess the response of the 
structure in case of different failures due to structural and non-structural components in an 
emergency. According to Law & Kelton (2000), a systematic simulation steps involves the 
following steps:  
- Comprehension of the objectives and study planning; 
- Assumption of the performance measures; 
- input and analysis data collection; 
- simulation model construction; 
- model validation; 
- simulation of scenarios; 
- outputs interpretation; 
- to draw conclusions; 
- resilience assessment. 
4.4.3 Emergency department functioning 
The emergency department (ED), whose general location in the hospital campus is shown in 
Figure 4. 32 and which is illustrated in more detail in Figure 4. 33, Figure 4. 34, and Figure 4. 35, 
is dedicated to the emergencies and urgencies which need dedicated spaces (see Figure 4. 37 and 
Figure 4. 38); moreover, it makes use of spaces dedicated to the short observation of those 
patients needing more time to have their conditions checked (see Figure 4. 36).  
The access to the emergency rooms and consequently to medical cares, does not depend on 
the relative time different patients arrive at the hospital, but on the severity of their health 
condition. In the case under consideration, this procedure is evaluated through a practice called 
³WULDJH´ Figure 4. 35), which allows to assign to each patients, upon their arrival, a degree of 
XUJHQF\UHSUHVHQWHGE\D³FRORuUFRGH´ 
Such a practice is used in Italy by those healthcare structures that reach more than 15000 
entries a year. Even though our hospital does not reach this amount of entries, the same procedure 
has been adopted also in the current case study since the personnel knows this practice and 
employs it in order to fasten the emergency department procedures. 
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Figure 4. 32 The Emergency Department (ED) location within the other structural units of the hospital campus. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 33 Inner space of the ED: corridor. Figure 4. 34 Inner space of the ED: corridor toward the OBI rooms. 
  
Figure 4. 35Inner space of the ED: triage desk. Figure 4. 36 Inner space of the ED: OBI room. 
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Figure 4. 37 Inner space of the emergency room 
(ER): the yellow code beds. Figure 4. 38 Contents of an emergency room (ER). 
Figure 4. 39 shows the rate of patient entries in the province of Arezzo, where the case study is 
situated. As briefly described in par. 4.1, the Tuscan hospital located in Sansepolcro belongs to 
the third category. This categorization is due both to its dimensions and to the number of 
recovery beds, i.e. the population to which it must take care of. The graphs illustrate the 
percentage of entries in comparison with other hospitals belonging to the same regional health 
framework. 
As evident from Figure 4. 39, the number of entries in the emergency department of the case 
study hospital is less than 15000 people; the same it happens for the Casentino and Valdichiana 
hospitals; on the contrary, the structures of Arezzo and Valdarno, serve a greater number of 
patients. Although, the hospitals with less than 15000 entries a year do not provide the triage 
service, the Sansepolcro hospital train its personnel to this service that is considered as an 
essential one for the good treatment of patients. Accordingly the current study reports data that 
FRXOGKDYHEHHQGUDZQIURPDQ\RWKHU³QRUPDO´KRVSLWDO 
Figure 4. 39 Number of entries in  the year 2012for the case study hospital among the other hospitals in the region 
network. 
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In Italy there are different colour codes to be assigned to a patient at the triage moment. 
Normally there are four different colour codes, but the Tuscany Region added a new one in order 
to give priority to urgency and emergency patients. When a patient arrives to the reception, the 
nurse starts the procedure in order to identify the most appropriate colour code on the base of the 
definitions listed in Table 4.6: 
Table 4.6 Colour codes definition 
 
RED CODE (RC) ± emergency IMMEDIATE ACCESS: the patient is in imminent DANGER of life. 
YELLOW CODE (YC) ± urgent 
QUICK ACCESS: 
not deferrable urgent, potentially life-threatening 
condition. 
GREEN CODE (GC) ± urgent deferrable Urgency deferrable, the PROBLEM is acute, but non-critical. 
BLUE CODE (BC) ± low emergency The problem is acute, but of little clinical relevance. 
WHITE CODE ± not urgent The problem is not acute, MINIMUM of relevance. 
 
Patients who are given the Major (yellow and red) Codes come in through the driveway entrance 
of the emergency department: they gain a rapid access by ambulance or by car. . On the contrary, 
the Minor Codes can reach the acceptance area through the north-west located crossover. On 
their arrival all patients have to register to get the code assigned by the nurse on duty: this does 
not apply to Red Codes that skip the queue and with immediate priority enter the emergency 
rooms.  
Once they are assigned the colour code, patients have to follow a specific procedure according 
to their own colour code. Minor Codes wait in the waiting room (WR) before entering the clinic 
for minor codes (ACM ± Ambulatorio Codice Minore): here they are seen by a doctor who 
allocate them to the Discharge (DISCH) or to the short intensive observation rooms (OBI ± 
Osservazione Breve Intensiva), depending on the outcome of the medical examination.  
Major Codes, after the triage (directly made by the hospital personnel or by other medical 
personnel) pass into the emergency room (Sala del Pronto Soccorso) where they are examined by 
a nurse (and often by another medical figure ± the OSS ± Operatore Socio Sanitario, who helps 
her during the medical treatment), and then by a doctor. 
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Figure 4. 40 Flow chart of “Major Codes” patients 
 
 
Figure 4. 41 Flow chart of “Minor Codes” patients 
 
'HSHQGLQJRQWKHSDWLHQW¶VFRQGLWLRQVWKHKRVSLWDOSHUVRQQHOFDQGHFLGHWRPRYHWKHSDWLHQW WR
WKH2%,WKH5HFRYHU\DUHDRUWKH'LVFKDUJH7KHSDWLHQWV¶IORZFKDUWVDQGWKHYDULRXVRSHUDWLRQV
in different locations follow the diagram represented in  Figure 4. 41 and Figure 4. 40. 
Patients who arrive at the Emergency department of the Sansepolcro hospital are rarely Red 
Codes: this hospital belongs to the Tuscan hospital network and therefore people in critical 
conditions are generally transferred to other hospitals by ambulance. However, the access of Red 
Codes cannot be excluded a priori : for this reason ± in the predicted emergency scenarios± they 
have  been included into the organizational model. In addition, the hospital has a room dedicated 
to infected patients: in case all other rooms are occupied this room is used as an alternative OBI 
room. 
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Figure 4. 42Patients’ paths and main locations of the emergency department in the normal scenario 
4.4.4 Procedures and data analysis 
The data to set WKHVLPXODWLRQPRGHOZHUHFROOHFWHGRQWKHEDVHRIWKHSDWLHQWV¶UDWHRIDUULYDOWKH
various types of treatments for different color-codes, the resources and the time necessary for 
carrying out the procedures associated with the health service, the hospiWDOSHUVRQQHO¶VZRUNLQJ
KRXUVDQGWKHQXUVHVDQGGRFWRUV¶DFWLYLWLHV6RPHRIWKHGDWDZHUHFROOHFWHGWKURXJKIDFH-to-face 
LQWHUYLHZVZLWKNH\KRVSLWDOSHUVRQQHOZKLOHRWKHUGDWDOLNHWKHSDWLHQWV¶UDWHRIDUULYDODQGWKH
duration of the cycle of services provided) were collected from different existing electronic 
databases. The data refer to a trimester (January-March 2012).   
$PRQJWKHPDLQGDWDIRUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHPRGHOWKHUHDUHWKHSDWLHQWV¶IORZFKDUWVDQG
the data regarding the medical staff. Number of resources (doctors and nurses) and work time, 
with the locations that the resources can visit are presented in Table 4.7, where the scheduled 
work time and the locations interested by each resource are specified, such as the medical 
personnel confirmed during the periodic meetings. 
The model accounts for the unidirectional or bidirectional paths associated with each resource. 
In the construction of the model it is possible to allow or not allow the entrance of a specific 
resource in the specific locations. In this case it is assumed for the medical personnel to work 
WKURXJK WKH HQWLUH HPHUJHQF\ GHSDUWPHQW ZKLOH WKH ³RWKHU´ UHVRXUFHV LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH
transporters) are limited to some locations (e.g. it is not permitted the transit through the OBI 
rooms and the ACM room). The shift rotation of nurses and doctors covers the whole day since 
the emergency department constitutes a 24 hour service for the community; while other medical 
personnel such as the OSS ± that are support (but not indispensable) personnel ± have reduced 
schedules.  
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Table 4.7 Nnumber and scheduled work time of Emergency department personnel. 
RESOURCES N° SHEDULED WORK TIME PATHS AND LOCATIONS 
NURSES 2 7-13 13-21 21-7 Entry, Reception, ACM, Waiting Room, Recovery, Discharge, Emergency Room, OBI Room 
OTHER MEDICAL 
OPERATOR (oss) 1 1-13 13-21 
Entry, Reception, ACM, Waiting Room, Recovery, Discharge, 
Emergency Room, OBI Room 
DOCTORS 2 h24 Entry, Reception, ACM, Waiting Room, Recovery, Discharge, Emergency Room, OBI Room 
OTHER 2 h24 Entry, Reception, Emergency Room, Discharge 
 
In normal scenarios OSS operators help the nurses to take care of the patients before they are 
seen by a doctor; moreover, they can help the patients to move from one location to another; 
however, they are not allowed to make the triage: this operation is strictly reserved to nurses and 
doctors who have been trained for that. Accordingly even in case there are no OSS workers the 
personnel of  the Emergency Department can fulfil their duties.  
Table 4.8 resumes the time needed by the hospital personnel to perform standard medical 
operations in different locations.  
Table 4.8 Time needed for triage and medical procedures by different colour codes in different locations 
  ENTRY 
TRIAGE 
(Reception
) 
EMERGENC
Y ROOM OBI 
OTHE
R 
BEDS 
RECOVER
Y ACM 
WAITIN
G ROOM 
RED 
CODES X 
around 2-5 
minutes 
around 5-10 
minutes with 
nurse and 10-20 
minutes with 
doctor 
- - to ask - - 
YELLO
W 
CODES 
X around 2-5 minutes 
around 5-10 
minutes with 
nurse and 10-20 
minutes with 
doctor 
from 
4 
hour
s to 
48 
hour
s 
- to ask - - 
GREEN 
CODES X 
5-10 
minutes - - 
30-90 
minutes - 
10-20 
minute
s 
? 
BLUE 
CODES X 
5-10 
minutes - - - - 
10-15 
minute
s 
? 
WHITE 
CODES X 
5-10 
minutes - - - - 
5-10 
minute
s 
? 
 
It is worth to notice that the triage of the Major (red and yellow) Codes needs less time than that 
of the minor codes: this is due to the urgent and serious conditions of the first category of patients 
whose triage is directly carried out by the medical personnel during the transfer to the hospital. 
It is difficult to exactly estimate the time spent by a patient into the emergency room; there 
are, however,  some mandatory medical operations requiring the time expressed in the table for 
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the red and yellow codes. Additionally, patients are moved as soon as possible to the OBI rooms: 
this procedure is meant to reduce queues and to keep emergency beds free for other patients who 
need to be examined.   For the same reason even the OBI beds have time restrictions: they can 
accommodate patients for no more than 48 hours. Then patients have to be discharged or 
recovered. The average time for a medical examination carried out by a doctor in the ACM 
ambulatory is 20 minutes, but iW FUXFLDOO\ GHSHQGV RQ WKH SDWLHQW¶V FRQGLWLRQ 3DWLHQWV¶ DUULYDO
data are used to outline the daily arrival pattern in a month and the trends concerning the hourly 
arrivals in a day.. The identified empirical probability distribution is used to simulate tKHSDWLHQWV¶
arrivals in the model. Figure 4. 43 and Figure 4. 44 show the probability distribution of daily 
patient volumes, as well aV WKH KRXUO\ SHUFHQWDJH RI SDWLHQWV¶ DUULYDOV DW WKH (PHUJHQFy 
department. 
 
Figure 4. 43 Average of hourly patient arrivals
 
Figure 4. 44 Distribution of daily patient arrivals 
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Figure 4. 43 shows that on 13 days out of 100 days, the number of patients arriving at the 
Emergency Department is 35. Figure 4. 44 shows that the number of patients arriving at the 
Emergency department after 9:00 am represents 10,41% of the total arrivals in a day. 
As PHQWLRQHGDERYH WKHILYHW\SHVRIFRGHVDUHGLYLGHGLQWRWZRPDMRUJURXSV WKH³0LQRU
&RGHV´ DUH DVVLJQHGZKLWH EOXHRUJUHHQ FRORXUZKLOH WKH ³0DMRU&RGHV´ WKH\HOORZDQG UHG
ones. This classification is made especially for planning purposes, both for the location 
management and for the hospital personnel involved. From a functional point of view the 
grouping of these two categories of patients takes into account the resources involved and is 
useful to estimate the timing of service delivery according to the emergency.  
 
Figure 4. 45 Arrival rate at the Emergency Department in a normal scenario. 
Besides, such classification permits to operate with the same distinction in a maxi-emergency 
phase, in which the Major Codes will have the highest priority, while the Minor codes will not be 
taken into care and will be transferred to other structures (for more details see par. 4.4.5.2.1).   
In the emergency model additional data are taken into account, that is: the time duration of 
surgeries, the increased inflow of patients to the Emergency Department, the availability of more 
resources and the opening of Operating Rooms (ORs).  
To capture the time required to transfer patients from one place to another, a matrix of 
distance has been prepared (see Table 4.9). This type of data are needed to estimate the time 
spent for transportation within the system. All distances are in meters and are derived from the 
architectural draws of the hospital. It must be noted that the path of the patients during the two 
scenarios (the normal and the emergency ones) varies widely: in the setting of normal operations 
all functions are carried out on a single level, while in a changing scenario, once the emergency 
procedures are activated, the patients are moved to the Operating Rooms located on the second 
floor. Only a vertical connection is installed between the two level by means of a dedicated ED 
elevator.  
The model accounts for the possibility to simulate a downtime during the path, such as in case 
of damage occurred at the elevator.  
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Table 4.9 Distance matrix for the Emergency Department in a normal scenario  
  ENTRY RECEPTION EMERGENCY ROOM 
WAITING 
ROOM ACM OBI 
ENTRY 0 20 9 25 25 25 
RECEPTION - 0 10 3 10 10 
EMERGENCY 
ROOM - - 0 12,5 17,5 13 
WAITING ROOM - - - 0 12 12 
ACM - - - - 0 18 
OBI - - - - - 0 
* All distances are in meters, measured from layout drawing. 
Moreover, in order to make the organizational model as realistic as possible, it is necessary to 
WDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHSRVVLELOLW\IRUSDWLHQWVWR³FKDQJHFRORXU´7KLVSURFHVVRFFXUVIUHTXHQWO\LQ
the Emergency department structure. As matter of fact, after the first triage, patients can be 
VWDELOL]HG ZDLWLQJ IRU WKH GRFWRU¶V H[DPLQDWLRQ DQG IXUWKHU LQYHVWLJDWLRQV LQ FDVH RI 0DMRU
Codes), or they can wait until they are examined by a doctor and then have to undergo further 
analyses. Therefore after the doFWRU¶VH[DPLQDWLRQLQ WKH(5RU WKH$&0DPEXODWRU\RUDIWHU
IXUWKHUDQDO\VHVWKHSDWLHQW¶VFRQGLWLRQFDQJHWEHWWHURUZRUVH 
'DWDSURYLGHGIURPWKHKRVSLWDOGDWDEDVHGHPRQVWUDWHDODUJHUDWHRI³FKDQJHGFRORXUV´)RU
the simulation to be realistic, the model takes into account this possibility: since a patient . can be 
assigned to different colours according to his/her varying health condition, the model gives 
priority to those patients whose condition is getting worse. The model includes the percentages 
referred to each colour code shifting to another level of severity, according to the data provided 
by the health system. The paWLHQWV¶SDWKVLGHDOO\VKRZQLQFigure 4. 41 and Figure 4. 40, change 
significantly and follow the diagrams represented in Figure 4. 46.  
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Figure 4. 46 Percentages referred to each code taking into account the possibility for a patient to change 
his/her colour after having been examined in the Emergency room (Red and Yellow Codes) or in the ACM 
ambulatory(Green and Blue Codes ). 
These data indicate that patients can be assigned different colours after the first medical 
examination (by a doctor), or after further analyses. For instance a patient who has been given a 
green code can get another colour once his/her conditions have been verified. Otherwise in case 
WKH SDWLHQW¶V FRQGLWLRQ UHPDLQV VWDEOH WKH FRORU FRGH GRHV QRW FKDQJH $V D FRQVHTXHQFH WKH
SDWLHQWV¶IORZFKDUWVERWKIRU0DMRUDQG0LQRUFRGHVDUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\IL[HGEXWFDQFKDQJH
due to further re-assignments.  
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Figure 4. 47 Realistic patients’ flow charts for Major Codes (“changed colours” included). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 48 Realistic patients flow chart of Minor Codes, including “change colour”. 
 
4.4.5 Simulation model description 
The activities performed in the ED can be summarized as follows:  to make the triage; to transfer 
the patients to the Emergency room, to move the Major-Codes from the Emergency room (ER) to 
the OBI rooms, to move the patients from the ER to the Recovery beds, to accommodate the 
walking patients from the Waiting room (WR) to the ACM ambulatory and/or to the OBI beds. 
*LYHQ WKHVH DFWLYLWLHV DV ZHOO DV WKH URXWHV SURFHVV WLPHV WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ WLPHV DQG VWDII¶V
schedules, an animated simulation model is able to show how patients are taken care of in the 
ER, ACM, OBI rooms and other beds. 
7KHG\QDPLFQDWXUHRIWKHSDWLHQWV¶IORZWRZDUGVWKHKRVSLWDOLVFDSWXUHGE\DOWHULQJWKHWLPH
between their arrivals at different times during a day. The total number of arrivals in a day 
follows the distribution shown in Figure 4. 44. Parameters and attribute values are assigned upon 
arrival for each patient. The most important attribute value ± the patient group (i.e. severity code) 
± is assigned according to the probability of occurrence of the cases shown in Table 4.10. 
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Table 4.10 Patient groups and probability of occurrence. 
WHITE 
CODES 
BLUE 
COSED 
GREEN 
CODES 
YELLOW 
CODES 
RED 
CODES 
DEAD
E tot 
416 17 447 105 5 1 991 
0.419 0.017 0.451 0.105 0.005 0.001 1 
0.42 0.02 0.45 0.11 0.01 0.00 1.00 
41.98% 1.72% 45.11% 10.60% 0.50% 0.10% 1.00 
 
The patients are routed through a sequence of units according to their types (see Figure 4. 48 and  
Figure 4. 47). For each unit, the appropriate staff resources and schedules are incorporated 
according to both location and patient group. Process time in each unit is also generated 
according to the appropriate distribution at the time a patient arrives at the unit (see Table 4.11). 
When two or more patients attempt to enter the same unit, a FIFO (First In- First Out) rule is 
used. In case a unit is full, patients who need to be treated in that unit will experience a waiting 
time. 
The transportation time is modelled with the help of the path network that captures the 
information in the from-to distance chart. Speeds of gurney movement (with and without 
patients) are specified. 
The software model calculates and adds the movement time where applicable.  
The following modelling assumptions have been made: each patient benefits from the priority 
assigned by his/her colour code; if a patients changes his/her colour code such a priority changes 
as well; all personnel of the same type have the same skill levels; the Brief Intensive Observation 
(OBI) rooms have limited capability (3+2 beds), as well as the Emergency room which 
accommodates one bed for the Red-Codes and two for the Yellow-Codes. The Waiting Room is 
considered as an infinity capability room.  
 
 
Figure 4. 49 Screenshot of the simulation model. 
CHAPTER 4 Case-study: the Sansepolcro hospital 
 
99 
Equipment/instruments are not explicitly modelled: at this state there is some chance for explicit 
modelling in structural and non-structural elements. Their failure and/or damage is simulated by 
assuming the closure of the rooms that implies an inoperability to provide medical services.  
The simulation model is capable of modelling the Emergency department for 24 hours a day. 
All entries (patients entering into ED), included those at night, are considered with full operation 
of the medical staff (with the only exception of the OSS operators). The simulation lasts one 
month. 
Table 4.11 Mathematical distribution representing the time spent by the colour code patients in different locations of 
the model 
  ENTRY 
TRIAGE 
(Recepti
on) 
EMERGENC
Y ROOM OBI 
OTHER 
BEDS 
RECOVER
Y ACM 
WAITING 
ROOM 
RED 
CODES X 
N(3.5;0.5
) 
N(7.5; 0.833) + 
N(15; 1.66) - - ? - - 
YELLO
W 
CODES 
X N(3.5;0.5) 
N(7.5; 0.833) + 
N(15; 1.66) 
N(1560
;440) - ? - - 
GREEN 
CODES X 
N(7.5;0.8
33) - - N(60;10) - 
N(15;
1.66) ? 
BLUE 
CODES X 
N(7.5;0.8
33) - - - - 
N(12.
5;0.8
33) 
? 
WHITE 
CODES X 
N(7.5;0.8
33) - - - - 
N(7.5
;0.83
3) 
? 
4.4.5.1 Model validation 
The data used for the construction of the model are associated to a period of three months, from 
January to March 2012. These patient volumes are also used for the model validation, to ensure it 
maps the hospital operations. To calibrate and validate the model the simulation-generated 
outputs are verified with the actual data.  
Some discrepancies may occur during the comparison due to the probability distribution used 
E\ WKHSURJUDPHVSHFLDOO\ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH SDWLHQWV¶DFFHSWDQFHXSRQDUULYDO$V IDU as the 
system measurements are concerned, one important measure is the time spent in the system; even 
more important are the data regarding the Waiting Time (WT) experienced by each patient. By 
comparing the simulation results with the actual data collected in a trimester (January-March 
2012), differences in average waiting time are obtained for each group. 
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Figure 4. 50 Output data from the model and current data from the hospital database. 
Considering the difficulties to capture the exact actual data (that refer to an entire semester) and 
the waiting time registered in the hospital for each patient group (sometimes given with the OBI 
rooms time, sometimes given without OBI and/or Recovery time), the variance in waiting time 
(WT) is compared with that of the actual data with a good result.  
For certain patient groups the value displayed by the simulation result is found to be higher 
than the variance showed by actual data. Into Figure 4. 50 is compared the waiting time from the 
PRGHO¶V VLPXODWLRQV YHUWLFDO EDU-graph), with the data provided by the hospital database 
(horizontal-bar graph). All the data is divided by a range of time of 2 hours. 
4.4.5.2 Simulation of scenarios 
The functionality conditions of a normal scenario drastically change in case of emergency, when 
more resources, like operating rooms (ORs), are activated according to the procedures of maxi 
emergency (PEMAF plan). The ORs, in accordance with the emergency procedures, have to  
suspend all programmed surgeries in order to accommodate the emergency cases. At the same 
time, all patients whose health condition allows them to leave the hospital are to be discharged in 
order to increase the number of beds available for new admissions.  
Figure 4. 51 sums up the transformation of the hospital system from the Normal Scenario to 
the Emergency Scenario and what concerns the striking of an earthquake. 
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Figure 4. 51 From a Normal scenario to Emergency scenario general view. 
As regards the model in an emergency scenario, all operating rooms have the same capacity; 
operating rooms are considered to be not damaged, and the emergency staff in the operating 
rooms is considered available. Also in the model relative to the state of emergency the only 
vertical connection between the ER and the operating rooms were taken into account and 
simulated by waiting a few minutes for the next step in the path traced to the operating room. 
In order to evaluate the performance of the ED functioning, to identify areas for 
improvements or changes and to assess the impact of adding more surgical case, the following 
models were made and performed: 
 
(1) Current patient volume and staff levels with the arrival pattern identified on the base of 
historical data (Model Name: Normal Condition ED); 
(2) Seismic arrival volume and current staff levels with the arrival pattern derived from the 
Northridge Hospital during the 1994 earthquake (Model Name: Emergency Condition 
NO PEMAF); 
(3) Seismic arrival volume and emergency staff levels following the emergency procedure 
(according to the PEMAF plan) with the arrival pattern derived from the Northridge 
Hospital during the 1994 earthquake (Model Name: Emergency Scenario PEMAF); 
(4) Seismic arrival volume and emergency staff levels following the emergency procedures 
with seismic arrival rate scaled with a factor from 1.0 to 1.6 (Models Name: Emergency 
ScenarLRĮ « 
(5) Seismic arrival volume and emergency staff levels following the emergency procedures 
with seismic arrival rate and closure of locations from 0 to 3 (Models Name: 
(PHUJHQF\6FHQDULRQ « 
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Each of the above models is simulated under different scenarios to evaluate possible 
improvements. More details for each model and characteristics are described in Chapter 5.  
4.4.5.2.1 Emergency planning of the hospital: the PEMAF plan 
The hospital organization of the emergency assistance in case of a disaster (called maxi-
HPHUJHQF\ LVGHOHJDWHGWR WKH³HPHUJHQF\SODQIRUPDVVLYH LQIORZRI LQMXUHGSDWLHQWV´FDOOHG
PEMAF- Piano di Emergenza Massiccio Afflusso di Feriti in Italian). This document describes in 
advance the most adequate logistic and organizational solutions to face a possible massive and 
unexpected flow of injured patients,  also identifying the types of measures to be taken, the terms 
and, as far as possible, the execution times and the leaders and executors of different procedures. 
To be effective, the plan must satisfy the following requirements: 
- Compatibility with the ordinary activities of the hospital; 
- Integration with the network of district rescue; 
- Adaptability to the multiplicity of the types of emergency or higher event; 
- Flexibility to best respond to a possible rapid evolution of the current situation; 
- Reliability, tested by regular exercises. 
 
The articulation of the PEMAF plan must also define: 
- The needs of particular sector of the population (children, disabled, foreigners); 
- Solutions to ensure immediate acceptance of victims and rapid reintegration of materials; 
- The hospital reception capacity in relation to the ordinarily resources available and the 
additional resources needed for the emergency. 
 
The first step in the PEMAF drafting is to consider hazards in the specific area of the hospital, 
and the importance of the healthcare facility in the network. In effect, since the PEMAF structure 
document is similar to every Italian hospital, each structure has its own characteristics related to 
the hazard areas, the hospital size, the number of resources and the type of service deliverable. 
With respect to this research, this case study refers to one of the most dangerous areas in 
Tuscany among those affected by earthquakes. The Emergency Plan must be coordinated with 
the other hospital activities in order to guarantee a medical service to the population; this entails a 
service both during an emergency in the case VWXG\¶V]RQHDQGLQDQRWKHUGLVWULFWIRUZKLFKWKH
facility zone needs help. In case of PEMAF activation, the Emergency Department must quickly 
change its setting: more resources are required and patients able to walk and whose health 
condition is not critical are moved to other locations. The normal setting of the emergency rooms, 
2%, URRPVDQG$&0DPEXODWRU\FKDQJHDQG WKUHHQHZ³]RQHV´DUHGHWHUPLQHG UHVXOWLQJ LQD
new capability:  
 
- A RED zone is identified within the Emergency Department location, regularly used by 
Red and Yellow Codes: in this area, where 2 patients can be simultaneously 
accommodated, operate 2 doctors, 2 nurses and 1 help operator (OSS); 
 
- A YELLOW zone identified within the Emergency Department places, regularly used by 
Yellow Codes and by OBI: in these areas, depending to the needs, operate from a 
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minimum of 1 doctor to a maximum of 3 doctors, 3 nurses and 2 OSS operators.; four 
patients can be accommodated in this area at the same time;  
 
- A GREEN zone is situated in the rehabilitation-gymnasium area. This area is designated 
for injured patients without alterations of vital parameters. Patients are accommodated in 
12 beds within the near ambulatories. The necessary staff consists of 2 doctors, 3 nurses 
and 1 OSS operator. 
 
These data are resumed in Table 4.12, while the architectural zoomed layout of the Emergency 
Department in Figure 4. 52 shows the new setting with the new resource disposition of the ED.  
Table 4.12 Resources activated in the different zone, following the emergency procedures. 
AREA DOCTORS N° 
NURSES 
N° 
OSSs 
N° 
PATIENTS 
MAXIMUM N° 
TRIAGE 1 1 - - 
RED ZONE 2 2 1 2 
YELLOW ZONE 2 3 2 4 
GREEN ZONE 2 3 1 12 
 
 
Figure 4. 52 Emergency Department changes in different zones following the Emergency procedures 
established by the PEMAF plan. 
In addition to the changed set of the Emergency Department, other locations are activated. The 
operating rooms immediately suspend the scheduled surgeries, in order to operate the grave 
patients coming from the disaster area. Therefore the path from-to the Operating Rooms (ORs) is 
included into the ED distance matrix. Table 4.13 and Figure 4. 53 show the distances and a 
general overview of the main locations during the Emergency phase. It is worth to note that the 
ORs are located on the second floor of another building, not so close to the Emergency 
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Department. Moreover, the only vertical connection between the two floors is an elevator, 
reserved to the hospital personnel.  
Table 4.13 From-to distance matrix of the locations activated following the Emergency procedures. 
 ENTRY RED ZONE 
YELLOW 
ZONE 
GREEN 
ZONE OR 
ENTRY 0 7,5 30 \ 60 
RED ZONE - 0 10 \ 60 
YELLOW 
ZONE - - 0 \ 70 
GREEN 
ZONE - - - \ \ 
OR - - - - 0 
* All distances are in meters, measured from layout drawing. 
 
  
 
Figure 4. 53 Changed path (for pedestrians and vehicles) from the Normal Condition Model (on the left) to the 
Emergency Condition Model (on the right). 
Patient paths and locations to accommodate them are modified following the emergency 
procedures. As described in the flow charts in Figure 4. 54, Figure 4. 55 and Figure 4. 56, 
patients skip the triage inside the emergency department since they are assigned a colour code 
before reaching the facility so that the emergency measures can proceed more rapidly than in a 
normal scenario.  
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Figure 4. 54 Flow chart of Red Codes during an emergency scenario. 
 
 
Figure 4. 55 Flow chart of Yellow Codes during an emergency scenario. 
 
 
Figure 4. 56 Flow chart of Green Codes during an emergency scenario. 
A new model (see Figure 4. 57) is built for the emergency scenario, adding resources and 
locations, modifying the patient flow charts and extending the layout until the ORs. The elevator 
is simulated to have the capacity of 1 patient location: the patient and the personnel wait some 
minutes to reach the upper floor. On the second floor, where the operating rooms are allocated, 
there are doctors and nurses dedicated to the surgeries. Therefore the medical staff that 
accompanies the patient delivers him to the staff operating on the second floor. This means that 
the hospital personnel of the emergency department must take care of patients until they are 
accommodated on the second floor. 
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Figure 4. 57  Screenshot of the Model during an Emergency Scenario 
4.4.5.2.2 The seismic arrival rate 
The arrival rate was determined by scaling the patient inflow of the Northridge hospital in Los 
Angeles, California, calculated during the earthquake which occurred in 1994 (Cimellaro et al. 
2011). First, the peak ground acceleration (PGA) at the site of the hospital was determined using 
the Italian seismic standard (for a Probability of Exceedance -PVR-  of 10% in 50 years), and the 
arrival rate at the Northridge hospital following the 1994 earthquake was scaled to the PGA value 
measured in the site of the hospital.  
The peak ground acceleration is evaluated according to the Italian Code (NTC- § 3.2); for 
those data is necessary to know other details regarding the structure and its location. The first one 
is the return Period, evaluated as a function of the reference period VR (NTC08 - § 2.4.3) and 
according to the corresponding probability PVR of exceeding of prearranged limit state during the 
reference period. The reference period (VR) is calculated as a function of the nominal life VN 
(NTC08 - § 2.4.1) and the coefficient of use CU  (NTC08 - § 2.4.3): 
 
ோܸ ൌ  ேܸ כ ܥ௎ (Eq.4. 5) 
The nominal life of a building is defined as the number of years in which the structure, as long as 
it has undergone  routine maintenance, must be able to be used according to the purpose it is 
intended for (see Table 4.14) 
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Table 4.14  VN index for different buildings (NTC08table 2.4.I) 
TYPE OF BUILDING VN 
Provisional building ± Structures in building ൑ ͳͲ 
Ordinary buildings, bridges, infrastructural 
constructions and dams of restrained 
dimensions or normal importance 
൒ ͷͲ 
Big structures, bridges, infrastructural 
constructions and dams of big dimensions or 
strategic importance 
൒ ͳͲͲ 
 
The coefficient of use  which depends on the building class of use (see Table 4.15). This class is 
assigned to the buildings based on their potential consequences as a result of a seismic event, 
such as interruption of operations or the eventual collapse (NTC - § 2.4.2). For buildings having 
public functions or being strategic, as hospitals are, the class of use is equal to IV. 
Table 4.15  Class of use and coefficient CU (NTC08table 2.4.II) 
Class of use I II III IV 
Coefficient CU 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.0 
 
The probability PVR of exceeding the reporting period, , is displayed in Table 4.16. 
Table 4.16  Probability of exceedance in the referred period VR, for different limit states 
Limit States PVR : Probability of exceedance in the referred Period VR 
 
SLE 
SLO 81% 
SLD 63% 
 
SLU 
SLV 10% 
SLC 5% 
 
7KH ³&RQVLJOLR GHL /DYRUL 3XEEOLFL´ GHYHORSHG D SURJUDP WKDW DOORZV WR FDOFXODWH WKH GHVLJQ
spectra for different reference periods, simply entering the town or the geographical coordinates 
of the building site. For the case study, the definition of the peak ground acceleration is 
calculated on the base of the following data: 
- Definition of nominal life and class of use of the building leading to the definition of the 
Reference Period of the seismic action. In this case, VN=50, CU=2 and VR=100. 
 
Assumption, as a function of the Latitude and Longitude (Table 4.17), of the basic seismic 
parameters ag, F0 and TC for the Limit State SLV. The peak ground acceleration for the site of the 
case study is calculated on bold calculated in  
Table 4.18. 
Table 4.17  Geographic coordinates. 
LONGITUDE LATITUDE 
12.15389907 43.57111808 
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Table 4.18: Seismic parameters for every return period associated with the different limit states. 
LIMIT STATE TR [years] ag  [g] Fo Tc [sec] 
SLO 60 0.098 2.343 0.271 
SLD 101 0.124 2.339 0.277 
SLV 949 0.287 2.397 0.310 
SLC 1950 0.361 2.403 0.324 
 
Considering the PGA for the 1994 earthquake in San Francisco, equal to 0.568 g, the scaling 
procedure is produced. However, this method presents some limitations; for instance, it does not 
take into account the real level of damage related to the area in which the earthquake happens. As 
matter of fact the case study inflow shows too low values compared to those of the Northridge 
1994 earthquake (see Figure 4. 58). 
 
 
Figure 4. 58 Seismic arrival rate calculated on the base of the inflow at the Northridge hospital during the 
1994 earthquake and scaled for the case study with the PGA scale factor. 
In order to get more significant results from the model, even putting the system under great 
pressure (in terms of patients number), another scaling has been used 
The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale, which takes in account all the above features, 
has been applied as a second scaling procedure.  
To compare seismic hazards in terms of PGA and certain intensities, it is necessary to have an 
empirical relation between intensity and acceleration, which allows to transform the macro-
seismic data into usable parameters (as it is here the case of the peak ground acceleration). 
Over the last 50 years many reports have been published about these correlations. This 
literature mainly differs with respect to the data under investigation and the addition of any extra 
parameter. On the base of such choices, a certain range of values within the formulation itself can 
EHFRQVLGHUHGYDOLGøQRUGHU to use these relations, the PGA of this case study must be assumed 
as follows: 
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ܲܩܣ௖௔௦௘௦௧௨ௗ௬ ൌ ͲǤʹͺ͹݃ ൌ ʹͺͳǤͶͷ ܿ݉ ݏଶΤ ൌ ʹͺͳǤͶͷ݉ ݏଶΤ  (Eq.4. 6) 
The PGA corresponds to the MMI intensity value which can be used in the formulations. The 
MMI scale has been determined using the relationships available in the literature (see Table 4.19) 
between the MMI values and the horizontal average and maximum PGA values at the site. 
Table 4.19 Formula available in the literature to compare PGA and MMI values. 
Author Relation Unit PGA 
Intensity range 
(validity) 
PGA range 
(cm/s2) 
Faccioli e Cauzzi (2006) IMCS=1,96LogPGA+6,54 m/s2 ,MCS 18-600 
Marin et al. 
(2004) I=10+2,3LogPGA g - - 
Wald et al. 
(1999) IMM=3,66LogPGA-1,66 cm/s
2 ,MM 4-1000 
Decanini et al. (1995) LogPGA=0,594+0,237IMM cm/s2 ,MM - 
Theodulis and 
Papazachos 
(1992) 
LnPGA=0,28+0,67IMM+0,42S 
S=0 at alluvium site 
S=1 at rock site 
cm/s2 ,MM 8,8-530 
Chiaruttini e Siro (1981) LogPGA(g*100)=-0,19+0,17I g - - 
0XUSK\	2¶%ULHQ 
(1977) LogPGA=0,25+0,25IMM cm/s
2 ,MM 10-700 
Ambraseys 
(1975) LogPGA=-0,16+0,36IMM cm/s
2 ,MM 2-600 
Medvedev and 
Sponheuer 
(1969) 
LogPGA=-0,408+0,301IMM cm/s2 ,MM 12-800 
Neumann 
(1954) 
Average distance of 25km 
LogPGA=-0,429+0,308 IMM 
Average distance of 160km 
LogPGA=-0,041+0,308 IMM 
cm/s2 ,MM 40-300 
 
The average values obtained by applying the above mentioned relations display an intensity equal 
to 8.26 IMM for the site of the case study, while the value was 9 in the Northridge case. 
Therefore a new scaling is obtained, as shown in Figure 4. 59. 
 
Figure 4. 59  Seismic arrival rate calculated for the inflow at the Northridge hospital during the 1994 
earthquake and scaled for the case study with the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale factor. 
Seismic resilience of hospitals  
 
110 
Figure 4. 60 shows the trend of the seismic patient inflow of the Northridge hospital and the 
patient seismic inflow modified according to the PGA (small dotted line) and the MMI (dotted 
line) for the hospital. The latter scaling procedure is used in the organizational model in order to 
simulate the inflow during an emergency. 
 
 
Figure 4. 60 Arrival rate in case of an Emergency scenario, following the Northridge data trend and scaling with PGA 
and MMI values. 
The inflow of the patient in terms of patient/minute during the emergency days (three days in the 
case of the Northridge earthquake) does not represent the only essential data. As matter of fact 
different disasters may result in different type of injuries. In this research, the disaster under 
consideration is an earthquake. In an emergency situation such as an earthquake, keeping track of 
patient/treatment is usually considered as a low priority activity (Pengfei 2005). As can be 
imagined, the pathological effects or injuries consequential to events of such significant 
magnitude can be varied, although in most cases they can be attributed to the following 
categories:  
a) harmful effects of traumatic injuries/burns;  
b) harmful effects of toxic nature/radiations;  
c) infections;  
d) diseases of the cardiovascular, respiratory and systemic organs.  
 
The proper distribution of cases within the hospital, the extent and the nature of the resources 
mobilized will depend, of course, on the main type of detrimental or pathological manifestations. 
Unfortunately, few injury data are available for analysis. Only two earthquakes are well 
documented (Aroni & Durkin 1987; Cheu 1994; Durkin 1995; Mahue 1996; Olson & Alexander 
1996; Salinas et al. 1998): the Northridge, CA earthquake in January 1994 and the Loma Prieta, 
CA earthquake in October 1989.  
It is difficult analyse the injuries; for this reason, according to the past researches, some data 
need to be taken into consideration, as well as the fact that physical injuries contribute to a large 
extent to the total ER examinations, and medical injuries also occupy ED resources. 
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Durkin (1995) reports the distribution of general types of injuries and medical problems in 
IRXU KRVSLWDOV¶ HPHUJHQF\ URRPV IRU WKH ILUVW  KRXUV DIWHU WKH1RUWKULGJH HDUWKTXDNH 6LQFH
these data referring to different earthquakes are not consistent, an additional adjustment is made 
to achieve a safe estimation; patients with similar medical needs and undergoing the same 
treatment procedure are grouped in six categories. These six categories are further divided 
according to the five Italian colour codes, in order to apply the patient/treatment distribution 
during an earthquake to the categories of the Italian hospital procedures.  
The results are shown in Table 4.20, where the percentages of patients in normal and 
emergency conditions as well as the number of entries are reported. 
Table 4.20  Arrivals at the Emergency Department in the normal scenario and in the emergency scenario.  
PATIENT TYPE 
 
NORMAL 
SCENARIO 
EMERGENCY SCENARIO 
 
% % number of people 
RED COLOR 0.5 3.7 37 
YELLOW 
COLOR 10.6 40 396 
GREEN COLOR 45.11 48.4 476 
BLUE COLOR 1.72 7.8 77 
WHITE COLOR 41.88 0 5 
 
During the emergency scenario, the emergency department of the case study treats only the major 
codes (red and yellow ones), while the minor codes are addressed to other parts of the hospital in 
order to facilitate the access to the emergency rooms. Since waiting times differ significantly for 
surgical and non-surgical patients, these categories are further classified in OR and non-OR 
patients as shown in Table 4.21.  
Table 4.21  OR and non-OR patients division.  
PATIENT TYPE 
 
OR patients Non-OR patients 
% % 
RED COLOR 0.215 0.785 
YELLOW 
COLOR 0.19 0.81 
 
In order to sketch a good comparison and to better comprehension the differences regarding the 
massive inflow of patients in an emergency scenario, Figure 4. 61 shows the normal arrival rate 
calculated in 31 days, and the derived seismic arrival rate for the first 3 days of emergency after 
the shock. On the right a zoomed 3-days comparison between the two arrival rates is shown: the 
peak around the end of the first day is more than two times the trend of the normal arrival rate 
expected for the same hospital. Both the inflows represent the total patients categories; into the 
model the distinction among the colour codes refers to the previously calculated percentages.  
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Figure 4. 61 Comparison between the arrival rate of Normal Scenario and the Seismic arrival rate defined for the 
Emergency Scenario. 
In both models (normal and emergency scenarios), the output data under consideration  are 
represented by the Waiting Time (WT) for each category of patient.  
It is possible to determine the effect of a ³seismic´ arrival rate on the organization and 
function ability of the ED personnel. The effects on patients WT, however, change drastically 
depending on the different applied models. In this research the WT considered as the unique 
value is the WT of Yellow Codes. This choice is due to two main facts: first, the impossibility to 
quantify WT for the Minor Codes (because of their movements during the Emergency phase) and 
second, the high priority reserved to Red Codes that, in most cases, are transferred to other 
structures. Accordingly the Yellow Codes appears to be the best category to be analysed and the 
easier to compare in different models. Since the simulation model does not apply to the first few 
hours immediately after a shock (an earthquake in this case), two factors have been left out of 
consideration: the issue of supplementary medical staff and the impossibility to reach the 
hospital. Their analysis, however, may constitute a future development of this research. 
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Chapter 5 
Meta-models and resilience 
5.1 Tools and data  
The performance of organizational models is analysed and evaluated considering a unique 
variable: the waiting time. As matter of fact this variable (see Ch. 3.1.1 for a detailed description) 
seems to be the most important to assess since it is the unique one being relevant for applying the 
methodology at different stages and therefore for describing the behaviour of the system under 
different conditions. The waiting time is calculated for each yellow-code patient entering the 
HPHUJHQF\GHSDUWPHQW7KHZDLWLQJWLPHLVFDOFXODWHGFRQVLGHULQJWKHSDWLHQW¶VPRYHPHQWVXSRQ
his/her arrival until he/she receives the first medical treatment, both in normal (red asterisk in 
Figure 5. 1) and emergency scenarios (red asterisk in Figure 5. 2). 
 
Figure 5. 1 Yellow patients’ flowchart in a normal scenario.
 
* **
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Figure 5. 2  Yellow patients’ flowchart in an emergency scenario. 
The Figures above show the beginning of the waiting time (indicated by a red asterisk) and its 
ending (signalled by a double red asterisk). The WT is measured inside the emergency room 
immediately after the first care is provided: in effect measuring the WT at the very entrance of 
the emergency room does not guarantee the medical assistance, say the patients getting the 
emergency room are not necessarily provided medical treatments. Monte Carlo methods of the 
organizational model are performed one hundred times: the resulting file lists the waiting time 
experienced by each patient. Such evidence must be filtered according to the colour code of the 
patients, then it is necessary to set the data clouds (black dots in Figure 5. 3), in order to calculate 
a median curve of these points (red dots in Figure 5. 3). 
 
 
Figure 5. 3 Yellow patients’ flowchart in a normal scenario.  
Generally the curves follow the same trend, well represented by a bell-curve. After a series of 
fittings, the Lognormal equation with three parameters results the best for fitting for all the 
curves, being a shifted Lognormal with two parameters. Indeed, some  simulations are performed 
with normal-condition-days before the shock (normal scenario), and some other are performed 
starting with the seismic arrival rate (emergency scenario). Three parameters are finally found, 
and they can be used to compare a series of models with variable parameters. This is illustrated in 
the following chapters.  
 
 
* **
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Figure 5. 4 Yellow patients’ flowchart in a normal scenario.  
These analytical manipulations permit to mathematically assess the waiting time experienced by 
patients under specific conditions: such evaluation can be used as a final tool by the medical 
personnel and the hospital manage to predict and prevent a loss of functionality inside the 
hospital.  
 
This curve is well represented as a Gaussian-curve, for which the best fitting has been found. All 
the waiting time curves have approximatively the same shape, and therefore the same fitting is 
used.  
After several approximations, the equation Lognormal with three parameters has been chosen. 
Such a choice depends on the possibility, in the future, to perform other simulations that take into 
account also the days before the shock event: the Lognormal distribution with three parameters is 
shifted to the right, which permits to compare different simulations at the same time. It is worth 
to keep in mind that the simulation that permitted to calibrate the model was performed on the 
base of two days in the normal scenario before the three days in the emergency scenario and 
some more days under normal conditions for re-establishing the normality of the system. 
This study exclusively refers to the waiting time experienced by yellow code patients: this is due 
to the fact that these patients are subject to a great variety of medical procedures, both under 
normal conditions and in case of emergency. Besides, according to the statistics provided by the 
hospital database, yellow code patients are those whose colour code more often changes after the 
first medical treatment. Moreover, in an emergency, the majority of patients entering the 
emergency department are yellow-coded and the treatments they undergo are statistically the 
most probable during an earthquake (see par. 4.4.4). 
 
Even though red-code patients have a higher priority than yellow-code patients,  the latter are 
subject to a greater number of clinical pathologies that this specific case-study is able to treat. As 
matter of fact, red-code patients are mostly transferred to other healthcare structures. 
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The DES model is able to register the waiting time at all stages of the simulation and, once 
conveniently set, the occurrence of different needs.  
5.2 Organizational models performed  
The organizational models performed in this work have a fundamental role inasmuch they are 
predictive of specific emergency situations in which the system can be tested. After the 
calibration of the model in normal conditions, it is possible to assume that the response to the 
seismic input, whit the activation of the general emergency procedures, is representative of a real 
situation, in which the system has to face a critical phase.  
Accordingly several organizational models have been performed after having introduced some 
dissimilarities. Three groups of models are identified, with multiple variable cases. For each 
group, assumptions are made in order to adapt the model to the main aim of the work, that is: to 
determine the behaviour of the hospital system under different critical conditions.  
In addition, other typologies of models are developed in order to validate the methodology 
presented in Ch.3, and to pinpoint the peculiarities of the healthcare facility. 
The performed simulations can be grouped as follows: 
- CASE 1: group of organizational models with permanent room closures and emergency 
procedures activated for all length of the simulation; 
- CASE 2: group of organizational models with permanent room closures; 
- CASE 3: group of organizational models with temporary room closures. 
 
Within each group, several variations are introduced, depending on the variables involved. In the 
paragraphs concerning each group of simulations the peculiarity and the characteristics of these 
groups are specifically presented. From a general point of view, the following assumptions are 
considered for all the groups: 
- the emergency phase lasts 3 days (72 hours): this parameter is due to the nature of the 
RQO\DYDLODEOHGDWDLHWKH1RUWKULGJHSDWLHQWV¶LQIORZ 
- WKH URRP FORVXUHV DUH FRQVLGHUHG  ³SHUPDQHQW´ LI WKH\ DUH FDXVHG E\ GDPDJHV ZKLFK
persist for 72 hours or more; 
- the rooms can accommodate one patient at a time, if the rooms are occupied, patients 
must wait until the first room is available; 
- the totality of closed rooms does not constitute a possible case (such a case would be 
nonsensical for the present investigation);  
- the access to the rooms by lined up patients is determined by the FIFO (first-in-first-out) 
law, for patients sharing the same code; 
- resources in terms of hospital personnel are fully available (which also implies that no 
member of the medical staff is injured); 
- no damages to the infrastructures network are considered: people arriving to the hospital 
JDLQ DFFHVV WKURXJK WKH DPEXODQFH HQWU\ LI WKH\ DUH FODVVLILHG DV ³PDMRU FRGHV´ RU
WKURXJKWKHSHGHVWULDQHQWU\LIWKH\DUHFODVVLILHGDV³PLQRUFRGHV´ 
- GXULQJ WKHHPHUJHQF\SKDVH WKHDUULYDORI³PLQRUFRGHV´DUULYDOV LV LQWHrrupted, due to 
the emergency procedures; 
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- the major codes have the priority on the minor codes and, in particular, red codes have 
the priority on the yellow one; however, if a medical operator is treating a patient with 
lower priority, before taking care of an entering major-code-patient, he/she must 
conclude the treatment to the first patient; 
- the seismic arrival rate is drastically increased, even if the general standard is not 
provided for a massive patients inflow (this choice is imposed by the necessity to 
mathematically analyse the healthcare system); 
- only the emergency department is taken into account because the emergency procedures 
involve this specific area of the hospital and impose to the rest of the  building only a 
greater availability of recovery beds; 
- the results depend on a unique variable, i.e. the waiting time experienced by yellow-code 
patients. 
 
100 Monte Carlo simulations have been performed for each type of model described, in 
accordance with the arrival rate both under normal conditions and in emergency conditions. The 
number of the Monte Carlo methods has been reduced to 100 for simplifying the resulting file, 
since the results with a higher number of simulations is similar to these adopted. The statistical 
results are considered and manipulated as outputs data of simulations. For each group of models, 
presented in the following paragraphs, a Metamodel is built to predict the waiting time 
experienced by a single patient at a certain time, and to consider other variables depending on the 
models analysed. The analytical construction of the waiting time predictive equation is singularly 
illustrated for each group of different organizational models. 
5.2.1 CASE 1: permanent closures of rooms 
With respect to the other models, for this group of simulations the efficiency of the system is 
investigated by introducing three days of emergency scenario.  
For this reason, after two normal-days the shock is introduced, i.e. it is represented by the seismic 
DUULYDOUDWHLQWHUPVRILQFUHDVHGSDWLHQWV¶LQIORw.  
In order to represent an hypothesized scenario in which to investigate the best performance of the 
system and the variation of the waiting time experienced by patients exclusively as a 
consequence of room closures and the seismic arrival rate, a model with the following 
characteristics is performed: 
- WKH HPHUJHQF\SKDVH ODVWV  GD\V IROORZLQJ WKH SURSHUO\ VFDOHG1RUWKULGJHSDWLHQWV¶
inflow; 
- for room closure (n value) it is intended the total number of rooms available, from the 
beginning to the end of the simulation; human resources, i.e. the hospital personnel, are 
fully available and no member of the staff is injured;  
- no damages to the infrastructures network are considered: people arriving to the hospital 
gain access through the ambulance entry (if WKH\ DUH FODVVLILHG DV ³PDMRU FRGHV´ RU
WKURXJK WKH SHGHVWULDQ HQWU\ LI WKH\ DUH FODVVLILHG DV ³PLQRU FRGHV´GXULQJ WKH
HPHUJHQF\ SKDVH WKH DUULYDO RI ³PLQRU FRGHV´ DUULYDOV LV LQWHUUXSWHG GXH WR WKH
emergency procedures; the seismic arrival rate is drastically increased, in order to 
mathematically analyse the healthcare system (Į values); 
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only the emergency department is taken into account since the emergency procedures involve 
this specific area of the hospital and impose to the rest of the  building only a greater 
availability of recovery beds;  
This model is performed for 29 days (648 hours). The performance begins in normal 
conditions (2 days), after the seismic event the increased arrival rate lasts for the entire 
emergency phase (3 days) and thereafter 24 days of normal arrival rate are considered (cf. 
Figure 5. 5). With respect to this it is important to keep in mind that the emergency staff is 
available for the whole simulation period.  
 
 
Figure 5. 5  Diagram of the simulation characteristics (CASE 1). 
 
As described above, each simulation consists of 100 Monte Carlo replications. The goal is to 
investigate the behaviour of the system, under critical condition, with the variation of the number 
of available rooms for treating patients. Two parameters vary in the simulations: 
 
- the number of closed rooms, n; 
- the seismic arrival rate, Į. 
 
Figure 5. 6 Permanent room closure: representation of the n coefficient, varying from 1 to 3. 
The number of closed rooms varies from 0 (no closure) to 3: the latter value represents the worst 
case of damage (Figure 5. 6 shows three cases when rooms are closed, with n variation from 1 to 
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3). The increasing of the seismic arrival rate is calculated with a scale factor, from Į=1 to a 
Į=1.6, as described in Ch. 4. All the cases in which these two factors combine are analysed.  
At first seven models (depending on the variation of the parameter Į) are performed by varying 
the seismic arrival rate with no room closure involved.  This is shown in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1  Models developed with several arrival rates and no room closure involved. 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n0E_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0E_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0E_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0E_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0E_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0E_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0E_ Į  NO - 
 
The waiting times resulted and estimated thanks to the model are manipulated as previously 
described and the final WT bell-curves are assessed. The following plots represent the results of 
the models listed in Table 5.1, without room closures (n=0) and varying the Į parameter. 
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Figure 5. 7  Waiting time curves for n=0 and Į varying between 1.0  and 1.6 (see the attachments for all the other 
cases). 
The same procedure is followed for the models with an increasing number of closed rooms (n 
parameter). These models are listed in Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. The waiting time 
curves for each model are estimated with the same technique (for all the graphs, see the 
attachments). 
Table 5.2   Models developed with varying arrival rates and one closed room (the room closure is maintained for the 
entire simulation period – MESP - ). 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n1E_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1E_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1E_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1E_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1E_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1E_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1E_ Į  1 All run length  
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Table 5.3  Models developed with varying arrival rates and two closed room (the room closure is MESP). 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n2E_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2E_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2E_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2E_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2E_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2E_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2E_ Į  2 All run length  
Table 5.4  Models developed with varying arrival rates and three closed room (the room closure is MESP). 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n3E_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3E_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3E_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3E_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3E_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3E_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3E_ Į  3 All run length  
5.2.1.1 The construction of the meta-model  
In order to create the meta-model for the yellow-code patients, the drastic increase in waiting 
time is considered as a consequence of two parameters, i.e. Į and n. A good illustration of this 
variation is provided by the following pictures, where the n parameter is constant, while the Į 
parameter varies: 
- n = constant 
- Į = variable 
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Figure 5. 8 Waiting time curves with n=constant and Į= variable (for all the cases described). 
By analysing the Į variation it is clear that the model is mainly subject to the variation of the 
peaks values, which rise with the increment of Į values: the changes displayed by the bell-curve 
on the high dimension is the main characteristic. By the contrary, considering the variation 
regarding the room closures and plotting the waiting time curves with: 
- n= variable, and 
- Į= constant. 
 
It is evident that the waiting time increases considerably. The following graphs show this 
behaviour, for each scale factor Į (from 1.0 to 1.6 values). The main difference on these graphs is 
represented by the width of the bell-curve, rather than by the peak values (that for n=3 are 
extensively high). 
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Figure 5. 9 Waiting time curves with n=variable and Į= constant (for all the cases described). 
After having considered the variation of these two parameters, the main goal is the construction 
of  a mathematical model able to describe the trend of the waiting times, as a function of time, 
number of closed rooms and seismic arrival rate.  
The equation in (5.1) generally indicate how to express the waiting time as a function of the 
chosen variables: 
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ܹܶ ൌ ݂ሺݐǡ ݊ǡ ߙሻ (Eq.5. 1) 
where t stands for the time of the simulation, n for the number of closed rooms and Į for the 
seismic arrival rate.  
 
The first consideration to make is that, for any n or Į, the curve which describes the waiting time 
in function of the time is always a bell-curve. Accordingly it is possible to approximate this curve 
with a Lognormal curve able to fit each variation of the parameters n and Į.  
As described in the introduction of this chapter, the equation that better approximates the curve is 
the following: 
 
ܹܶሺݐሻ ൌ ܽ כ ሺെͲǡͷ כ ቌ
 ቀݐܿቁ
ܾ ቍ
ଶ
ሻȀݐ (Eq.5. 2) 
where a, b, and c are the coefficients assuming different values for each variation of the two 
parameters n and Į. 
 
The coefficients are evaluated by a dynamic-nonlinear regression: different sets of these three 
coefficients (a, b, and c) are calculated, as shown in Table 5.5 (for all the parameter values, see 
Appendix b). 
Table 5.5  Coefficients deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=0. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n0E_ Į  1744236 0.1957 4470.938 
Model_n0E_ Į  2547769 0.2583 4907.4 
Model_n0E_ Į  4175566 0.3698 5940.189 
Model_n0E_ Į  5808548 0.3887 6418.565 
Model_n0E_ Į  8479162 0.4009 6865.804 
Model_n0E_ Į  11353831 0.41 7214.502 
Model_n0E_ Į  13917735 0.4135 7482.819 
 
At this point it is worthwhile to find an equation able to express the behaviour of the three 
parameters as a function of the coefficient Į, maintaining the n parameter fixed. The following 
graphs, for instance, represent only the variation of the parameters for n=0 (all the parameters 
can be found in Appendix b). 
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Figure 5. 10 Varying parameters for n=0. 
Then, thanks to an additional dynamic-nonlinear regression analysis, it is possible to express the 
variation of the parameters a, b, and c through a general form of a quadratic polynomial equation, 
as follows:  
 
ܽሺߙሻ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵߙ ൅ ܽଶߙଶ (Eq.5. 3) 
 
ܾሺߙሻ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵߙ ൅ ܾଶߙଶ (Eq.5. 4) 
 
ܿሺߙሻ ൌ ܿ଴ ൅ ܿଵߙ ൅ ܿଶߙଶ (Eq.5. 5) 
These equations are valid for all sets of the three parameters, for n coefficient varying from 0 to 
3. For each parameter other three sub-parameters are identified. These sub-parameters (a0, a1, a2, 
b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2) permit to express the general three-parameter-set in function of Į. 
Therefore it is possible to write the equation representing the waiting time as a function of both 
the time t and the coefficient Į. 
 
ܹܶሺݐǡ ߙሻ ൌ ܽሺߙሻ כ ሺെͲǡͷ כ ൮
 ൬ ݐܿሺߙሻ൰
ܾሺߙሻ ൲
ଶ
ሻȀݐ (Eq.5. 6) 
Even the sub-coefficients can be correlated as a function of n, as the following graphs show, and 
be represented by an equation. The procedure is the same as the previous one: the graph in Figure 
5. 11, for instance, represent only the variation of a0, a1, a2 (first sub-parameter group) for 
varying n (all the sub-parameter sets can be found in Appendix b). 
 
   
Figure 5. 11 Varying parameters for a0, a1, a2 in function of the n coefficient. 
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After having estimated the other sub-parameters, i.e. b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2, it is possible to find 
another correlation by means of equations able to describe their trend as a function of n, in order 
to estimate the values for setting the global meta-model (Eq.5. 2). The best fitting estimated is 
represented, for this case, by the cubic polynomial equation, whose general form is: 
 
ܽሺ݊ሻ ൌ ቐ
ܽ଴ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܽ଴଴ ൅ ܽ଴ଵ݊ ൅ ܽ଴ଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܽ଴ଷ݊ଷ
ܽଵሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܽଵ଴ ൅ ܽଵଵ݊ ൅ ܽଵଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܽଵଷ݊ଷ
ܽଶሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܽଶ଴ ൅ ܽଶଵ݊ ൅ ܽଶଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܽଶଷ݊ଷ
 (Eq.5. 7) 
ܾሺ݊ሻ ൌ ቐ
ܾ଴ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܾ଴଴ ൅ ܾ଴ଵ݊ ൅ ܾ଴ଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܾ଴ଷ݊ଷ
ܾଵሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܾଵ଴ ൅ ܾଵଵ݊ ൅ ܾଵଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܾଵଷ݊ଷ
ܾଶሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܾଶ଴ ൅ ܾଶଵ݊ ൅ ܾଶଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܾଶଷ݊ଷ
 (Eq.5. 8) 
ܿሺ݊ሻ ൌ ቐ
ܿ଴ሺ݊ሻ ൌ  ܿ଴଴ ൅ ܿ଴ଵ݊ ൅ ܿ଴ଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܿ଴ଷ݊ଷ
ܿଵሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܿଵ଴ ൅ ܿଵଵ݊ ൅ ܿଵଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܿଵଷ݊ଷ
ܿଶሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܿଶ଴ ൅ ܿଶଵ݊ ൅ ܿଶଶ݊ଶ ൅ ܿଶଷ݊ଷ
 (Eq.5. 9) 
 
Substituting the values determined with the dynamic fitting, the equations become the 
followings: 
ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ቐ
ܽ଴ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ͳ͵͵Ͷͳ͹ͲͷǤͳͳ െ ʹ͸ͳͳͲͻ͵ͺǤͳͶ݊ ൅ Ͷ͸ͳʹͺͳ͹Ǥͳͻ݊ଶ െ ͳͶ͵ʹͺ͵Ǥͻͺ݊ଷ
ܽଵሺ݊ሻ ൌ െ͵ʹͲͻͶͲͳͶǤͶʹ ൅ ͶͲ͵ʹͶ͹ͷͻǤͻͷ݊ െ ͳͲͻͶͶͳͶʹǤʹͶ͹݊ଶ ൅ ʹͷ͸͸͵ͶͲǤͷ͵݊ଷ
ܽଶሺ݊ሻ ൌ ʹͲ͵͹ͲͺͲͶǤͶ͸ െ ͸͹Ͳͷ͹ͷ͵Ǥ͸ͳ݊ െ Ͷ͵ͲͶͲͲͻǤͶ͸݊ଶ ൅ ʹ͸͵͸Ͳʹ͵ǤͶͳ݊ଷ
 (Eq.5. 10) 
ܾሺ݊ሻ ൌ ቐ
ܾ଴ሺ݊ሻ ൌ െͳǤ͹ʹ ൅ ʹǤͷʹ݊ െ ͳǤͲ݊ଶ ൅ ͲǤͳʹ݊ଷ
ܾଵሺ݊ሻ ൌ ʹǤͺͻ͵͹ െ ͵Ǥ͵͸ͻ͵݊ ൅ ͳǤʹͶ͹͵݊ଶ െ ͲǤͳͶͲʹ݊ଷ
ܾଶሺ݊ሻ ൌ െͲǤͻ͹͹͵ ൅ ͳǤͳʹͺͳ݊ െ ͲǤͶͲ͵ͳ݊ଶ ൅ ͲǤͲͶͶ͸݊ଷ
 (Eq.5. 11) 
ܿሺ݊ሻ ൌ ቐ
ܿ଴ሺ݊ሻ ൌ െͻͲ͹͵Ǥͻ͵͸ʹ െ ͵͵ʹ͹Ǥͻʹʹͳ݊ ൅ ͻͲ͹ͷǤͲ͵ͺ͵݊ଶ െ ʹͳʹ͹Ǥͷʹ͹͹݊ଷ
ܿଵሺ݊ሻ ൌ ͳͺͷͺ͹Ǥ͸Ͷ͹͵ ൅ ͺͶͳ͹ǤͲͷʹͳ݊ െ ͳͶ͵ͻͺǤ͵ͶͷͶ݊ଶ ൅ ͵ʹͻ͸ǤͶͲ͸͹݊ଷ
ܿଶሺ݊ሻ ൌ െͷͳͶ͸Ǥͻ͹ͳʹ െ ͵͹͹͸Ǥͻ͸ͻ͸݊ ൅ ͷʹͺͳǤʹͻͷͳ݊ଶ െ ͳͳ͵͸ǤͻͶʹʹ݊ଷ
 (Eq.5. 12) 
 
In the end, the global meta-model (Eq.5. 13) depending on these three parameters is estimated. It 
has the following general form: 
 
ܹܶሺݐǡ Ƚǡ ݊ሻ ൌ ܽሺȽǡ ሻ כ ሺെͲǡͷ כ ൮
 ൬ ݐܿሺȽǡ ሻ൰
ܾሺȽǡ ሻ ൲
ଶ
ሻȀݐ (Eq.5. 13) 
This meta-model assesses the waiting time experienced by yellow-code patients, when a damage 
occurs which determines the permanent closure of the dedicated rooms (from 1 to 3, up to a total 
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of 4). Thanks to an Excel file and to the values found for the parameters, it is possible to estimate 
the waiting time value for the patients, for a determined number of closed room (n), depending on 
the seismic arrival rate (Į), for a specific instant of time t. An example extrapolated from the 
Excel file  is shown in Figure 5. 12. 
 
Figure 5. 12 Estimation of the waiting time for a determined n, Į, and t. 
The validation of the meta-model  can be easily achieved  by plotting the estimated WT curve on 
the top of the drawn WT-curves associated with the group of simulations. The curve calculated 
with the meta-model equation is drawn with the black line in the graph, while the waiting time 
for a specific instant of time (t) is shown in the red block; the desired values for the parameters 
are displayed in the red blocks (Figure 5. 13, on the left) with an arrow-shape object. The 
parameters used in the boxes, which correspond to those which have been previously calculated, 
are inserted as a coefficient of the analytical equation of WT.  
 
  
Figure 5. 13  Metamodel graph and validation (extracted from the Excel file). 
Moreover, another coefficient is included in the formulation, that is: a percentage (%) which 
represents the percentage of damaged structure as it is assumed by the methodology in case of 
structural fragility curves associated with the damage limit state. Accordingly, such a procedure 
also allows to approximate the damaged area.  
5.2.2 CASE 2: permanent room closure 
Unlike the previous case, this model starts with the shock due to the earthquake, and the seismic 
arrival rate begins at time 0 and lasts three days (72 hours). After this critical 72 hours, other 26 
days of normal arrival rate are considered for a total amount of 29 days (648 hours). In the 
normal scenario, resources in terms of medical staff and beds available are re-activated; all-code 
patients are treated into the emergency department. The diagram corresponding to the simulation 
properties of this model is represented in Figure 5. 14:  
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Figure 5. 14 Diagram of the simulation properties (CASE 2). 
 
The peculiarity of this model depends on the presence of the emergency staff only during the 
emergency phase: after three days (72 hours), the medical staff reverts to the normal setting and 
the treatments to minor-codes patients are performed again. The general setting of dedicated beds 
is restored and the ORs do not execute any longer emergency surgeries.  
As for CASE1, the goal is to investigate the behaviour of the system under critical condition: 
in this model real procedures are set into the organizational planning in order to evaluate the 
system under several conditions. Therefore two varying parameters are taken into account: 
- the number of closed rooms, n; 
- the seismic arrival rate, Į. 
 
Figure 5. 15 Permanent room closure: representation of the n coefficient, varying from 1 to 3. 
The number of closed rooms varies from 0 (no closure) to 3, which represents the worst case of 
damage (Figure 5. 15 shows three cases when rooms are closed, with n values variation from 1 to 
3). The totality of closed rooms is not taken into account. The increasing seismic arrival rate is 
calculated with a scale factor, from Į=1 to a Į=1.6, as described in the Ch. 4. All the cases in 
which these two factors combine are analysed. At first seven models (depending on the variation 
of the parameter Į) are performed by varying the seismic arrival rate with no room closure 
involved. This is shown in Table 5.6: 
3-days
Emergency
Scenario
26-days
Normal
Scenario
START 
SIMULATION
START 
SEISMIC 
ARRIVAL 
RATE
STOP
SEISMIC 
ARRIVAL 
RATE
EMERGENCY  PROCEDURES 
ACTIVATED
STOP
SIMULATION
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Table 5.6   Models run with several arrival rates and no closed rooms. 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n0_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0_ Į  NO - 
Model_n0_ Į  NO - 
 
The waiting times resulted and estimated thanks to the model are manipulated as previously 
described and the final WT bell-curves are assessed. The following plots represent The results of 
the models listed in Table 5.6, in terms of waiting time curves for yellow-code patients, are 
graphically represented in Appendix c. 
The same procedure is followed for the models with an increasing number of closed rooms (n 
parameter). These models are listed in Table 5.7, Table 5.8 and Table 5.9. The waiting time 
curves for each model are estimated with the same technique (for all the graphs, see Appendix c). 
Table 5.7   Models developed with varying arrival rates and one closed room (the room closure is maintained for the 
entire simulation period). 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n1_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1_ Į  1 All run length  
Model_n1_ Į  1 All run length  
Table 5.8   Models developed with varying arrival rates and one closed room (the room closure is maintained for the 
entire simulation period). 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n2_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2_ Į  2 All run length  
Model_n2_ Į  2 All run length  
Table 5.9  Models developed with varying arrival rates and one closed room (the room closure is maintained for the 
entire simulation period). 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Closure time  
Model_n3_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3_ Į  3 All run length  
Model_n3_ Į  3 All run length  
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The procedure for the construction of the meta-model is similar to that described for case1, and 
the increasing waiting time is considered as the main variation depending on the two parameters, 
Į and n. The following plots well illustrate the dissimilarities displayed by different simulations, 
where the n parameter is constant, while the Į parameter varies: 
- n = constant 
- Į = variable 
Figure 5. 16  Waiting time curves with n=constant and Į= variable (for all the cases described). 
The analysis of the Į parameter indicate that the most significant change regards the waiting time 
peaks : accordingly, the dimension which is mostly affected by such variation is the height of the 
curve. However, considering the variation regarding the room closures and plotting the waiting 
time curves with:  
- n = variable, and 
- Į = constant 
 
it is evident that the waiting time increases considerably. The following graphs show this 
behaviour, for each scale factor Į  (from 1.0 to 1.6 values). The main difference on these graphs 
is represented by the width of the bell-curve, rather than by the peak values (that for n=3 are 
extensively high).  
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Figure 5. 17 Waiting time curves with n=variable and Į= constant (for all the cases described). 
To construct a mathematical model able to describe the trend of the waiting times, as a function 
of the time (t), the number of closed rooms (n), and the seismic arrival rate (Į), the equation in 
(Eq.5. 1 must be considered inasmuch it describes the general form to express the waiting time. 
 
The first consideration to make is that, for any n or Į, the curve which describes the waiting time 
in function of the time is always a bell-curve. Accordingly it is possible to approximate this curve 
with a Lognormal curve able to fit each variation of the parameters n and Į.  
The coefficients are evaluated by a dynamic-nonlinear regression: different sets of these three 
coefficients (a, b, and c) are calculated, as shown in  Table 5.10 (for all the parameter values, see 
Appendix c). 
Table 5.10  Coefficients deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=0. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n0_ Į  858222.3 0.5791 1949.654 
Model_n0_ Į  1525402 0.6076 2292.202 
Model_n0_ Į  2283117 0.619 2567.834 
Model_n0_ Į  3387885 0.5903 2855.197 
Model_n0_ Į  4610620 0.5877 3096.354 
Model_n0_ Į  5801531 0.5879 3238.725 
Model_n0_ Į  7075789 0.5867 3405.085 
 
At this point it is worthwhile to find an equation able to express the behaviour of the three 
parameters as a function of the coefficient Į, maintaining the n parameter fixed. The following 
graphs, for instance, represent only the variation of the parameters for n=0 (all the parameters 
can be found in Appendix c). 
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Figure 5. 18  Varying parameters for n=0. 
Then, thanks to an additional dynamic-nonlinear regression analysis, it is possible to express the 
variation of the parameters a, b, and c through a general form of a quadratic polynomial equation, 
such as in CASE 1; the equations are valid for all sets of the three parameters, for n coefficient 
varying from 0 to 3. For each parameter other three sub-parameters are identified. These sub-
parameters (a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2) permit to express the general three-parameter-set in 
function of Į. Even the sub-coefficients can be correlated as a function of n, as the following 
graphs show, and be represented by an equation. The procedure is the same as the previous one: 
the graph in Figure 11, for instance, represent only the variation of a0, a1, a2 (first sub-parameter 
group) for varying n (all the sub-parameter sets can be found in Appendix c). 
 
   
Figure 5. 19 Varying parameters for a0, a1, a2 in function of the n coefficient. 
It is possible to find another correlation by means of equations able to describe the trend of the 
sub-parameters (b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2) as a function of n, in order to estimate the values for 
setting the global meta-model (Eq.5. 1). The best fitting estimated is represented, for this case, by 
the cubic polynomial equation. Substituting the values found through the dynamic fitting into 
(Eq.5. 13, the meta-model in function of t, Į and n is determined.
This Metamodel assesses the waiting time experienced by yellow-code patients, when a 
damage occurs which determines the permanent closure of the dedicated rooms (from 1 to 3, up 
to a total of 4). 
The validation of the metamodel  can be easily achieved by plotting the estimated WT curve 
on the top of the drawn WT-curves associated with the group of simulations. The curve 
calculated with the metamodel equation is drawn with the black line in the graph, while the 
waiting time for a specific instant of time (t) is shown in the red block; the desired values for the 
parameters are displayed in the red blocks (Figure 5. 20, on the left) with an arrow-shape object. 
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The parameters used in the boxes, which correspond to those which have been previously 
calculated, are inserted as a coefficient of the analytical equation of WT.  
 
 
Figure 5. 20 Metamodel graph and validation (extracted from the Excel file). 
Moreover, another coefficient is included in the formulation, that is: a percentage (%) which 
represents the percentage of damaged structure as it is assumed by the methodology in case of 
structural fragility curves associated with the damage limit state. Accordingly, such a procedure 
also allows to approximate the damaged area. 
5.2.3 CASE 3: temporary room closure 
In order to obtain results for damages caused by non-structural failures, a series of hypotheses 
involving the temporary closure of the OBI rooms have been performed. The simulations for this 
type of organizational model relies on a total amount of 29 days (648 hours). The simulation 
starts  with the shock due to the earthquake (which is represented by the seismic arrival rate, 
lasting 72 hours): after the emergency phase (3 days), other 26 days of normal arrival rate are 
taken into account. During the normal phase, resources in terms of medical staff and number and 
beds available are re-activated; all-code patients are treated into the emergency department. The 
diagram corresponding to the simulation properties of this model is represented in Figure 5. 21:  
 
 
Figure 5. 21 Diagram of the simulation properties (CASE 3). 
In this case, room closure affects the OBI rooms but, unlike permanent closures, after a pre-set 
amount of time, these rooms become available again. As for permanent closures, during the 
simulation two variables are taken into account: 
DTs: 60 h
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- the number of closed rooms, n; 
- the downtime, DTs. 
 
Figure 5. 21 shows the different downtimes (DTs) during the emergency phase, while Figure 5. 
22 shows the variation of the n parameter, from 1 to 3. The yellow-cross indicates that the closure 
is not permanent. Table 5.11 lists the downtimes of the rooms that, thereafter, return to be 
RSHUDWLYHLHSDWLHQWV¶DFFRPPRGDWLRQLVDJDLQDYDLODEOH'XULQJWKHGRZQWLPHDUHVWRUDWLRQLV
supposed in order to reopen the room.  
 
Figure 5. 22 Temporary room closures: representation of the n coefficient, varying from 1 to 3. 
The different downtimes indicate the time needed to restore the room, conditioned by the failures 
of non-structural components, the effects on other non-structural elements and the extension of 
the damage; furthermore, it is worth to consider the difficulties encountered by operators to reach 
the hospital and to work during the emergency. For these reasons six time intervals (DTs) are 
supposed which  cover the entire emergency phase (3 days, 72 hours) and correspond to the last 
downtime: this assumption matches the first hypothesis of permanent closure.  
Table 5.11 Models developed with several downtimes (DTs) for one OBI room. 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Downtime (hour) 
Model_OBI1_DT12 YES 12 
Model_OBI1_DT24 YES 24 
Model_OBI1_DT36 YES 36 
Model_OBI1_DT48 YES 48 
Model_OBI1_DT60 YES 60 
Model_OBI1_DT72 YES 72 
 
The waiting times estimated by the model are manipulated as described in par. 5.1 and the final 
bell-curves are assessed.  
The same procedure is followed for the models having a higher number of closed rooms (n 
parameter), as shown in Table 5.12 and Table 5.13. The waiting time curves for each model are 
estimated with the same technique (for all the plots, see Appendix d). 
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Table 5.12  Table 1 Models developed with several downtimes (DTs) for two OBI rooms. 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Downtime (hour) 
Model_OBI2_DT12 YES 12 
Model_OBI2_DT24 YES 24 
Model_OBI2_DT36 YES 36 
Model_OBI2_DT48 YES 48 
Model_OBI2_DT60 YES 60 
Model_OBI2_DT72 YES 72 
Table 5.13  Table 2 Models developed with several downtimes (DTs) for three OBI rooms. 
Model (name) Closure of rooms Downtime (hour) 
Model_OBI3_DT12 YES 12 
Model_OBI3_DT24 YES 24 
Model_OBI3_DT36 YES 36 
Model_OBI3_DT48 YES 48 
Model_OBI3_DT60 YES 60 
Model_OBI3_DT72 YES 72 
 
The procedure for constructing the meta-model is similar to the others (see par. 5.2.1.1), 
however,  since the number of simulations is different, several dynamic-nonlinear regressions are 
applied. By varying the two coefficients, the waiting time curves change noticeably; therefore it 
is possible to build the analytical Metamodel also for temporary closures, using the two 
parameters, DTs and n. Figure 5. 23 describes the variation of the waiting time curves, applying 
the different downtimes (DTs), for a fixed number of closed rooms n: 
 
- n = constant 
- DTs = variable 
 
   
Figure 5. 23 Waiting time curves with n=constant and DTs=variable. 
Then, plotting the waiting time curves considering the n parameter (closured rooms) and a fixed 
downtime: 
- n = variable, and 
- DTs = constant 
 
a considerable increase in waiting time is evident.  The following graphs show this behaviour, for 
each time-range performed Dts (with values from 12 to 72 hours). The main dimension subject to 
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variation is the width of the bell-curve, while the height dimension is more susceptible to the 
change of the downtime.  
 
Figure 5. 24 Waiting time curves with DTs=constant and n=variable. 
To construct the mathematical model able to describe the trend of the waiting times, in function 
of the time (t), the number of closed rooms (n), and the downtime (DTs), the equation in (Eq.5. 14 
must be considered, that describes the general form to express the waiting time, in function of the 
variables presented: 
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ܹܶ ൌ ݂ሺݐǡ ݊ǡ ܦܶሻ (Eq.5. 14) 
where t is the time of the simulation, n is the number of closed rooms and DTs is the downtime.  
 
The first consideration to make is that, for any n or DTs, the curve which describes the waiting 
time in function of the time is always a bell-curve. Accordingly it is possible to approximate this 
curve with a Lognormal curve able to fit each variation of the parameters n and DTs.  
As described in the introduction of this chapter, the equation that better approximates the curve is 
the following: 
 
ܹܶሺݐሻ ൌ ܽ כ ሺെͲǡͷ כ ቌ
 ቀݐܿቁ
ܾ ቍ
ଶ
ሻȀݐ (Eq.5. 15) 
where a, b, and c are the coefficients assuming different values for variable n and DTs. 
 
The coefficients are evaluated by a dynamic-nonlinear regression: different sets of these three 
coefficients (a, b, and c) are calculated, as shown in Table 5.14 (for all the parameter values, see 
Appendix d). 
Table 5.14 Coefficients deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=1. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_OBI1_DT12 877764 0.6954 2049.951 
Model_OBI1_DT24 1110638 0.6989 2047.238 
Model_OBI1_DT36 1324832 0.6664 2104.993 
Model_OBI1_DT48 1560612 0.679 2335.281 
Model_OBI1_DT60 1652308 0.7038 2456.303 
Model_OBI1_DT72 1719602 0.7704 2759.523 
 
At this point it is worthwhile to find an equation able to express the behaviour of the three 
parameters as a function of the coefficient DTs, maintaining the n parameter fixed. The following 
graphs, for instance, represent only the variation of the parameters for n=0 (all the parameters 
can be found in Appendix d). 
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Figure 5. 25 Varying a, b, c parameters for n=1. 
Parameters a, b, and c are expressed through a quadratic polynomial equation. Then, each 
parameter other three sub-parameters are identified (a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2).  
Therefore it is possible to write the equation representing the waiting time as a function of 
both the time t and the coefficient DTs. 
 
ܹܶሺݐǡ ܦܶݏሻ ൌ ܽሺܦܶݏሻ כ ሺെͲǡͷ כ ൮
 ൬ ݐܿሺܦܶݏሻ൰
ܾሺܦܶݏሻ ൲
ଶ
ሻȀݐ (Eq.5. 16) 
Even the sub-coefficients can be correlated as a function of n, as the following graphs show, and 
be represented by an equation. The procedure is the same as the previous one: the following 
graphs, for instance, represent only the variation of a0, a1, a2 (first sub-parameter group) for 
varying n (all the sub-parameter sets can be found in Appendix d).  
 
   
Figure 5. 26 Varying parameters of a0, a1, a2 in function of n coefficient. 
Such as in the cases previously described, the global meta-model (Eq.5. 17) depending on these 
three parameters is estimated. It has the following general form: 
 
ܹܶሺݐǡ ܦܶݏǡ ݊ሻ ൌ ܽሺܦܶݏǡ ݊ሻ כ ሺെͲǡͷ כ ൮
 ൬ ݐܿሺܦܶݏǡ ݊ሻ൰
ܾሺܦܶݏǡ ݊ሻ ൲
ଶ
ሻȀݐ (Eq.5. 17) 
This meta-model assesses the waiting time experienced by yellow-code patients, when a 
downtime from 0 to 60 hours occurs which determines the permanent closure of the dedicated 
rooms (from 1 to 3). The meta-model is not valid for values over the 60 hours, therefore if the 
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downtime exceeds the 80% of the emergency phase, i.e. its total duration, such a case is not 
considered as a temporary closure. The Metamodel is able to estimate the waiting time 
experienced by the patients for a determined number of closed rooms c n, depending on the 
downtime occurred (DTs), for a specific instant of time t.  
The validation of the meta-model can be easily achieved  by plotting the estimated WT curve 
on the top of the drawn WT-curves associated with the group of simulations. The curve 
calculated with the metamodel equation is drawn with the black line in the graph, while the 
waiting time for a specific instant of time (t) is shown in the red block; the desired values for the 
parameters are displayed in the red blocks (Figure 5. 27, on the left) with an arrow-shape object. 
The parameters used in the boxes, which correspond to those which have been previously 
calculated, are inserted as a coefficient of the analytical equation of WT.  
 
Figure 5. 27 Metamodel graph and validation through the Excel file.  
5.2.4 Analysis of the peaks of waiting time 
The waiting time peaks are worth to be analysed for each model. This analysis  permits  to 
evaluate the variation regarding the maximum waiting time experienced and, in particular, the 
extent to which such variation depends on the two parameters used for the simulations.  
Figure 5. 28 shows that the values displayed by the two parameters  follow different trends: in 
this particular case, for a model subject to permanent closures during the emergency phase, the 
increase of the peaks is linear  if associated with Į variation, and exponential if associated with a 
varying number of closed rooms. In effect, by increasing the seismic arrival rate the maximum 
time increases proportionally to the variation of Į. The values in Figure 5. 28 resulted from the 
analyses are high, but it depends on the extreme Į increment. The unrealistic input (seismic 
arrival rate) is used for the mathematical assessing of the Meta-model and for the evaluation of 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOV\VWHP0RUHRYHU WKHDQDO\VLVRQ WKH³VHQVLWLYHSDUDPHWHUV´ VHH&KDSWHU
show the importance of the proportion between inflow of patients and resources, that in this case 
is not take into account.  
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Figure 5. 28  Waiting time peaks in function of the Į parameter (on the left), and the n parameter (on the right) for 
CASE 1-MODEL. 
It is worth to note that for case 1 and case2 the peaks have the same trend, which is related to the 
variation regarding the seismic arrival rate and the number of closed rooms; however, the peaks 
vary in values since in case 1 there are more resources available and, even if the  n parameter 
does not change (it varies from 1 to 3, on a total amount of 4 rooms), the higher availability of 
medical staff affects the system. 
Since the values are so high, it is possible to conclude that, globally, the responses of the two 
system are not VR GLIIHUHQW 7KHUHIRUH DQ DQDO\VLV RQ WKH ³VHQVLWLYH SDUDPHWHUV´ QHHGV WR EH
performed in order to investigate which parameters mostly affect the system response (see 
Chapter 6).  
 
Figure 5. 29  Waiting time peaks in function of the Į parameter (on the left), and the n parameter (on the right) for 
CASE 2-MODEL. 
Case 1 displays the same behaviour: here the differences are related to the availability of 
additional resources during the simulations. If the model suffers from temporary downtimes of 
the rooms, the trend of WT peaks related to the number of the closed rooms is less evident. This 
result is associated with the time of the closures that, on the base of the whole simulation-length, 
is less incisive.   
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Figure 5. 30 Waiting time peaks for different downtimes (on the left) and for different closed rooms (on the right) for 
CASE 3-MODEL. 
5.3 Resilience 
In order to estimate the total resilience of the system, the maximum waiting time value displayed 
during the simulation needs to be identified. Such a value corresponds to the worst occurrence for 
a system after an earthquake shock. It is quite improbable for hospital system to offer continuous 
medical treatments when more than half rooms are unavailable; however, it is convenient to 
hypothesize even extreme circumstances in order to prevent detrimental actions due to the 
unawareness of the system performance. 
5.3.1 Estimation of the total loss of functionality 
The meta-model data clearly indicate that the worst occurrence for the system verifies when the 
number of down rooms corresponds to the number of feasible rooms. This state of affairs is due 
to the reality of the hospital situation in an emergency, when the contribution of the system is still 
sufficient to take care of the injured population.  
Generally speaking, in healthcare systems the maximum number of down rooms is determined 
by: 
 ݊௠௔௫ ൌ ݊௧௢௧ െ ͳ (Eq.5. 18) 
where ݊௠௔௫ is the maximum value of closed/down rooms and ݊௧௢௧ corresponds to the total 
number of rooms for a specific category of patients, thanks to which the hospital is still 
considered to be functional. 
In order to calculate the  ݊௠௔௫, it would be useful work with the hospital staff and in 
collaboration with the hospital network leader.  
The number of maximum rooms that can be closed is an indispensable factor to estimate the 
strategic points for both the waiting time curve and the associated resilience curve. 
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5.3.2 Equivalence between curves and representative points 
The main issue is represented by the correspondence between the waiting time curve and the 
related resilience curve. For this procedure it is possible to assume that the increase in waiting 
time during an emergency corresponds to a decrease in the functionality of the system (for more 
information, see par. 2.2.1). Given this assumption, it is possible to identify the strategic points 
for building the resilience curve on the base of the associated waiting time curve. 
Accordingly, it is convenient to linearize the waiting time curve. To do this the maximum 
waiting time registered during the simulations must be taken into account: the maximum waiting 
time point registered during several simulations, despite different ordinate values, has different 
abscissa (x-coordinate) values depending on the characteristics of the models and the variation of 
its parameters.  
As illustrated in Figure 5. 31, the maximum waiting time can be shifted along the x-axis, but 
also the y-coordinate values vary conditioned by the variation of the parameters; therefore to 
identify the maximum value  it is possible to evaluate only the ordinates of the waiting time 
points.,  
Maybe it is convenient to suppose that, even if the waiting time increases following a variable 
incline, a drastic increase in waiting time implies a drastic loss of functionality. Accordingly it is 
possible identify the loss of functionality at the time the shock occurs.  
 
Figure 5. 31 Several possibilities of x-coordinates for the WTmax having the same y-coordinate. 
As a consequence it becomes easier to compare different resilience curves corresponding to 
different scenarios in a system. After the setting of the maximum waiting time values, the 
equivalence of areas is adopted as a method to linearize the curves (cf. Figure 5. 32). 
The equivalent area of the two curves is used to obtain the new linearized curve, for which 
specific points can be taken into account. The points represented within the graph and the table 
(cf. Figure 5. 33 and Table 5.15) are representative of the equivalent waiting time curve 
calculated by the equivalent area  as a result of the organizational model of the system. 
Seismic resilience of hospitals  
 
144 
 
Figure 5. 32 Conversion between the equivalent areas. 
The representative points illustrated in Figure 5. 33 and shown in the table below, are the main 
points used to build the associated resilience curve. Point A represents the starting point, while 
point B is the time at which the earthquake strikes; point C is the maximum waiting time value  
according to the experimental data and point D is the point representing the normalization of the 
waiting time. 
 
Table 5.15 Points related to the conversion of the 
equivalent area 
POINT X-coordinate Y-coordinate 
A 0 0 
B Shock time 0 
C Shock time max peak 
D shock time+ equivalent base 
normalized 
WT 
E Simulation end normalized WT 
 
Figure 5. 33 Conversion between the equivalent areas. 
 
It is worth to note that the abscissa value of point C at the time the earthquake strikes. Finally, 
point E is the end of the simulation and also represents the restored waiting time in the system. 
These point acquire related meanings once translated  into a resilience equivalent curve, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. 34 and Table 5.16. Accordingly point C becomes the representative point 
of the loss of functionality of the system, while point D represents the restoring point,  i.e. the 
time the system reverts to its functionality.  
A B 
C 
D E 
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Table 5.16 Points related to the conversion of the 
equivalent area 
POINT X-coordinate Y-coordinate 
A 0 Full functionality 
B shock time Full functionality 
C shock time Residual functionality 
D 
shock time+ 
equivalent 
base 
Restored 
functionality 
E Simulation end 
Restored 
functionality 
 
Figure 5. 34 Conversion through the equivalent areas. 
 
The point C during several scenarios is calculated on the basis of the worst case acceptable for 
the hospital system. Once the point C in the worst case represents the total loss of functionality, 
associated with the highest value registered of the waiting time, all the other cases can be 
calculated. More specification are included into paragraph 5.3.2.2. 
5.3.2.1 Simplified recovery function model 
Once the representative points of the resilience curve are identified, bearing in mind the 
mathematical definition of resilience6, it is essential to determine the function between point C 
and point D in the resilience curve. Indeed this is a complex operation: the recovery process ± to 
be more precise the behaviour of the system in the time span between loss of functionality and 
recovery ± depends on multiple factors affecting the system, like: time dimensions, spatial 
dimensions (e.g. different neighbourhoods may have different recovery paths), and 
interdependencies between different economic sectors involved (Cimellaro et al. 2009). 
 
Currently  few accurate recovery process models have been developed, in particular Miles and 
Chang (2006) have set out the foundations for building models of community recovery, 
presenting a comprehensive conceptual model, which indeed is too complicated for the purpose 
of this work.. However, the oversimplification provided by Cimellaro et al. (2009) permits to use 
recovery functions that can fit the more accurate results obtained with the model by Miles and 
Chang (2006) 
Three possible recovery functions can be selected depending on the system and the social 
response: (i) a linear equation, (ii) an exponential equation (Kafali & Grigoriu 2005), and (iii) a 
trigonometric equation (Chang & Shinozuka 2004), as illustrated below: 
                                                 
6 Resilience is defined graphically as the normalized shaded area underneath the functionality function of a system, 
defined as Q(t). Q(t) is a non-VWDWLRQDU\VWRFKDVWLFSURFHVVDQGHDFKHQVHPEOHLVDSLHFHZLVHFRQWLQXRXVIXQFWLRQ>«@
(Cimellaro et al. 2010, pag.2). 
A B 
C 
C 
D D E 
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linear: ௥݂௘௖ሺݐǡ ோܶாሻ ൌ  ൬ͳ െ
 െ ݐ଴ா
ோܶா
൰ (Eq.5. 19) 
exponential: ௥݂௘௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሾെሺ െ ݐ଴ாሻ ሺ݈݊ʹͲͲሻ ோܶாΤ ሿ (Eq.5. 20) 
trigonometric: ௥݂௘௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ͲǤͷሼͳ ൅ ܿ݋ݏሾߨ ሺ െ ݐ଴ாሻ ோܶாΤ ሿሽ (Eq.5. 21) 
where  t is the time, t0E is the initial time of the extreme event E,  and TRE is the recovery time 
from event E. 
 
The simplest form is the linear recovery function that is generally used when there is no 
information available about the organization of the community: however, as shown in Figure 5. 
35, it is possible to associate the linear function (Eq.5. 19) with an average-prepared community, 
the exponential function (Eq.5. 20) with a not well-prepared community, and the trigonometric 
(Eq.5. 21 with a well-prepared community.  
 
Figure 5. 35 (Cimellaro, Reinhorn and Bruneau, 2010) Functionality curves associated with the different equations: 
(a) average-prepared community (no information is provided regarding preparedness and available resources); (b) 
not well-prepared community (the social response is driven by some initial inflow resources, but then the rapidity of 
the recovery process slows down); (c) well-prepared community (the community displays an increasing organization 
and sometimes other communities offer their help so that the rapidity of the recovery process increases over time). 
For the sake of simplicity this work uses the linear equation and the resilience curve obtained 
from the waiting time curve comparison is approximated with the equation in (Eq.5. 19): from 
point C in the resilience diagram the system improves its functionality in a linear way, until it 
reaches a new restored level of functionality (signalled by point D). 
Indeed when the recovery process ends the system not necessarily reverts to its pre-disaster 
performance: depending on the performance of the system and on the characteristics of the 
organizational model, it can only be assumed a priori that some degree of functionality is 
restored.  
To conclude, the resilience curve can be described as follows: 
- the segment AB is the line joining the starting point of the simulation (A) with the 
starting time of the earthquake; 
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- the segment BC represents the loss of functionality of the system calculated on the base 
of the worst case as a percentage-base derivative;  
- the segment CD is the linear segment adopted in this specific case, and better described 
in the following paragraph; 
- the last segment, i.e. segment ED, represents the waiting time value of the restored 
organizational aspects into the hospital.  
5.3.2.2 Maximum value of point C  
The total loss of functionality in a system is determined on the base of the worst case calculated 
by the simulations for which a total loss of functionality (100%) is assumed. The maximum 
waiting time registered in that case is considered as the maximum loss of functionality due to the 
specific variation of the parameters used during the simulations.  
By assuming a case of total loss of functionality it is possible to calculate/estimate the other 
resilience curves, following the general equation exemplified below: 
݂ݑ݈݈݂ݑ݊ܿݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݐݕ െ ݂ݑ݊ܿݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݐݕ݈݋ݏݏሺ௣భୀ௜ǡ௣మୀ௞ሻ ൌ  ݎ݁ݏ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݂ݑ݊ܿݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݐݕሺ௣భୀ௜ǡ௣మୀ௞ሻ (Eq.5. 22) 
where ݌ଵ and ݌ଶ respectively represents the condition 1 and the condition 2 which vary during 
the scenario, and the functionality loss is represented by the maximum waiting time,  i.e. point C.  
ͳͲͲ െ ܻܿ݋݋ݎ݀݅݊ܽݐ݁஼௣௢௜௡௧ሺ௣భୀ௜ǡ௣మୀ௞ሻ ൌ ݎ݁ݏ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݂ݑ݊ܿݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݐݕ (Eq.5. 23) 
In order to assess the Y-coordinate of point C in the resilience curve, it is necessary to equalize 
the results to the maximum waiting time (by representing point C on the WT-curve and the 0% of 
functionality in the system) for each simulation, with a simple proportion: 
ܯܽݔܹ ሺܶ௣భୀ௠௔௫ǡ௣మୀ௠௔௫ሻǣ ͳͲͲ ൌ ܯܽݔܹ ሺܶ௣భୀ௜ǡ௣మୀ௞ሻǣ ݔ (Eq.5. 24) 
where ݌ଵ ൌ ݉ܽݔ and ݌ଶ ൌ ݉ܽݔ are the extreme conditions in which the maximum waiting time 
is registered.  
By assuming the maximum waiting time to correspond to the maximum loss of functionality of 
the system (Eq.5. 25), all the other simulations due to the variation of the parameters involved are 
scaled on the base of the maximum case registered.  
ܯܽݔܹ ሺܶ௣భୀ௠௔௫ǡ௣మୀ௠௔௫ሻ ൌ ܯܽݔܮܱܵܵሺ௣భୀ௠௔௫ǡ௣మୀ௠௔௫ሻ
ൌ ܯ݅݊ܨܷܰܥܶܫܱܰܣܮܫܶ ሺܻ௣భୀ௠௔௫ǡ௣మୀ௠௔௫ሻ (Eq.5. 25) 
Such a procedure permits to construct all resilience curves: 
5.3.3 Evaluating global resilience in a post-earthquake period 
For a global understanding of the hospital system, it may be useful to fix a limit time within 
which to assess the resilience of the hospital.  
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Considering the length of emergency phase (3 days), the drastic conditions assumed for the 
system and the amount of the seismic arrival rate,  it is possible to fix the value of the limit time 
as five times the length of the emergency phase. This means that the global resilience of the 
hospital can be assessed 15 days after the shock, even though the system has not been completely 
restored yet. According to this methodology, the best possible case, say undamaged structure and 
SDWLHQWV¶ QRUPDO DUULYDO UDWH LQGLFDWHV D  UHVLOLHQFH RI WKH V\VWHP DV D FRQVHTXHQFH DOO
other possible cases can be described by calibrating these opposite outcomes, i.e. worst case and 
best case. Considering the area under the curve, within the two limits defined, i.e. shock time and 
limit time (15 days after the shock), it is possible to estimate the resilience of the system with a 
percentage value, as shown in  Figure 5. 36: 
 
  
Figure 5. 36  Resilience evaluation by using the area method.
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Chapter 6 
Case study: application of the 
methodology 
In this chapter the results obtained by applying the Methodology presented in Chapter 3 will be 
shown in terms of fragility curves. By comparing fragility curves referred to different scenarios it 
is possible to estimate the effects of the single examined properties regarding physical features 
and organizational aspects of the hospital system. 
The first part of the chapter presents the structural fragility curves and then the fragility curves 
related to the assessment of  structural and non-structural systems.  
The second part of the chapter deals with some possible applicative outcomes of the 
illustrated procedure in order to show how the meta-model could be employed to improve the 
hospital functionality. 
Finally a resilience assessment is provided, following the procedure sketched in par. 6.1.4. 
6.1 Tool setting for the case study 
The comparison between demand and capacity, estimated by considering the contribution of the 
non-structural components, has been performed by using a deterministic method, as a simpler 
alternative to probabilistic approaches.  
Following this procedure, the probability of failure for non-structural components is estimated 
by considering different demands associated with various limit states. According to the Italian 
Code (Nuove Norme Tecniche per le Costruzioni, 2008), seismic demands corresponding to the 
Ultimate Limit State (called SLV in this work), and the Damage Limit State (associated with 
Serviceability Limit State, i.e. SLO,  and Damage Limit State, i.e. SLD) are derived from the 
analyses of the building on the base of the 3D Ruaumouko model using an incremental dynamic 
analysis (IDA) for two ground motion record sets (FEMA and Site Specific). 
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6.1.1 Structural fragility curves  
Structural fragility curves have been found for each ground level of the building: they have been 
calculated on the base of the displacement occurred at the storey after the assumed ground 
motion. Figure 6. 1 and Figure 6. 2 show the comparison between the obtained fragility curves. 
The comparison underlines the increasing acceleration from the ground level to the second floor. 
In effect, the highest value of acceleration is often registered on the top of the structure: this fact 
is very important  for the current analysis, since the functionality of the system must be checked 
at each storey. 
 
Figure 6. 1 Peak total first floor acceleration fragility curve for the serviceability limit state of the second floor(FEMA 
record set on the left and Site Specific record set on the right), compared with the fragility observed at the ground 
level. 
Figure 6. 2 Peak total first floor acceleration fragility curve for the damage limit state of the second floor(FEMA 
record set on the left and Site Specific record set on the right), compared with the fragility observed at the ground 
level. 
The fragility curves at each storey have been calculated even for the serviceability and damage 
limit states and for the two record sets. In these two cases, all the non-structural components 
allocated inside the emergency department have been considered. Many examples of non-
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structural components can be made, for instance all the cabinets and their contents and all the 
³DFFHOHUDWLRQ VHQVLWLYH´7 ones.  By considering Figure 6. 1- Figure 6. 4 it is evident how the 
amount of acceleration at each storey can vary and, therefore, how different the required capacity 
of the non-structural components should be. 
Figure 6. 3 Peak total first floor acceleration fragility curve for the serviceability limit state (FEMA record set on the 
left and Site Specific record set on the right). 
Figure 6. 4 Peak total first floor acceleration fragility curve for the damage limit state (FEMA record set on the left 
and Site Specific record set on the right). 
6.1.2  Comprehensive (structural and non-structural) fragility curves 
Suspending ceiling systems in two different types of room in the emergency unit have been 
assessed with reference to serviceability and damage limit states of the structure. The fragility of 
                                                 
7 ³$FFHOHUDWLRQVHQVLWLYHFRPSRQHQWV´DUHHOHPHQWVVXEMHFWWRDFFHOHUDWLRQsuch as the Engineering Demand Parameter 
(EDP). By making a comparison between structural fragility curves and several non-structural fragility curves it is 
worth to note that non-structural elements must be susceptible to the same EDP. In this work the comparison is made 
between the structural fragility curves expressed by acceleration, and two non-structural components belonging to the 
FODVVRIWKH³DFFHOHUDWLRQVHQVLWLYHFRPSRQHQWV´ 
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similar ceiling systems developed at the University of Canterbury, and based on experimental 
testing, has been adopted as the capacity curve for the case study. The envelope curve of the 
FRPSRQHQWV¶ IUDJLOLW\FXUYHVKas considered as the capacity. In addition, another non-structural 
component, i.e. the cabinet, has been taken into account thanks to the data provided by Cosenza 
et al. 2014. Accelerations for all the curves have been considered as the Engineering demand 
parameter (EDP). 
6.1.2.1  Suspended ceiling system 
For the Intensive Brief Observation (OBI) and the emergency rooms (ER) the fragility curves 
have been calculated both for the structure and for the comprehensive system, say the structure 
and  the suspending ceiling system together. Figure 6. 5 - Figure 6. 8 show the comparison 
between these fragility curves. Since the suspended ceiling of the storey is related to the 
behaviour of its top floor, to find the fragility curves of the comprehensive system the fragility 
curves for the upper floor must have been calculated. 
The comparison between these curves shows the effect of the non-structural components for 
the evaluation of the seismic reliability of the whole system, which is related to the type of 
closure (temporary or permanent) actualised. Figure 6. 5 and Figure 6. 6 indicate the assessments 
for the emergency room: it is clear that the suspending ceiling system is safe with reference to the  
serviceability and damage limit states. The same behaviour can be noted for the suspended 
ceiling system in the OBI room (Figure 6. 7 and Figure 6. 8), that is smaller in size and therefore 
is represented by a right-shifted curve in the graphs. Figure 6. 7 and Figure 6. 8 illustrate the big 
difference in safety between structural and non-structural fragility curves. In particular, it is 
possible to note how, choosing any referring peak floor acceleration (PFA), no simultaneous 
percentage of exceeding the associated limits (structural or non-structural) occurs. 
 
Figure 6. 5 Comparison between structural fragility curve 
associated to the serviceability limit state and the 
suspended ceiling system fragility curve for the 
emergency room. 
Figure 6. 6 Comparison between structural fragility curve 
associated to the damage limit state and suspended 
ceiling system fragility curve for the emergency room. 
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Figure 6. 7 Comparison between structural fragility 
curves associated to the serviceability limit state and 
suspended ceiling system fragility curve for the OBI 
room. 
Figure 6. 8 Comparison between structural fragility 
curves associated to the damage limit state and 
suspended ceiling system fragility curve for the OBI 
room.
It is important to point out the significance of the curves representing the suspended ceiling 
system for both the rooms: in the case of the ER room, the representative fragility curve for the 
whole system is plotted, while for the OBI room the envelope curve is taken into account: both 
the curves are shifted on the left of the graph. To assess a safety condition for the entire system, 
the failure is assumed to occur as soon as one of its components fails. Such a failure does not 
necessarily imply the component to fail down: any loss of functionality depending on a certain 
component can result in a damage to other non-structural elements and may hinder the medical 
service. This strict assessing is precautionary for the service provided by this kind of facility and 
is closely related to the security of medical measures. 
6.1.2.2 Cabinets  
To assess the fragility curves associated with the cabinets the response parameters at the bottom 
level of the considered storey must be taken into account: this is due to the fact that cabinets are 
subject to the acceleration of their floor. The fragility curves of the structure, associated with the 
first floor, for both ground motion sets and limit states (serviceability and damage) are compared. 
Figure 6. 9 and Figure 6. 10 show that, for the considered limits states, no failure occurs to the 
cabinet. In this case, as it happens for other components (see par. 6.1.2.1), for a chosen referring 
acceleration no failure or damage can cause a permanent closure of the rooms (the term 
³permanenW´ conventionally refers to a time span of 3 days, i.e. the emergency phase). 
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Figure 6. 9 Comparison between structural fragility 
curves associated to the serviceability limit state and the 
cabinet fragility curve. 
Figure 6. 10 Comparison between structural fragility 
curves associated to the damage limit state and the 
cabinet fragility curve. 
As illustrated in par. 3.3.1.1, an emergency room is a complete and complex assembled 
combination of elements that must be operating and functional at the same time. This means that 
if a non-structural components fails, despite not being essential for the treatment of emergency 
patients, it can represent an obstacle for the functionality of the room. Therefore for assuming a 
room to be completely functional the contribution of all its non-structural components must be 
considered. 
Despite the scarcity of data, a rough evaluation is possible that is representative of the 
proposed procedure: such an evaluation relies on the analysis of two non-structural elements 
inside the same room. 
 
 
Figure 6. 11 Comparison between non-structural fragility 
curves of non-structural components in the ER room. 
Figure 6. 12 Comparison between non-structural fragility 
curves of non-structural components in the OBI room
In Figure 6. 11 the two curves are assumed to refer to the ER room, while in Figure 6. 12 they are 
assumed to refer to the OBI room. In the ER room, the two curves cross each other in a little 
interval of PFA, and are associated with a low percentage chance of exceeding the performance 
limit state (PLS); by the contrary,  in the OBI room the intersection appears for higher values of 
peak floor acceleration associated with a higher performance chance of exceeding the PLS. 
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Following the methodology, if the structural fragility curve crosses the two NSC fragility curves, 
an envelope curve for these latter should be assessed and compared. In this specific case the NSC 
fragility curves do not cross the structural fragility curves and no assessment is needed.  
 
This technique follows the methodology introduced in Ch.3: it allows to evaluate the physical 
consequences for the health care facility after aseismic event, expressed in terms of room 
closures. The comparison between the fragility curves of non-structural components and the 
structural fragility curves associated with the different limit states indicates the role played by 
non-structural components in the global reliability of the system. 
 
 
Figure 6. 13 Flowchart of the steps needed for assessing the physical characteristics of the hospital. 
According to this study, the existing suspended ceilings and cabinets show a good performance at 
the serviceability and damage level demand for both the investigated rooms (ER room and OBI 
room). As matter of fact both the structural and non-structural fragility curves never cross each 
other: this means that no failures due to the chosen non-structural components occur that are 
related to the investigated limit state.  
6.1.3 The organizational system  
According to the methodology applied in this work (cf. Ch. 3), the assessment of the physical 
aspects concerning the case study must have consequences for the organizational setting of the 
hospital in case an earthquake occurs. The results permit to hypothesize the permanent closure of 
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the rooms into the emergency department, adopting the case 2 organizational model. The 
assumptions for the setting of the emergency procedures are the same declared for the 
organizational model simulations.   
 
In this section the meta-model calculated for the ³case 2´ (see par. 5.2.2) has been applied by 
varying the number of the closed rooms and the percentage of the damage extension, maintaining 
IL[HGWKHĮSDUDPHWHUHTXDO WRMore specifically, a seismic arrival rate scaled with a MMI 
value, from the Northridge inflow and corresponding to the 0.27 g of the site, is applied to the 
DES model.  
It is worth to note that, on the base of WKH ³DQDO\VLV RI WKH SLFNV´ D GLUHFW FRUUHVSRQGHQFH
EHWZHHQĮ and the pick values is found; therefore it is possible to hypothesize that also for values 
less than 1.0, the metamodel well approximates the waiting time curve for the yellow-code 
patients during an emergency and with variable closed rooms.  
The following equation (in the general form no.(5.13) is applied with sub-parameters of 
equations (5.10)-(5.11)-(5.12):  
 
ܹܶሺݐǡ Ƚǡ ݊ሻ ൌ ܽሺȽǡ ሻ כ ሺെͲǡͷ כ ൮
 ൬ ݐܿሺȽǡ ሻ൰
ܾሺȽǡ ሻ ൲
ଶ
ሻȀݐ (Eq.5.13) 
Assuming that the shock occurs at: 
t0 = 0 min = 0 hour = 0 days 
with a PGA= 0.27g 
corresponding to a: 
Į =1.0; 
it is possible to set the other parameters 
n, 
t,  
and the percentage (%) of damaged area. 
 
The waiting time curves are calculated and the waiting time values for a certain instant of time t 
can be assessed, as shown in Figure 6. 14: 
 
 
Figure 6. 14 Metamodel for Į =1 and the other varying parameters (extract of the Excel file).  
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7KH ³SK\VLFDO´ representation of the hospital system has been enriched by adding other 
information derived from the medical world and the healthcare management: this permitted to 
obtain the framework sketched in Figure 6. 15 that display the interaction between different 
fields, whose functionality is expressed in terms of WT.  
 
Figure 6. 15 Flowchart of the steps needed to include the organizational aspects of the hospital, and  the assessment of 
meta-models associated with the case study 
6.1.4 Resilience estimation   
On the base of the waiting time curves of the meta-model corresponding to the case2-model, with 
Į it is possible to pinpoint the worst case and, consequently, to scale all other results. This 
further step is essential for evaluating the resilience depending on each possible occurrence, 
without overestimating the system.  
Following the procedure illustrated in Ch. 5, the total loss of functionality (100%) is 
calculated thanks to the equivalence of the waiting time curve with the functionality curve. Table 
6. 1 and Table 6. 2 show the coordinates for assessing the normalised waiting time curve and the 
associated functionality curve, as anticipated in par. 5.3.3. 
Table 6. 1  Point coordinates of the normalized waiting time curve in the worst case for the Sansepolcro hospital. 
POINT X-coordinate Y-coordinate 
AWTcurve 0 0 
BWTcurve t0 0 
CWTcurve t0 Max Peak of WT 
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DWTcurve 
t0 + normalized 
equivalent base  0 
EWTcurve Simulation end 0 
Table 6. 2  Point coordinates of the associated functionality curve in the worst case for the Sansepolcro hospital. 
POINT X-coordinate Y-coordinate 
AFUNCcurve 0 100 
BFUNCcurve t0 100 
CFUNCcurve t0 
Residual 
functionality 
DFUNCcurve 
t0 + equivalent 
base 100 
EFUNCcurve Simulation end 100 
 
Referring to the data of this particular case, assuming that the shock occurs at: 
t0 = 2880 min = 48 hour = 2 days 
with a PGA= 0.27g 
corresponding to a seismic arrival rate with the amplifying factor 
Į =1.0, 
the worst case is represented by a damage which affects three rooms  
n =3 
for the totality of their area = 100%.  
The normalized waiting time curve associated with this case and the related functionality curve 
are described in the following Tables: 
Table 6. 3  Point coordinates of the normalized waiting time curve in the worst case for the Sansepolcro hospital. 
POINT 
X-
coordinate Y-coordinate 
AWT(worst case) 0 0 
B WT(worst case) 2 0 
C WT(worst case) 2 8195.797 
D WT(worst case) 10.636 0 
E WT(worst case) 27.77 0 
Table 6. 4  Point coordinates of the associated functionality curve in the worst case for the Sansepolcro hospital. 
POINT 
X-
coordinate Y-coordinate 
AFUNC(worst case) 0 100 
B FUNC(worst case) 2 100 
C FUNC(worst case) 2 0 
D FUNC(worst case) 10.636 100 
E FUNC(worst case) 27.77 100 
 
Table 6. 4, is graphically represented in Figure 6. 16. The maximum peak of functionality loss is 
associated with the value 0%, while the time needed to restore the functionality is calculated 
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through the equivalence of the areas (cf. par. 5.3.2), using the simplified recovery function (cf. 
equation (5.19)), to represent the section between point C and point D.  
 
 
Figure 6. 16 Functionality curves related to the worst case, associated with Į =1.0 
The results in terms of functionality curves are showed in Figure 6. 17. The functionality curves, 
for variable n values, differ from each other and considerably increase both the BC segment and 
the X-coordinate-values of point D (corresponding to the time required to restore the 
functionality). The associated CD line, which corresponds to the recovery function, shows a 
changing slope, as a function of the n value.   
 
 
Figure 6. 17 Functionality curves related to Į =1.0 and n variable. 
 
The values obtained for the slope, as a function of the assumed n variable,  is illustrated in Table 
6. 5. From the analysis of the variation (see Figure 6. 18), an exponential function is taken into 
account as representative of the variation: this function is essential for a better understanding of 
the behaviour of the hospital system, subject to different room closures.  
A B 
C 
D E 
n=3 
n=0 
A B 
C 
D E 
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Table 6. 5  Values of the variation of the CD segment slope, in function of the n variable. 
n Slope of the CD segment 
0 4.732364 
1 4.719645 
2 7.224772 
3 11.57923 
 
 
Figure 6. 18Variation of the CD segment slope, in function of the n variable.. 
In addition, the variation of the area under the curves is analysed, together with the peak values 
(Y-coordinates of point C). The values are shown in Table 6. 6 and Table 6. 7, and graphically 
represented in Figure 6. 19 and Figure 6. 20 respectively.  
Table 6. 6  Values of the area under the linearized waiting time curve, as a function of the n variable (with Į=1.0). 
n area 
0 1245759.6 
1 2689891.9 
2 9610158.9 
3 62763677 
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Figure 6. 19 Variation of the area under the linearized waiting time curve, as a function of the n variable (with Į=1.0). 
Table 6. 7  Values of the Y-coordinate of the C point, as a function of the n variable (with Į=1.0). 
n Y-coordinate of C point 
0 93.673 
1 89.311 
2 72.170 
3 0 
 
 
Figure 6. 20 Variation of the Y-coordinate of the C point, as a function of the n variable (with Į=1.0). 
The global behaviour of the hospital system is summarised in Figure 6. 21, where four 
percentages of damaged areas related to the corresponding n parameter are additionally plotted. 
The derivation of damages equal to 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% for the areas involved are 
calculated in order to understand the varying response of the system. 
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Figure 6. 21 Functionality curves related to different damaged areas, in function of n variable (with Į =1.0). 
Figure 6. 21 indicates that different percentages of damage and a variable number of rooms affect 
the variation of the resilience curves, which display a specific behaviour: point D of the resilience 
curves never changes. This happens because the variation of the damaged area percentage is 
applied within the same range (that in this case corresponds to the same n value), without 
affecting the BD segment of the resilience curve: therefore the latter is only subject to the 
variation of the n parameter. By the contrary, the area of the resilience curve and, consequently, 
the peaks and the recovery segment (respectively the segments BC and CD), are influenced by 
the extension of the damaged area.  
By applying the equation in (5.3.2.2) all the all the points needed for the construction of the 
resilience curve are assessed, for the simplified cases of n variable, 100% of functionality of the 
URRPVDYDLODEOHDQGĮ =1.0. 
The following Figures illustrate the resilience curves assessed for n parameter ranging from 0 
to 3; the resilience is calculated within the range of 18 days, which cover the emergency-phase (3 
days) plus further 15 days after the shock, i.e. five times the emergency phase length.  
 
This area is rudely VFDOHGRQWKHEDVHRID³IXOO\´RSHUDWLRQDOFXUYHFRUUesponding to resilience 
equal to 100%, and is associated with no occurred damages. If the rooms are partially damaged 
the difference in resilience will be within the range of each n-case, due to the linear variation of 
the functionality curve that have been previously analysed.  
0 %  
n=0 n=3 
75% 
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Figure 6. 22  Resilience curves associated with n=0 (case a), n=1 (case b), n=2 (case c), and n=3 (case d). 
For instance, if n=2, (cf. case (c) in Figure 6. 22), the variation on resilience depending on the 
damage extension (%) do not exceed the 90,96%, probably varying between 93,4% and 90,96%. 
However, it is important to note that these results are closely related to the assumptions that, in 
turn, can be considered as valuable only for the case study. For other problems or buildings, 
different assumptions should be made that strictly depend on the specific system under 
consideration.  
 
93,86% 93,4% 
90,96% 68,7% 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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Figure 6. 23 Flowchart of the steps followed for assessing the resilience associated to the case study.  
To conclude, Figure 6. 23 resumes the entire qualitative procedure which has been employed to 
assess the resilience of a healthcare facility, focusing on different fields. The arrows indicate the 
efforts made to channel all these competences in a unique direction. One of the more relevant 
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applications of the presented methodology is the possibility to focus on the particular element 
that is responsible for the loss of functionality, as well as the possibility to modify the 
organizational setting of the emergency procedures in case low resilience depends on the 
organizational aspects.  
 
Accordingly this procedure permits to identify the specific cause of a failure, be it of physical or 
organizational nature.  
On the one hand, in case of damage due to one or more elements, the meta-model can be used 
to understand the possible interventions needed to improve the system functionality. As matter of 
fact, once the resilience of the system is known, it becomes feasible to identify the steps to be 
WDNHQ IRU HQVXULQJ WKHKRVSLWDO¶s recovery: by fixing a certain value for the desired (expected) 
resilience, even the rime needed to achieve such result is known. On the other hand, if the 
performance is expressed in terms of time, it is also possible to quantify the resilience, together 
with all the related information. This tool can be very useful both in post-earthquake scenarios 
(for assessing the restoration time), and in pre-event scenarios (for improving the management 
involving all mentioned performances). 
Even under normal conditions, i.e. normal scenarios where no emergency occurs, this 
approach constitutes a precious tool to calibrate the organizational aspects, minimizing the 
interruption of the service provided. It is important to mention that the real simulations performed 
by the medical staff, which are essential for the training of the hospital personnel, are expensive 
both in economic and human terms. 
Illustrations of the procedures and relative interventions of the different aspects are shown in 
Figures 6.25-6.29, with reference to the following guide-outline: with the Ȝ is represented the 
structural part, while the non-structural elements are symbolized with the ȕ and the organizational 
aspects are described through the ܵ symbol (divided in ܵ0 and ܵ1 for no-earthquake and 
earthquake occurrence), with the ݊ symbol is represented the interrelation between the three 
aspects (completely shown in Figure 6.29).  
 
 
Figure 6. 24  Outline of the following flowchart taken into account in the study. 
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Figure 6. 25 Flowchart of the punctual steps into Ȝ segment.  
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Figure 6. 26 Flowchart of the punctual steps into ȕ segment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PH
YS
IC
AL
 A
SP
EC
TS
 Non-structural Structural OrganizaƟonal ORGANIZATIO
NAL ASPECTS 
ɴ ʄ ࠹0 
ʄ*ɴ*࠹1=ࡏ 
࠹1 
Structural 
Power 
Systems 
Equipment Ceiling 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
('3(&3 
NO 
More resear-
ches and la-
boratory tests 
for data deri-
vaƟon 
Available 
data  
NO 
Non-structural 
NO 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
('3(&3 
MulƟple NSC assessment 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
('3(&3 
Performance improve-
ments/ 
REPLACEMENT of the 
weak element(s)/
Monetary investments 
for performance in-
creasing 
Fragility assessment 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
('3(&3 
YES 
YES 
Pipe  
Systems 
Etc.  
NO NO 
AND 
Single NSC assessment  
Are they within the 
same room? 
YES 
PH
YS
IC
AL
 A
SP
EC
TS
 
STRUCTURAL OR 
AND 
NON-STRUCTURAL STRUCTURAL vs NON-STRUCTURAL 
fragility curves 
Available 
data  
Available 
data  
Available 
data  
Fragility assessment 
O
RGANIZATIO
NAL ASPECTS 
OrganizaƟonal 
Safe 
Seismic resilience of hospitals  
 
168 
 
 
Figure 6. 27 Flowchart of the punctual steps into ћ0 segment. 
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Figure 6. 28 Flowchart of the punctual steps into ћ1 segment.  
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Figure 6. 29 Flowchart of the punctual steps into Ѱ segment. 
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6.2 Application #1: how to evaluate the redundant elements 
The results of this study may be applied to improve the current setting of the hospital system, or 
to figure out how a better functionality can be achieved in case of calamity. Figure 6.24 permits 
to define remarkable sub-flows focused on specific aspects, i.e. the role of non-structural 
components and of redundant sub-systems. 
Figure 6. 30 shows the theoretical path followed to identify the weakest non-structural 
components into the current system as a result of its features, like: the location, the installation, 
the number and the capacity of the sub-systems. Once the weakest elements have been identified, 
possible solutions can be found, for instance how to replace them or how to by-pass their 
function by introducing new alternative sub-systems. With respect to this special attention has 
EHHQSDLG WR WKH ³UHGXQGDQW´ HOHPHQWV E\XVLQJ WKH ³UHGXQGDQF\ IDFWRU´as introduced in par. 
3.31.2. Even in this case, the referring waiting time curves are associated to the yellow code 
patients. The first applicative example presented here is the identification of the elevator as a 
weak element and a possible redundant improvement. This element is the only one which 
connects the emergency department (allocated on the first floor) with the emergency rooms on 
the second floor, that in case of emergency must be operative (following the emergency 
procedures of the hospital). 
In case the elevator gets damaged there will be no possibility to reach the upper floor. As 
matter of fact the hospital plan has a complex structure and the ORs are not easy to be reached 
from other areas of the building; moreover the other elevators are too little in size to 
accommodate a stretcher. Figure 6. 31 shows the position of the elevator, located between two 
different structural units. It must be classified as a ³VWUDWHJLF´ GHYLFH VLQFH ± despite its 
importance ±it can easily undergo service interruption. Even for low-intensity ground motions, 
the seismic response of the structure can compromise the effectiveness of the elevator (Figure 6. 
31b), with a consequent loss of connections between the two storeys.  
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Figure 6. 30 Procedure flowchart: remarkable sub-inflow on the non-structural cause for the loss of functionality
PH
YS
IC
AL
 A
SP
EC
TS
 Non-structural Structural OrganizaƟonal ORGANIZATIO
NAL ASPECTS 
ɴ 
ʄ ࠹0 
ʄ*ɴ*࠹1=ࡏ 
࠹1 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
NO 
TEMPORARY 
Closure of the rooms 
PERMANENT 
OrganizaƟonal model in EMERGENCY 
condiƟons AND DAMAGES 
PHYSICAL  
RETROFIT 
OPTION 
WaiƟng Ɵme assessment 
ANALYTICAL MetaModel: WT in func-
Ɵon of PHYSICAL parameters   
OR 
0 
150 
75 
0 5 10 
YES 
YES 
NO 
OR 
ORGANIZATIONAL  
IMPROVEMENT 
OPTION 
OR 
AND 
Acceptable 
For physical reasons  
Performance impro-
vements/ 
REPLACEMENT of 
the weak element
(s)/Monetary invest-
ments for perfor-
mance increasing 
STRUCTURAL vs NON-STRUCTURAL  fragility curves PH
YS
IC
AL
 A
SP
EC
TS
 
Non-structural 
Structural 
O
RGANIZATIO
NAL ASPECTS 
OrganizaƟonal 
0 
50 
0 
100 
5 10 
FuncƟonality 
assessment 
0 
50 
0 
100 
5 10 
RESILIENCE 
derivaƟon NO 
END 
YES 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
For organiza-
Ɵonal reasons  
NO 100 
50 
10 5 
0 5H
VLO
LHQ
FH

 
0 7LPHGD\ 
YES
Acceptable 
NO 
Seƫng soluƟons for the 
management organizaƟon 
in case of EMERGENCY 
(PEMAF) 
AND 
Structural fragility curve as-
sociate with the limit state 
and related to the PEAK 
FLOOR ACCELERATION 
NON-STRUCTURAL 
MulƟple NSC assessment 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 0.4 0.8 
('3
YES 
Are they within the 
same room? 
YES 
Available 
data  
Fragility assessment 
CHAPTER 6 Case study: Application of the methodology 
 
173 
 
 
Figure 6. 31  a) Main patients paths in case of emergency where the only vertical connection is the elevator (left); b) 
zoom of the emergency department and location of the elevator.
A first model of the current situation has been performed under emergency conditions, then 
several downtimes have been applied to the elevator. In order to compare alternative 
organizational choices by the hospital, other hypothesized models with a redundant elevator have 
been run as well. The differences regarding the physical characteristics are shown in the 
architectural plans of Figure 6. 32.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. 32 a) Main patients’ paths in case of emergency with redundant  vertical connection (on the left); b) zoom of 
the emergency department and location of the elevators (on the right). 
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In total 8 models have been developed, as summarized in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 Models developed with several downtimes (with and without redundancy element). 
Model (name) Redundancy (redund) Downtime (DT) 
Model_NOredund_NODT NO 0 hours 
Model_NOredund_DT24h NO 24 hours 
Model_NOredund_DT48h NO 48 hours 
Model_NOredund_DT72h NO 72 hours 
Model_YESredund_NODT YES 0 hour 
Model_YESredund_DT24h YES 24 hours 
Model_YESredund_DT48h YES 48 hours 
Model_YESredund_DT72h YES 72 hours 
 
The simulations include three days of emergency scenario and 26 days under normal conditions 
to restore normal waiting times for patients. Two variable conditions are considered: the 
presence/absence of a redundant elevator and a variable downtime which starts at time 0, due to 
the earthquake shock. The first model performed is the current setting model, which has been 
assumed as a reference point for all other examples, then it has been compared with the 
redundant-elevator models without downtime.  
These first results, despite being expected, are of great help for comprehending the behaviour 
of the model: in case no downtime occurs the waiting time experienced by patients does not 
change drastically. In effect without downtime patients are divided between the two elevators, 
which work for a little amount of time and not uninterruptedly. The little discrepancy in the graph 
is probably due to some waiting patients in queue for the elevator, causing a delay in the normal 
transferring from the ER to the ORs. In case a redundant elevator is present, there will be no 
queues and the second elevator will compensate the temporary interruption of the service.  
 
 
Figure 6. 33 Waiting time curves without downtime, with presence of a redundant elevator in the current setting model. 
With a downtime of 24 hours the waiting time increases significantly (growing proportionally 
with the downtime hours). Figure 6. 34 clearly illustrates it (on the left) also showing the 
variation regarding the waiting time if a redundant elevator is available (on the right). 
Notwithstanding the increase in the downtime hours, the effects on the physical system are the 
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same, and the waiting time variation is irrelevant. In these cases, the system works exactly as in 
presence of an undamaged elevator, which is the case of the current setting organizational 
system. Therefore it can be concluded that the methodology is effective in evaluating the role of 
redundant non-structural components. 
 
Figure 6. 34  a) Waiting time bell curve of the model with one elevator (NO-redundancy) on the left; and b) the model 
with two elevators (YES-redundancy) during three days of emergency and no one elevator downtime, on the right. 
Beside the waiting time, it is interesting to consider the number of treated patients. As Figure 6. 
35 shows, the number of treated patients do not change in case no downtime occurs, despite the 
number of elevators involved. The in-patients number is the same in all the simulations, since the 
input arrival rate of the model does not change; such as in the waiting time curve comparison, 
also the in/out-patient number does not change between the current system and a redundant 
system without downtimes.  
 
Figure 6. 35 Time history graph representing in-patients and out-patients of the model with one elevator (NO-
redundancy)on the left, and the model with two elevators (YES-redundancy) during three days of emergency and no 
one elevator downtime, on the right. 
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On the one hand, these results suggest the uselessness of a redundant elevator, although the 
difference is undeniable considering the probable downtime that may occur to the elevator. On 
the other hand, great differences can be found not only regarding the waiting time curves, but 
also concerning the input-output patients graphs. However, assuming an interruption of the 
service for the existing elevator, which at this time has entrusted all inputs in the operating 
rooms, the gap between the waiting time curves and the time history of treated patients is 
significant. 7KHHIIHFWRIHOHYDWRUV¶GRZQWLPHVIRr the number of discharged patients is shown in 
Figure 6. 36: 
 
   
Figure 6. 36 In-patients and Out-patients time history of the model with one elevator (NO-redundancy) and different 
elevator downtimes. 
This difference is well illustrated in Figure 6. 37, where a comparison is sketched for different 
downtimes determining a variable frequency of out-patients. With no downtime the system is 
able to discharge patients in a reasonable time, while increasing downtimes necessarily affect the 
discharge procedure. 
 
 
Figure 6. 37 In-patients and out-patients time history. 
Analysing the waiting time peaks (see Table 9) it is interesting to note how the peaks of non-
redundant models have a direct relationship with a longer downtime. This behavior is described 
in Figure 6. 38 (on the right), where the peaks of waiting time are plotted vs. the different 
Dt=0 
Dt=72 
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downtimes occurred in the model. By the contrary, with a redundant model (or rather, with a 
redundant elevator) even if the downtimes increase, the redundant (additional) elevator 
compensates for loss of functionality of the damaged one, maintaining the waiting time curve and 
the associated peak of WT at the level of no-downtimes cases.    
Table 6.9 Waiting time peaks registered during the performed models. 
Model Peak of waiting time (min) 
Model_NOredund_Dt0h 586.0294 
Model_NOredund_Dt24h 2232.6509 
Model_NOredund_Dt48h 4186.3610 
Model_NOredund_Dt72h 6190.1450 
Model_YESredund_Dt0h 456.6369 
Model_YESredund_DT24h 485.8595 
Model_YESredund_DT48h 576.8624 
Model_YESredund_DT72h 505.4978 
 
  
Figure 6. 38 Comparison between waiting time curves of all the models, and waiting time peaks (on the left), with their 
trend (on the right) vs. several downtimes. 
6.3 Application #2: how to optimise the additional resources in an 
emergency 
Figure 6.34 shows the flowchart of the hospital system functionality; by applying the proposed 
analytical approach, it is possible to improve the organizational setting of the emergency 
procedure, varying the available resources and picking up the parameters which more effectively 
affect the response of the emergency department. 
By focusing on the organizational aspects, the multiple factors affecting the emergency 
procedures and their relationship can be investigated in terms of waiting time. In what follows an 
applicative example of this procedure is illustrated. 
The resources, both hospital personnel and beds, are assumed as variables, while the arrival 
rate has been considered as constant for all the simulations (Į=1). The variation of resources is 
assumed as the possibility to arrange multiple beds or to request additional medical staff. In other 
Seismic resilience of hospitals  
 
178 
words, among all the parameters which seem to be the most relevant, a study has been carried out 
to identify the key ones.  
The increasing resources are expressed in terms of: 
- n: number of rooms for yellow codes treatments in case of emergency; 
- m: number of resources in terms of increased units following the emergency procedures, 
corresponding to transporters, nurses, OSS, and doctors, i.e.  m stands for the additional 
number of members involved. 
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Figure 6. 39 Flowchart of the punctual steps to be taken into account in the study. 
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As a basic condition the current setting organizational model has been considered, following the 
emergency procedures in an emergency, that is: 
- n = 4 (number of beds reserved to the yellow code patients); 
- m = 5 (additional human resources, only referred to doctors). 
 
Other resources are: 5 (nurses), 3 (OSSs) and 4 (transporters); however, only the number of 
additional doctors is taken into account. This basic model is called M_n4+0m since it implies 4 
additional rooms and no additional medical resources with respect to those regulated by the 
emergency procedures.  
 
 
Figure 6. 40 Waiting time curves of different n parameter (number of rooms) variation vs. m parameter (number of 
additional human resources) 
In the modified models, the number of rooms (n) has been increased from 4 to 10. The first two 
additional beds, i.e. those for green codes in normal scenarios, are located into the emergency 
department, while the other two additional beds are assumed. The number of resources (m) is 
increased two by two. The considered cases are listed in Table 6.10: 
Table 6.10: Names and properties of the different models referred to in this section. 
 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9 n=10 
+0m M_n4+0m M_n5+0m M_n6+0m M_n7+0m M_n8+0m M_n9+0m M_n10+0m 
+2m M_n4+2m M_n5+2m M_n6+2m Mn7+2m M_n8+2m M_n9+2m M_n10+2m 
+4m M_n4+4m M_n5+4m M_n6+4m M_n7+4m M_n8+4m M_n9+4m M_n10+4m 
+6m - - - - M_n8+6m M_n9+6m M_n10+6m 
+8m - - - - - - M_n10+8m 
+10m - - - - - - M_n10+10m 
Despite all resources are increased, only the additional number of doctors is considered: this 
choice depends on the existing ratio between n and m, as shown in Table 6.10. 
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The actual ratio is equal to:  
 
ܴ ൌ ݊ ݉Τ ൌ Ͷ ͷൗ ൌ ͲǤͺ 
(Eq.6. 1) 
with n corresponding to the number of the available beds, and m to the number of doctors 
dedicated to the yellow-category of patients. In this case the number of doctors is 3, i.e. 5 doctors 
in total, with 2 of them dedicated to red codes, and 4 yellow-beds. 
 
Accordingly the waiting time curves referred to yellow-code patients are assessed and compared. 
Multiple evaluations are made, investigating first the variation of the waiting time curves of 
models with a fixed number of medical personnel, but a variable number of available rooms. The 
results are graphically presented in the following plots (Figure 6. 41). 
 
 
a) 
 
b) 
c) d) 
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e) f) 
Figure 6. 41 Waiting time curves with fixed m parameter (number of additional human resources) and n parameter 
(additional number of rooms) variable: a) no supplement resources; b) 2 supplement resources; c) 4 supplement 
resources; d) 6 supplement resources; e) 10 rooms and 8 supplement resources, and f) 10 supplement resources.  
With respect to these results it is worth to make some observations, especially concerning the 
increasing of rooms available for treating patients with a fixed m, i.e. the number of additional 
resources.  
First of all, in graph (a) under normal conditions (without additional resources), a big 
difference in terms of waiting time occurs until 2 further rooms are added; after this improvement 
(from 3 to 10 rooms available), however, the difference in waiting time is not so relevant. By the 
contrary, the addition of two rooms considerably modifies the organizational response of the 
system, halving the waiting time. Thereafter, despite the consistent increase in the number of 
rooms, the waiting time does not decrease because of the staff availability.  
Another important observation regards the drastic reduction of the waiting time for a number 
of available rooms ranging between 4 and 5. The comparison between the first two graphs (cf. (a) 
and (b)) underlines that an additional number of doctors and nurses (m parameter) does not lead 
to a notable reduction of the waiting time: this is due to the impossibility to allocate patients in 
additional places/beds/rooms. However, the organizational model undeniably benefits from the 
addition of one or two beds. The graph in (c) shows that the waiting time more significantly 
varies when the n/m ratio reverts about 0.65 (cf. Table 6.11). In effect, the waiting time under the 
current conditions for the rooms involved  does not change despite additional resources are 
employed. A similar situation is displayed by the waiting time associated with the curves in graph 
(d): the variation of the waiting time is not so evident as it is in the first three graphs because the 
ratio n/m is stable around the same value. The most significant decrease in waiting time is 
obtained when 10 rooms are made available and 8 or 10 human resources are added. The 
variation regarding the latter two cases is not relevant (they are associated with  the same ratio of 
values). 
 
CHAPTER 6 Case study: application of the methodology 
  
183 
Table 6.11 Ratios associated with different simulations: the bold-typed red ratio is associated with the current (real) 
emergency scenario. 
R=n/m n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9 n=10 
+0m 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 
+2m 0.571429 0.714286 0.857143 1 1.142857 1.285714 1.428571 
+4m 0.444444 0.555556 0.666667 0.777778 0.888889 1 1.111111 
+6m 0.363636 0.454545 0.545455 0.636364 0.727273 0.818182 0.909091 
+8m 0.307692 0.384615 0.461538 0.538462 0.615385 0.692308 0.769231 
+10m 0.266667 0.333333 0.4 0.466667 0.533333 0.6 0.666667 
 
Even the variation regarding the medical personnel (m parameter) with a fixed n (number of 
doctors) can be evaluated:  Figure 6. 42 shows that the waiting time curves calculated by varying 
the m parameter are very close to each other. For instance in graph (a) the additional number of 
doctors during the emergency phase does not change the waiting time curve of the patients since 
they get no accommodation into the hospital. By including some little variations ± all graphs well 
represent this behaviour ± and, progressively, by increasing the number of rooms, the bell curves 
decrease. Exclusively in graph (d) it is possible to detect a slight difference between the curves: it 
is the result of the higher number of available rooms and of the satisfactory n/m assumption.  
The last graph (Figure 6. 42) represents the waiting time curves associated with the ratio 
R=n/m value, around 0,8 and marked in red in Table 6.12. 
 
a) b) 
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c) 
 
d) 
e) 
 
f) 
g) h) 
Figure 6. 42 Waiting time curves for different n parameter (number of rooms) variation vs. m parameter(number of 
additional human resources)   
The last plotting (graph (h)) shows how the waiting time curves having the same R significantly 
decrease  as a consequence of an increase in the n and m parameters respectively.  
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These results validate the assumption that the hospital performance is sensitive to the 
available resources in terms of medical staff and available beds. Comparing the best 
performances of the hospital with varying resources at its disposal, with the same R ratio, the best 
results are obtained when 2 doctors and 2 beds are added (model M_n6+2m  in Table 6.12) since 
this case provides the most convenient waiting time. In Table 12 the models plotted in Figure 6. 
42, case (h), corresponding to the R ratio indicated in Table 6.11, are typed in red. 
Table 6.12 Summary of performed simulations: the bold-typed red names are associated with the best ratios n/m. 
 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9 n=10 
+0m M_n4+0m M_n5+0m M_n6+0m M_n7+0m M_n8+0m M_n9+0m M_n10+0m 
+2m M_n4+2m M_n5+2m M_n6+2m Mn7+2m M_n8+2m M_n9+2m M_n10+2m 
+4m M_n4+4m M_n5+4m M_n6+4m M_n7+4m M_n8+4m M_n9+4m M_n10+4m 
+6m - - - - M_n8+6m M_n9+6m M_n10+6m 
+8m - - - - - - M_n10+8m 
+10m - - - - - - M_n10+10m 
 
It is worth to note how an increasing number of resources in terms of medical staff/personnel 
does not influence the organizational response of the system; by the contrary, an increased 
number of rooms/beds available crucially affects the hospital performance.  
This result is not surprising: on the one hand, the working resources (doctors, nurses or Oss 
personnel) perform the standard procedures for a limited time; on the other hand, patients 
receiving treatment remain into the hospital for a period of time that goes from a minimum to a 
maximum estimable on the base of the calculated times registered in the statistical database of the 
hospital. In addition, the arrival rate is randomly generated and follows the trend displayed by the 
input provided by the organizational model. Accordingly, in case of emergency, a discrepancy 
shows up between these two variables: despite all difficulties, the human resources follow the 
procedures according to predictable times, while the number of arriving patients and their 
conditions cannot be easily predicted. As a consequence, the rate of occupancy of the rooms is 
much more influenced by the uncertainties deriving from the contingent scenario than from the 
operability of the medical staff. Therefore it is possible to state that: 
x if n=m, all doctors work regardless of the occupancy of the rooms and the SDWLHQWV¶
arrival rate; 
x if n>m, the system can be more efficient because the work of the doctors is not linked to 
the permanence of patients in the rooms, and they can work and take care of other 
patients by accommodating them in added beds/rooms; 
x if n<m, the system does not improve and behaves exactly as in case n=m; in this specific 
case, however, many doctors cannot work due to the scarcity of beds/rooms available. 
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Figure 6. 43  Graphical setup of the model with the maximum number of additional human resources (m=+10) and the 
maximum number of available beds for yellow-code patients (n=10). 
Figure 6. 43  graphically represents the setup of the model called M_n10+10m, where the 
maximum number of medical units and beds is available. The additional accommodations for 
yellow-code patients are assumed without taking into account the current architectural plan of the 
emergency department. This choice is exclusively due to mathematical reasons. 
 
Plotting the waiting time peaks in function of the number of the additional resources (Figure 6. 
44, on the left) or in function of the number of the rooms available (Figure 6. 44, on the right), it 
becomes clear that the increased number of operative resources is not so influent if compared 
with the increased number of available rooms; however, a little discrepancy among the peaks 
having the same n parameter can be observed. This is due to the remarNDEOHSDWLHQWV¶LQIORZEXW
this differences are not impressive as the variation of the peaks in function of the n parameter.  
 
Figure 6. 44 Waiting time peaks in function of the additional resources (on the left), and in function of additional 
rooms available (on the right) 
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It is evident how the peak values change depending on the number of rooms available.  
The behaviour seems to be the same for all n variations. In addition, analysing the peak variation 
vs. the n parameter, the sensitivity visibly changes depending on the n value. This is a 
confirmation of the ratio between the n parameter and the m parameter, which is essential to 
improve the system. 
Figure 6. 45 shows (on the right) the best coupling among m values: a decreasing waiting time 
is more evident when associated with a specific X-coordinate (corresponding to the n value). By 
the contrary, focusing on a single X-value, the variation associated with the different additional 
resource is easier to catch. Another important factor is constituted by the arrival rate inflow 
(Figure 6. 45, on the left)  since all the simulations were developed  with Į=1.0. Even if the 
assumed flow of patients is excessive, it is useful to investigate the behaviour of the 
organizational aspects subject to the other variables and, more specifically, depending on the 
number of rooms available.  
 
 
Figure 6. 45 Waiting time curves varying the n parameter (from n=1 to n=10), with Į=1.0. 
The simulations used in Ch. 5, having the same patients inflow and different n parameters, are 
extrapolated and then compared, in order to investigate the changes from n=1 (which is the 
maximum acceptable loss), up to n=10. Figure 6. 45 shows all the waiting time curves, for a 
patients inflow equal to Į=1.0, a number of resources equal to those regulated by the emergency 
procedure (no additional resources, m=0) and several values of the n parameter. As evident, the 
difference between n values lower than the current layout and the waiting time curves 
representing n>4 is remarkable. Therefore the unaltered behaviour for values of n>4 confirms the 
significance of having enough medical staff able to treat the patients accommodated in the rooms.   
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The analysis of the waiting time peaks (cf. Figure 6. 46) permits to conclude that the variation of 
the ratio between the number of available rooms and human resources notably compromises the 
behaviour of the system.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. 46 Waiting time peaks as a function of the n/m (R) ratio (on the left), and as a function of the m/n (R-1) ratio 
(on the right side). 
For the first case, the variation of the peaks follows an exponential-growth-function with three 
parameters, as exemplified by the following equation: 
 
݂ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ כ ሺܿ כ ݔሻ (Eq.6. 2) 
where the three parameters are identified with the values indicated in Table 6.13. 
Table 6.13  Parameters of the exponential-growth-function. 
Parameters Value 
a -15,094370 
b 1327,1443 
c 0,3982 
 
On the one hand, the result indicates that the waiting time significantly increases at the increasing 
of the n/m ratio: for the latter having values <1, the peaks do not vary; however, when the ratio 
exceeds the value 2 the waiting time peaks increase considerably. On the other hand, considering 
the ratio m/n ± which is the inverse of the previous one ± the waiting time peaks decrease with 
values of the m/n ratio higher than 0.8, maintaining these values constant. The equation that 
better approximates the behaviour of these values is an inverse polynomial-second order (Eq.6. 
3), whose values for the three parameters involved are indicated in Table 6.14. 
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݂ ൌ ܽ ൅ ቀܾ ݔൗ ቁ ൅ ቀܿ ݔଶൗ ቁ (Eq.6. 3) 
Table 6.14 Parameters of the inverse polynomial-second-order equation  
Parameters Value 
a 90,8563 
b 31,0383 
c 8092,7213 
 
By analysing the behaviour of these two ratios, i.e. n/m and m/n, in function of the increasing 
number of available rooms during an emergency (cf. Figure 6. 47, graph on the left) the values of 
the m/n ratio proportionally increase as a function of the n parameter, following a simple linear 
equation (as shown in (Eq.6. 4)): 
   
݂ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ כ ݔ (Eq.6. 4) 
The two parameters involved are illustrated in Table 6.15: 
Table 6.15  Parameters of the simple linear polynomial equation. 
Parameters Value 
a 9,1563E-19 
b 0,2 
 
Figure 6. 47 Plotting of m/n ratio vs. the n parameter (on the left), and n/m ratio vs. n parameter (on the right). 
 
As expected, the n/m ratio follows an inverse-first-order polynomial equation, corresponding to 
the general equation: 
   
݂ ൌ ܽ ൅ ቀܾ ݔൗ ቁ (Eq.6. 5) 
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The two parameters defining the variation of m/n ratio are shown in Table 6.16: 
 Table 6.16  Parameters of the simple linear polynomial equation. 
Parameters Value 
a 3,3492E-16 
b 5,0 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
This thesis develops an holistic methodology, based on  fragility analysis, to evaluate the 
performance and the seismic resilience of hospital buildings. To this purpose, different fields, 
sometimes under investigated, have been studied and connected with each other. The resulting 
FRPSOH[ LQWHUFRQQHFWLRQ PRGHO FDOOHG ³PHWD-PRGHO´ LQ WKH WH[W LV WKH PRVW UHOHYDQW
achievement of this work.  
The developed ³PHWD-PRGHO´ has been applied to a case study, i.e. a hospital located in 
Sansepolcro (Italy). In order to cover all the possible safety conditions occurring at the varying of 
the assumed seismic input, different scenarios have been considered and investigated. The 
proposed framework, representing both the physical integrity and the organizational optimization 
of the case-study, has been studied before and after the assumed emergency, consisting in an 
earthquake whose intensity is consistent with the seismicity of the area. The results of this study 
evidence the importance of considering the hospital building as a whole system, included the 
analysis of its structural and non-structural components, as well as the organizational models 
applied both in case of normal activities and emergency. Moreover, the proposed approach can 
represent a useful tool to optimize the planning of possible interventions aimed at improving both 
the safety of the hospital system and its efficiency, which in this study are measured in terms of 
waiting time experienced by patients. In the following sections the main outcomes of the research 
are recalled. 
 
7.1 Research outcomes 
Since the research has faced many different issues and fields, a first relevant result has been the 
recognition of the main lacks of knowledge affecting each of them. In order to control the safety 
and the efficiency of a hospital system, indeed many databases and tools must be available. The 
structural behaviour of secondary systems, in particular, seems to be not satisfactory; more 
knowledge and tools, like fragility curves, should be developed in order to include the non-
structural components in the global analysis of hospital systems. In effect, the non-structural 
components are currently introduced in the buildings without any specific attention to the 
contribution provided by their global safety and performance. The performed analysis, however, 
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clearly shows that the behaviour of non-structural components can largely affect the global safety 
of the whole structure, even compromising its functionality.  
In this work structural DQG³FRPSUHKHQVLYH´LHLQFOXGLQJERWKVWUXFWXUDODQGQRQ-structural 
components) fragility curves have been constructed for different limit states and different floors 
of the building. Only few non-structural components, i.e. the suspended ceilings and the cabinets, 
have been included in the analysis; all the other non-structural components, like piping system or 
gas network, have not been investigated in this thesis, since, at the current time, there are not 
available tools able to exhaustively describe their structural response. Accordingly, the best 
method to increase the current knowledge, as it has already been pursued in other countries, is to 
prompt a joint work with the companies supplying the non-structural components and their 
contents. The scientific community, together with the supplying companies, should have as a 
main objective the best possible implementation of the available databases regarding non-
structural components.  In particular, the standardisation of non-structural components should be 
aimed at increasing their performance in earthquake scenarios. 
As regards the assumed case-study, however, the investigated non-structural components, i.e. 
the suspended ceilings and the cabinets, seem to fit the system since they do not affect its seismic 
performance. 
The structural performance of the hospital system is well investigated. The proposed meta-
model should be considered as a general framework to be implemented for specific purposes. A 
more careful choice, for instance, could be made about the ground motions selection, and a more 
detailed structural model, including the infill-wall contribution as well as alternative hysteretic 
models. The introduction of any additional model describing specific sub-systems would not 
compromise the effectiveness of the meta-model, but would rather constitute a further 
improvement. 
One RIWKHPRVWUHOHYDQWDVSHFWVXQGHUOLQHGLQWKLVZRUNLVWKHXVHRI³IORRUIUDJLOLW\FXUYHV´
instead of the more common ones. Depending on the system under consideration and its location, 
in fact, the fragility curves referred to a specific storey should bHDGRSWHG7KH³IORRU IUDJLOLW\
FXUYHV´ DOORZ WR LPPHGLDWHO\ GHWHUPLQH the real Engineering Demand Parameter for non-
structural components, wherever they are located. The coupling provided by these curves permits 
to compare the two physical elements for the described procedure, and to assess the 
organizational aspects, for instance prescribing the closure of different rooms. Accordingly, the 
³IORRU IUDJLOLW\ FXUYHV´ SURSRVHG LQ WKLVZRUN UHSUHVHQW D ³EULGJH-WRRO´ IRU DPXOWLGisciplinary 
approach to this subject.  
The dataset resulting from the evaluation of structural and non-structural elements not only 
permits to better describe the physical system, but also leads to include the organizational aspects 
and to determine the global response of the hospital system.  
 
In this work a great effort has been made to assess the organizational aspects of the case study. 
The obtained results show how the organizational aspects  strictly depend on all the other features 
that are indispensable to guarantee an efficient and safe response by the hospital. Moreover, the 
study highlights the importance of the effectiveness of the organizational plan, its procedures and 
features and how these elements suffer from the response of structural and non-structural 
performance once the waiting time reaches unacceptable levels.  
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Although both the model and the dataset need to be improved ± many assumptions have been 
made in the analysis which can limit the generality of the achieved results ± a first step towards a 
new idea of organizational assessment has been made. The calibration of the input dataset will 
probably need further improvements, like the seismic arrival rate; moreover, it would be 
GHVLUDEOHDFROODERUDWLRQZLWKWKH³'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH&LYLO3URWHFWLRQ´IRUSURMHFWLQJDSUHGLFWLYH
model to assess the seismic resilience of the hospital network, to improve the available dataset 
and to support the practical activity concerning the results obtained from simulated scenarios. An 
adequate planning is essential for guaranteeing an efficient medical response in case of future 
earthquakes: therefore the possibility to test and to simulate changes within the investigated 
model would be an advantage both in terms of money and time saving, without having to wait 
future disasters for testing the prototype¶V performances and its possible variations. To minimize 
the probability for a healthcare system to lose its functionality ± especially considering its crucial 
UROH IRU VDWLVI\LQJ WKH FRPPXQLW\¶V QHHGV LQ DQ emergency ± the behaviour of the hospital 
structure and, consequently, the efficiency of the provided medical treatment can be only 
predicted taking into account every aspect of the system.  
However, the emergency simulations performed by the hospital staff are fundamental for 
being adequately prepared in case of calamity: the human component cannot be totally 
reproduced by a machine, therefore doctors, nurses, sanitary operators and all people 
participating to the emergency procedures have to be trained to face each situation.  
7.2 Future applications  
The most significant result is the management of a complex system, thanks to the joint use of 
information coming from different fields and subjects, which merge into an exclusive process 
with a final outcome. 
The performed study shows how the proposed methodology can be applied to a real case 
study. Even if the investigation is not completed (because of the scarcity of data on non-structural 
components), several possible applications are performed, which offer interesting and useful 
information for hospital managers, hospital supervisors and politicians. 
The methodology can be enriched by considering additional data regarding a specific hospital, 
or by studying a greater number of hospitals, involving the whole healthcare network: 
DFFRUGLQJO\WKHUHVHDUFKFRXOGEHLPSURYHGERWKLQD³YHUWLFDO´GLUHFWLRQDQGLQD³KRUL]RQWDO´
perspective.  
Special attention has been paid to the many possible applications of this methodology, for 
instance by adding different fields, like the economic one, together with an implementation of the 
available data. The hypothesis regarding the future improvement of the procedure is real and 
close to be achieved, both for the single healthcare facility and the regional medical system. 
7.2.1 Further achievements in single hospitals 
The economic management of healthcare facilities is a complex issue, especially where 
investments do not  guarantee adequate results in terms of increased performance. In case of 
emergency, the medical staff must face dramatic situations, like the impossibility to treat patients, 
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although no structural damages have occurred to the system. Unfortunately this has been the most 
recurrent scenario during the last earthquakes, even if large amounts of money have been 
invested for the seismic restoration of the structure.  
Combining technical and economical knowledge and costs, a more convenient selection of the 
proper interventions could be made which is able to ensure the target efficiency even in 
emergency conditions. Such additional information within the methodology would allow 
managers and  investors to better plan the expenses, to make focused interventions, and to 
guarantee a good maintenance of the entire system. As shown in Figure 6.43, the economic loss 
could be measured in different steps of the flowchart, due to the different costs associated with 
the failure. For example, if an earthquake strikes and a disruption of functionality occurs due to 
the suspended ceiling system failure, different levels of economic loss could be taken into 
account.  
If no preventive actions are made and the functionality of the system is compromised, the 
economic loss could be very high; however, if cautionary actions are made with specific attention 
to non-structural components, the budget needed for increasing the seismic performance of the 
elements could be lower and no interruption of the service may occur. 
Accordingly this approach gives the possibility to define the element representing the 
³ZHDNHVWULQJ´RIWKHFKDLQLQRUGHUWR identify the best strategy to manage the whole system and 
the best way to invest money for its improvement. The study on redundant elements is an 
applicative example: the relative cost for a new elevator can be compared with the total cost 
related to the impossibility to treat any patient during the emergency. In this specific case the 
costs to be compared are: the costs for the installation of the elevator and its maintaining versus 
the costs for transferring each patient to another hospital, without counting the costs in terms of 
human life (which are not measurable). Even the possibility to validate the emergency procedures 
of the hospital (PEMAF in Italy) is an interesting application of the current procedure, as 
revealed by application#2. Sensitive parameters, such as the ratio n/m, can be identified: this 
permits to take faster and well-aware decisions with consequent enhancements both during the 
emergency phase and the post-disaster period.   
7.2.2 The network level applications 
The methodology and its applications can be extended at an higher level, i.e. the regional medical 
system. The applications discussed for a single facility can be applied on a larger scale. The 
economic development can be used on the urban and inter-urban scale, taking into account the 
regional healthcare framework, the interconnections among hospitals, the distances and the time 
needed to reach other facilities, as well as the available resources in that region. In this case the 
monetary interest regards the costs for every patient to be transferred, each unavailable care-unit  
and the funds for the re-establishing of the interrupted medical service.  
In case of emergency, decisions must be rapidly taken time, and all resources are to be used 
for transferring  patients to places able to accommodate them. The costs of these procedures are 
high and often exceed the expected costs.  
It is worth to note that the regional Italian healthcare network is based on a pyramidal 
organization; consequently, not all the hospitals are able to care a specific injury and the support 
of an higher-level hospital is needed. The methodology permits to analyse the resources needed 
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in terms of medical staff, i.e. doctors and nurses, beds and medical services, but also ambulances, 
transportation equipment, and all is necessary to connect the network. In this sense, the redundant 
analysis on the elements is very useful, as it includes not only the components within the hospital, 
EXW WKH ZKROH SURYLGHG ³PHGLFDO VHUYLFH´ WKH URDG QHWZRUN WKH HVVHQWLDO ZDWHU JDV DQG
electrical networks. Therefore the identification of weak elements for the extended chain would 
be of significant help within the maxi-emergency programs of the region.   
On the one hand, a supported collaboration with the Civil Protection is desirable and 
potentially fruitful, since one of its competences is the management of the territorial resources 
under disaster conditions. On the other hand, data regarding single hospitals in terms of time and 
resilience performance are essential for obtaining good results when a big area is in an 
emergency. 
The use of this methodology by each single hospital will permit a complete overview of the 
entire healthcare system. This last goal can be represented by a cobweb, in which each fibre is 
composed by a hospital. The use of the methodology could represent a tool for the Civil 
Protection in defining different procedures and plans, dependent on several emergency scenarios, 
with consequent better organized decisional programs by politicians and administrative 
personnel. 
7.3 A multidisciplinary perspective 
The most important issue concerning this research field, as already underlined, crucially regards 
the need for a multidisciplinary approach.  
The starting point of this work necessarily relied on the simultaneous investigation of multiple 
areas and the available input data were gathered from the fields involved. As a consequence, the 
work strongly relies on the comparison between various datasets and, to compensate the lack of 
information, on the formulation of various assumptions. Furthermore, the presented methodology 
intends to cope with the shortcomings of suitable methods noticed in the current literature. More 
specifically, the proposed methodology aims at stressing the strict interplay of the non-structural 
elements of the hospital, that are essential for an adequate and continuous operability of the 
system, with proper structural elements. In other words, the methodology correlates the physical 
features of the system, i.e. non-structural and structural elements, with its organizational aspects, 
that are currently considered in a mere qualitative sense. A methodology that is able to identify a 
single component as the cause of a loss of functionality offers a great advantage not only for the 
prevention phase, but also during the emergency. To develop such a methodology a 
multidisciplinary approach must be adopted, where multifaceted knowledge and various data, 
subjects and competences are simultaneously taken into account.  
7.3.1 A greater awareness among experts 
Such multidisciplinary approach highlights the necessity of awareness for all the operators 
involved in the process. For instance, engineers must be aware of the significance of the non-
structural components and the functions imposed by the architectural features; in addition, both 
engineers and architects should combine their knowledge to improve the efficiency of internal 
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contents along with manufacturing companies; the latter should conform to the standards 
established by the code and, in cooperation with the experts, improve their products. 
The awareness concerning the medical knowledge can only be expressed by taking into 
account all the functional tools into the hospital as well as the conditions under which they 
maintain their functionality. Medical treatments are essential, but doctors must be able to operate 
in safe conditions and in a functional place. 
The good performance of individual functions is certainly a necessary condition, but it is not 
sufficient for the hospital to offer its global service to the community.  
7.3.2 A new resilience coordinator for the heath-care facilities 
Nowadays there are great expectations regarding the full specialization of each sector; all systems 
have been evolving along with their users and are increasingly becoming more complex 
³PDFKLQHV´9HU\ RIWHQ LQQRYDWLYH FRPSRQHQWV DUH GHYHORSHG DQG ORFDWHG LQ ROG FRQWH[WV EXW
they reveal to be not useful since they cannot be fully exploited. 
Perhaps the best solution may be to combine the specialist subjects (that necessarily produce 
improvements) into a global management, reinstating a figures able to supervise multiple areas of 
interest. Accordingly the common purpose, say the interest in providing timely and continuous 
health support to the population, will be strengthened. Such a reference figure, able to coordinate 
the specific interventions in individual areas of expertise, will not complicate the existing 
hierarchy (as it may seem); by the contrary, it will better organize WKH³V\VWHP´. 
 
7KHHYDOXDWLRQRIDKRVSLWDODVD³FRPSOH[DSSDUDWXV´PXVWEHPDGHE\DVNLOOHGSHUVRQKDYLQJ
different competences and being able to communicate with any kind of specialist in order to 
completely understand the system. In effect, complex systems are often overlooked even by 
engineers that, given their background, tend to omit human features, medical and architectural 
aspects, that is: all those aspects that over time have been proved to be of crucial importance and 
therefore not less relevant than the structural elements making up the building. 
This new figure must be aware of the close link between: 
- environment and organizational factors; 
- medical features and instrumentations; 
- scientific management of each single component and flexible management in case of 
emergency.  
Furthermore this person must have a strong sense of renovation, must be flexible and able to 
interact with people having different scientific backgrounds and expertise.  
Although this study paves the way for a deeper comprehension of the strict interplay between 
physical damages, structural and non-structural performances, organizational response and their 
effect on loss of functionality, more efforts are needed for tKHGHYHORSPHQWRIVXFK³QHZILJXUH´
able to efficiently manage the seismic resilience of a hospital. Only in this way the developed 
methodology will really have beneficial effects on the final performance of the healthcare facility 
within a community.  
It is evident that in the future the functionality and resilience of hospital buildings should be 
DQDO\VHG LQ WHUPVRI³FRH[LVWHQFH´ WKLVGRHVQRWPHDQ WKDWHYHU\VSHFLDOLVWKDV WRNQRZHYHU\
aspect involved, but that cooperation and organization must be ensured. This new integrated 
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approach represents the future of hospitals as it will guarantee a level of resilience suitable to face 
any kind of situation. 
7.4 Future developments 
The seismic resilience of hospital buildings represents a research field that crucially needs further 
analyses.  
Future research should be extended to a a wider range of hospitals, with variable size and 
GLIIHUHQW SDWLHQWV¶ FDWHJRULHV )XUWKHU VWXGLHV PD\ permit to standardize the calibration of the 
organizational model and simpler and better planned procedures may be tested. Moreover a larger 
DPRXQWRI WHVWHGKRVSLWDOVFRXOGSURYLGHPRUHGDWDDERXW WKHGLIILFXOWLHVDULVLQJIURPSDWLHQWV¶
medical treatment, which would deliver fruitful results for evaluating seismic resilience. 
At the same time, further investigations should deal with non-structural components: more 
laboratory tests are needed and a stable cooperation between engineers and suppliers should be 
established. A fruitful achievement in this area could be the economic quantification of seismic 
resilience, by carefully coupling the monetary loss for each element contributing to the whole 
functionality of the hospital: as a result, hospital managers would be able to consider another 
variable for making decisions and planning mitigation actions. 
The seismic resilience of hospital buildings will not be satisfactorily comprehended until all 
the parties involved jointly participate in its improvement and, most importantly, until each of 
them makes efforts to improve their performance.  
 
7KHPDLQDLPRI WKLV WKHVLV LV WRRIIHUDFRQFUHWHFRQWULEXWLRQ WRPDQNLQG¶VVDIHW\DQG IURPD
theoretical viewpoint, to increase the scientific interest in a dynamic field where multidisciplinary 
and continuous research is both needed and promising.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix a): Non-structural components list  
In this Appendix is shown a list of non-structural components, deriving from several different 
lists of literature. The main non-structural components are grouped according to their function, 
and are strictly referred to health-care facilities.  
Table 1Non-structural components list derived from literature and grouped by main functions of them. The aim of the 
list is to take into account all the possible “secondary elements” which may be within a hospital.  
C
ri
tic
al
 sy
st
em
 
Electrical system 
Generators 
Electrical equipment, cables and cables ducts 
Control panel 
Lighting system for critical areas of teh hospital 
External electrical systems 
Telecommunications system 
Antenna and antenna bracing 
Low-voltage systems 
Alternative communications systems 
Anchors and braces for telecommunications 
equipments and cables 
Internal communications systems 
Water supply system 
Water tanks 
Water storage tanks 
Alternative water distribution network 
Water distribution system 
Supplementary pumping system 
Fuel storage (gas, gasoline, diesel) 
Fuel tanks 
Distribution system (valves, hoses and 
connections) 
Madical Gases (oxygen, nitrogen, etc.) Anchors for medical gas tanks, cylinders and related equipment 
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Medical gas distribution system 
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 Supports for ducts 
 
Pipes, connections, valves 
Anchors for heating and/or hot water equipment 
Anchors for air-conditioning equipment 
HVAC equipment (boiler, air-conditioning 
systems, exhaust, etc.) 
O
ff
ic
e 
an
d 
st
or
er
oo
m
 
fu
rn
is
hi
ng
s a
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 e
qu
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Anchors for shelving and shelf contents 
 
Computers and printers 
Office furnishings and other equipment 
M
ed
ic
al
 a
nd
 la
bo
ra
to
ry
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t a
nd
 
su
pp
lie
s u
se
d 
fo
r 
di
ag
no
si
s a
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tr
ea
tm
en
t 
Medical equipment in operating theaters and 
recovery rooms 
 
Radiology and imaging equipment 
Laboratory equipment 
Medical equipment in emergency services unit 
Medical equipment in intensive or intermediate 
care unit 
Equipment and furnishings in the pharmacy 
Equipment in starilization unit 
Medical equipment for neonatal care 
Medical equipment and supplies for burn 
management 
Madical equipment for nuclear medicine and 
radiation therapy 
Madical equipment in other services 
Anchors for shelving and medical contents 
A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
al
 e
le
m
en
ts
 
Doors and entrances 
 
Windows and shutters 
Others elements of the building envelope 
(outside walls, facings, etc.) 
Roofing 
Parapets 
Perimeters walls and fencing 
Outside elements (cornices, ornaments, etc.) 
Inside circulation (stairs, corridors, elevators, 
exit doors, etc.) 
Internal walls and partitions 
False or suspended ceilings 
Internal and external lighting systems 
Fire protection system 
Elevator system 
Stairways 
Floor coverings 
Hospital access routes 
Other architectural elements, including 
emergency signs 
 
  
APPENDICES Appendix b 
 
209 
Appendix b): Permanent closures into organizational model simulations 
(model: case 1) 
In this Appendix are presented the results from the case 1- organizational model. The results are 
grouped according to the steps described into Chapter5: the first group show the data clouds, then 
are presented the fitted curves. This order is followed for each varied variable. The second part of 
the appendix shows the coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis, 
grouped according to the varied variable. The last part of the appendix describes the  a, b, c 
parameters variation, both graphically and with the sub-parameters values. 
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Figure 1 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions without room closures 
(n=0), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Data clouds (experimental 
data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential 
smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 2 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions without room closures 
(n=0), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
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Figure 3 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of one 
room (n=1), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal 
days. Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Data clouds 
(experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative 
exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 4 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of one 
room (n=1), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal 
days. Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Smooth analysis with 
third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three 
parameters. 
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Figure 5 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of two 
rooms (n=2), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal 
days. Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Data clouds 
(experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative 
exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 6 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of two rooms 
(n=2), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters 
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Figure 7 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of 
three rooms (n=3), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Data clouds 
(experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative 
exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 8 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of three rooms 
(n=3), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Emergency procedures always activated, both in terms of resources and patients paths. Smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameter 
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Table 2 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=0. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n0E_ Į  1744236 0.1957 4470.938 
Model_n0E_ Į  2547769 0.2583 4907.4 
Model_n0E_ Į  4175566 0.3698 5940.189 
Model_n0E_ Į  5808548 0.3887 6418.565 
Model_n0E_ Į  8479162 0.4009 6865.804 
Model_n0E_ Į  11353831 0.41 7214.502 
Model_n0E_ Į  13917735 0.4135 7482.819 
Table 3 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=1. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n1E_ Į  3644783 0.342 5596.745 
Model_n1E_ Į  5883396 0.3795 6328.052 
Model_n1E_ Į  8919542 0.3901 6826.676 
Model_n1E_ Į  11577560 0.3952 7121.395 
Model_n1E_ Į  15207661 0.3961 7375.213 
Model_n1E_ Į  18506309 0.4013 7587.265 
Model_n1E_ Į  22109093 0.411 7818.534 
Table 4 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=2. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n2E_ Į  14622650 0.3731 7086.107 
Model_n2E_ Į  19288887 0.3768 7339.918 
Model_n2E_ Į  24374307 0.3869 7629.918 
Model_n2E_ Į  29684196 0.3963 7884.429 
Model_n2E_ Į  35024762 0.4031 8107.121 
Model_n2E_ Į  40881879 0.4129 8340.206 
Model_n2E_ Į  46583831 0.4219 8550.887 
Table 5 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=3. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n3E_ Į  65031913 0.4291 8781.418 
Model_n3E_ Į  77823395 0.4495 9199.311 
Model_n3E_ Į  91429363 0.4674 9588.988 
Model_n3E_ Į  1.05E+08 0.4867 10017.18 
Model_n3E_ Į  1.2E+08 0.5038 10426.57 
Model_n3E_ Į  1.36E+08 0.5225 10856.77 
Model_n3E_ Į  1.52E+08 0.5403 11301.53 
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Figure 9 a0, b0, and c0 parameters for the model with n=0 
 
Table 6 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=0. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 13341705 b0 -1.72302 c0 -9073.94 
a1 -3.2E+07 b1 2.893702 c1 18587.65 
a2 20370804 b2 -0.97726 c2 -5146.97 
 
   
Figure 10 a0, b0, and c0 parameters for the model with n=1 
 
Table 7 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=1 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 -8299700 b0 -0.0738 c0 -5454.35 
a1 -147056 b1 0.6315 c1 15902.76 
a2 11997065 b2 -0.2076 c2 -4779.59 
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Figure 11 a0, b0, and c0 parameters for the model with n=2 
 
Table 8 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=2 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 -2.2E+07 b0 0.3257 c0 3550.151 
a1 25309661 b1 0.0226 c1 4199.624 
a2 10831447 b2 0.0236 c2 -671.268 
 
   
Figure 12 a0, b0, and c0 parameters for the model with n=3 
 
Table 9 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=3. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 -2.7E+07 b0 0.2197 c0 5174.395 
a1 59674180 b1 0.2258 c1 3256.677 
a2 32690091 b2 -0.016 c2 356.337 
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Figure 13 a0, a1, a2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 10 a0, a1, a2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
a0 parameter value a1 parameter value a2 parameter value 
a00 13341705 a10 -3.2E+07 a20 20370804 
a01 -2.6E+07 a11 40324760 a21 -6705754 
a02 4612817 a12 -1.1E+07 a22 -4304009 
a03 -143284 a13 2566341 a23 2636023 
 
  
Figure 14 a0, a1, a2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 11 b0, b1, b2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
b0 parameter value b1 parameter value b2 parameter value 
b00 -1.723 b10 2.8937 b20 -0.9773 
b01 2.5222 b11 -3.3693 b21 1.1281 
b02 -0.997 b12 1.2473 b22 -0.4031 
b03 0.124 b13 -0.1402 b23 0.0446 
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Figure 15 b0, b1, b2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 12 c0, c1, c2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
c0 parameter value c1 parameter value c2 parameter value 
c00 -9073.94 c10 18587.65 c20 -5146.97 
c01 -3327.92 c11 8417.052 c21 -3776.97 
c02 9075.038 c12 -14398.3 c22 5281.295 
c03 -2127.53 c13 18587.65 c23 -1136.94 
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Appendix c): Permanent closures into organizational model simulations 
(model: case 2) 
In this Appendix are presented the results from the case 2- organizational model. The results are 
grouped according to the steps described into Chapter5: the first group show the data clouds, then 
are presented the fitted curves. This order is followed for each varied variable. The second part of 
the appendix shows the coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis, 
grouped according to the varied variable. The last part of the appendix describes the  a, b, c 
parameters variation, both graphically and with the sub-parameters values. 
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Figure 16 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions without room closures 
(n=0), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third polynomial 
degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 17 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions without room closures 
(n=0), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting 
with three parameters. 
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Figure 18 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of 
one room (n=1), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line).
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Figure 19 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of 
one room (n=1), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and 
lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
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Figure 20 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of 
two rooms (n=2), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 21 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of two rooms 
(n=2), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting 
with three parameters 
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Figure 22 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of 
three rooms (n=3), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 23 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with the closure of three rooms 
(n=3), and increasing arrival rate (from 1.0 to 1.6). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting 
with three parameters 
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Table 13 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=0. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n0_ Į  858222.3 0.5791 1949.654 
Model_n0_ Į  1525402 0.6076 2292.202 
Model_n0_ Į  2283117 0.619 2567.834 
Model_n0_ Į  3387885 0.5903 2855.197 
Model_n0_ Į  4610620 0.5877 3096.354 
Model_n0_ Į  5801531 0.5879 3238.725 
Model_n0_ Į  7075789 0.5867 3405.085 
Table 14 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=1 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n1_ Į  1749397 0.6134 2409.71 
Model_n1_ Į  2731793 0.6045 2731.369 
Model_n1_ Į  4081929 0.5921 3012.408 
Model_n1_ Į 1.3 5642244 0.5877 3257.462 
Model_n1_ Į  7199898 0.5858 3442.867 
Model_n1_ Į  9083488 0.5884 3666.479 
Model_n1_ Į  10811933 0.5964 3841.212 
Table 15 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=2. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n2_ Į  6594559 0.5814 3423.595 
Model_n2_ Į  8997888 0.5815 3711.193 
Model_n2_ Į  11566543 0.5823 3947.3 
Model_n2_ Į  14440232 0.5931 4193.504 
Model_n2_ Į  17446236 0.5973 4409.664 
Model_n2_ Į  20711623 0.6106 4637.206 
Model_n2_ Į  23895294 0.6188 4846.966 
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Table 16 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=3. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_n3_ Į  37778471 0.6637 5744.024 
Model_n3_ Į  46356620 0.6859 6188.518 
Model_n3_ Į  55531183 0.7075 6635.338 
Model_n3_ Į  65104093 0.7264 7062.341 
Model_n3_ Į  75571382 0.7456 7510.056 
Model_n3_ Į  86738268 0.7647 7965.149 
Model_n3_ Į  98521919 0.7827 8437.179
 
   
Figure 24 a, b, c parameters variation for n=0. 
 
Table 17 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=0. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 617863.3 b0 0.3171 c0 -3600.11 
a1 -6282453 b1 0.4543 c1 7499.357 
a2 6472985 b2 -0.1813 c2 -1951.97 
 
   
Figure 25 a, b, c parameters variation for n=1. 
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Table 18 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=1. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 -1512248 b0 0.9602 c0 -2108.93 
a1 -4425030 b1 -0.5411 c1 5887.297 
a2 7609760 b2 0.1958 c2 -1358.41 
 
   
Figure 26 a, b, c parameters variation for n=2. 
 
Table 19 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=2. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 -7870083 b0 0.6853 c0 143.341 
a1 5324776 b1 -0.2117 c1 3874.782 
a2 9107142 b2 0.1069 c2 -585.836 
 
   
Figure 27 a, b, c parameters variation for n=3. 
Table 20 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=3. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 -10330306 b0 0.404 c0 1703.556 
a1 15104349 b1 0.2992 c1 3784.533 
a2 33068910 b2 -0.0392 c2 262.4661 
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Figure 28 a0, a1, a2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 21 a0, a1, a2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
a0 parameter value a1 parameter value a2 parameter value 
a00 617863.34 a10 -6282453.44 a20 6472985.08 
a01 -1512248.17 a11 -4425030.40 a21 7609760.13 
a02 -7870082.62 a12 5324775.88 a22 9107142.25 
a03 -10330305.75 a13 15104349.05 a23 33068909.97 
 
   
Figure 29 a0, a1, a2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 22 b0, b1, b2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
b0 parameter value b1 parameter value b2 parameter value 
b00 0.32 b10 0.45 b20 -0.18
b01 0.96 b11 -0.54 b21 0.20 
b02 0.69 b12 -0.21 b22 0.11 
b03 0.40 b13 0.30 b23 -0.04
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Figure 30 b0, b1, b2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 23 c0, c1, c2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
c0 parameter value c1 parameter value c2 parameter value 
c00 -3600.11 c10 7499.36 c20 -1951.97 
c01 -2108.93 c11 5887.30 c21 -1358.41 
c02 143.34 c12 3874.78 c22 -585.84 
c03 1703.56 c13 3784.53 c23 262.47 
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Appendix d): Temporary closures into organizational model 
simulations (model: case 3) 
In this Appendix are presented the results from the case 3- organizational model. The results are 
grouped according to the steps described into Chapter5: the first group show the data clouds, then 
are presented the fitted curves. This order is followed for each varied variable. The second part of 
the appendix shows the coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis, 
grouped according to the varied variable. The last part of the appendix describes the  a, b, c 
parameters variation, both graphically and with the sub-parameters values. 
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Figure 31 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with one closed room 
(n=1), and increasing the downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line).Focus on the emergency days. 
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Figure 32 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with one closed room 
(n=1), and increasing downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and 
lognormal fitting with three parameters. Focus on the three emergency days. 
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Figure 33 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with one closed room 
(n=1), and increasing downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and 
lognormal fitting with three parameters.  
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Figure 34 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with two closed rooms 
(n=2), and increasing the downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line).Focus on the emergency days. 
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Figure 35 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with two closed rooms 
(n=2), and increasing downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and 
lognormal fitting with three parameters. Focus on the three emergency days. 
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Figure 36 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with two closed rooms 
(n=2), and increasing downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and
lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
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Figure 37 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with three closed 
rooms (n=3), and increasing the downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days 
and 26 normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with 
third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line).Focus on the emergency days. 
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Figure 38 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with three closed 
rooms (n=3), and increasing downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 
26 normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and 
lognormal fitting with three parameters. Focus on the three emergency days. 
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Figure 39 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with three closed 
rooms (n=3), and increasing downtime (from 12 hours to 72 hours). Simulations run with three emergency days and 
26 normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and 
lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
Table 24 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=1. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_OBI1_DT12 877764 0.6954 2049.951 
Model_OBI1_DT24 1110638 0.6989 2047.238 
Model_OBI1_DT36 1324832 0.6664 2104.993 
Model_OBI1_DT48 1560612 0.679 2335.281 
Model_OBI1_DT60 1652308 0.7038 2456.303 
Model_OBI1_DT72 1719602 0.7704 2759.523 
Table 25 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=2. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_OBI2_DT12 1233159 0.7923 2209.246 
Model_OBI2_DT24 1751188 0.7708 2212.085 
Model_OBI2_DT36 2440071 0.7186 2279.949 
Model_OBI2_DT48 3169909 0.672 2413.966 
Model_OBI2_DT60 3990307 0.6254 2572.643 
Model_OBI2_DT72 4795560 0.5704 2690.156 
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Table 26 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with n=3. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_OBI3_DT12 1606621 1.0332 2985.176 
Model_OBI3_DT24 2530779 0.8647 2354.487 
Model_OBI3_DT36 3823951 0.8817 2585.468 
Model_OBI3_DT48 5071096 0.7948 2540.925 
Model_OBI3_DT60 6503694 0.7709 2631.671 
Model_OBI3_DT72 7900675 0.7632 2789.055 
 
 
   
Figure 40 a, b, c parameters variation for n=1. 
 
Table 27 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=1. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 547646.1 b0 0.7529 c0 2088.803 
a1 28180.38 b1 -0.0047 c1 -6.6526 
a2 -163.429 b2 6.75E-05 c2 0.2211 
 
   
Figure 41 a, b, c parameters variation for n=2. 
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Table 28 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=2. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 697808.5 b0 0.8266 c0 2190.421 
a1 39701.59 b1 -0.0023 c1 -1.1369 
a2 243.3258 b2 -1.80E-05 c2 0.1161 
 
   
Figure 42 a, b, c parameters variation for n=3. 
 
Table 29 a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, c0, c1, and c2 parameters value for n=3. 
a parameter value b parameter value c parameter value 
a0 596156.7 b0 1.13 c0 3230.393 
a1 75840.97 b1 -0.0108 c1 -35.6633 
a2 362.3285 b2 7.94E-05 c2 0.4191 
 
   
Figure 43 a0, a1, a2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 30 a0, a1, a2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
a0 parameter value a1 parameter value a2 parameter value 
a00 145669.5 a10 41277.34 a20 -857.936 
a01 527883.7 a11 -25406 a21 838.3832 
a02 -125907 a12 12309.08 a22 -143.876 
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Figure 44 a0, a1, a2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 31 b0, b1, b2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
b0 parameter value b1 parameter value b2 parameter value 
b00 0.9089 b10 -0.018 b20 0.000300 
b01 -0.2708 b11 0.0188 b21 -0.000400 
b02 0.1148 b12 -0.0055 b22 0.000091 
 
   
Figure 45 b0, b1, b2 parameters for the variation of n. 
 
Table 32 c0, c1, c2 values of parameters for the variation of n. 
c0 parameter value c1 parameter value c2 parameter value 
c00 2925.539 c10 -52.2104 c20 0.7341 
c01 -1305.91 c11 65.5789 c21 -0.717 
c02 469.1773 c12 -20.0211 c22 0.204 
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Appendix e): Results of the case study 
In this Appendix are presented the results from the application of the methodology on the case 
study. In particular are shown the fragility curves derived with the MLE procedure and the 
parameters values comparison with the traditional approach. 
 
  
  
Figure 46 Derived fragility curves for both the two ground motion sets (FEMA and Site Specific), for the 
Serviceability Limit State (indicated as SLO) and the Damage Limit State (indicated with SLD),associated with the 
ground level. 
Table 33Values of ύ and ȕ, with the traditional procedure and the Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure 
CONDITION VALUES MLE TRADITIONAL 
FEMA record set, SLO ύ 0.122655115 0.360931399 ȕ 0.366248563 0.11881654 
Site Specific record set, SLO ύ 0.193784866 0.360530943 ȕ 0.307485506 0.118297566 
FEMA record set, SLD ύ 0.128863885 0.423552357 ȕ 0.282647358 0.151952079 
Site Specific record set, SLD ύ 0.215713687 0.423052357 ȕ 0.274722551 0.151425733 
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Appendix f): Redundant and not redundant organizational model 
simulations  
In this Appendix are presented the results from the organizational model simulated with and 
without redundant elements. The results are grouped according to the steps described into 
Chapter5: the first group show the data clouds, then are presented the fitted curves. This order is 
followed for each varied variable. The second part of the appendix shows the coefficient deriving 
from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis, grouped according to the varied variable.  
 
  
  
Figure 47 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions without redundant element 
(elevator), and variation of several downtimes (from DT=0 hours to DT=72 hours). Simulations run with three 
emergency days and 26 normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth 
analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 48 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions without redundant 
element (elevator), and variation of several downtimes (from DT=0 hours to DT=72 hours). Simulations run with three 
emergency days and 26 normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother 
(black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
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Figure 49 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with a redundant element 
(elevator), and variation of several downtimes (from DT=0 hours to DT=72 hours). Simulations run with three 
emergency days and 26 normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth 
analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line).
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Figure 50 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with a redundant 
element (elevator), and variation of several downtimes (from DT=0 hours to DT=72 hours). Simulations run with three 
emergency days and 26 normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother 
(black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
 
Table 34 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with several 
redundance. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
Model_NOredund_NODT 988223.6898 0.6012 2014.6146 
Model_NOredund_DT24h 3737265637 0.8067 2312.5064 
Model_NOredund_DT48h 7392824.86 0.8043 2439.4505 
Model_NOredund_DT72h 11129913.1871 0.8042 2484.4952 
Model_YESredund_NODT 707410.9730 0.6011 1855.7629 
Model_YESredund_DT24h 825985.2742 0.5894 1936.8207 
Model_YESredund_DT48h 945402.0640 0.5820 1932.8797 
Model_YESredund_DT72h 749854.8807 0.5931 1839.9637 
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Appendix g): Sensitive parameters organizational model simulations
In this Appendix are presented the results from the case 2- organizational model. The results are 
grouped according to the steps described into Chapter5: the first group show the data clouds, then 
are presented the fitted curves. This order is followed for each varied variable. The second part of 
the appendix shows the coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis, 
grouped according to the varied variable.  
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Figure 51 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable rooms 
(from n=4 to n=10), and current staff resources (m=0). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 normal days. 
Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third polynomial 
degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line).
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Figure 52 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable 
rooms (from n=4 to n=10), and current staff resources (m=0). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and 
lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
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Figure 53 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable rooms 
(from n=4 to n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+2). Simulations run with three emergency 
days and 26 normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis 
with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 54 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable 
rooms (from n=4 to n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+2). Simulations run with three 
emergency days and 26 normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother 
(black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
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Figure 55 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable rooms 
(from n=4 to n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+4). Simulations run with three emergency 
days and 26 normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis 
with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 56 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable 
rooms (from n=4 to n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+4). Simulations run with three 
emergency days and 26 normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother 
(black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
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Figure 57 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable rooms 
(from n=8 to n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+6). Simulations run with three emergency 
days and 26 normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis 
with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line). 
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Figure 58 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added variable 
rooms (from n=8 to n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+6). Simulations run with three 
emergency days and 26 normal days. Smooth analysis with third polynomial degree negative exponential smoother 
(black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters. 
  
Figure 59 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added rooms 
(n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+8). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line) on the left; smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters, on 
the right side. 
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Figure 60 Results from simulations of the organizational model in emergency conditions with added rooms 
(n=10), and added doctors to the current staff resources (m=+10). Simulations run with three emergency days and 26 
normal days. Data clouds (experimental data into legend) from organizational model and smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (red medium dash line) on the left; smooth analysis with third 
polynomial degree negative exponential smoother (black dotted line), and lognormal fitting with three parameters, on 
the right side. 
 
Table 35 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with no added 
resources and variable n parameter. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
M_n4+0m 843120.9104 0.5987 1939.3751 
M_n5+0m 612355.0456 0.5733 1854.5782 
M_n6+0m 497272.3405 0.5207 1816.0836 
M_n7+0m 429044.0747 0.4993 1761.6146 
M_n8+0m 389735.1823 0.5332 1735.7617 
M_n9+0m 338511.6766 0.4723 1834.6718 
M_n10+0m 368274.6166 0.5518 1906.7290 
Table 36 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with added resources 
(m=+2), and variable n parameter. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
M_n4+2m 832712.6983 0.5898 1954.1657 
M_n5+2m 517599.1598 0.5597 1809.8346 
M_n6+2m 481812.9846 0.5266 1798.9821 
M_n7+2m 405322.1273 0.5058 1766.5394 
M_n8+2m 352920.1932 0.4985 1770.6030 
M_n9+2m 292196.8861 0.4263 1737.6020 
M_n10+2m 349253.8971 0.5205 1962.2569 
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Table 37 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with added resources 
(m=+4), and variable n parameter. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
M_n4+4m 741698.9015 0.6041 1882.5122 
M_n5+4m 637953.7836 0.5725 1739.7489 
M_n6+4m 499925.8945 0.5069 1894.1601 
M_n7+4m 385018.9811 0.55 1930.6213 
M_n8+4m 460840.2695 0.5098 1883.1450 
M_n9+4m 326439.4519 0.5112 1834.2628 
M_n10+4m 209551.7561 0.4434 1765.3829 
 
Table 38 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with added resources 
(m=+6), and variable n parameter. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
M_n8+6m 286416.3013 0.4708 1768.5762 
M_n9+6m 318661.2349 0.4876 1802.8411 
M_n10+6m 401307.3237 0.5141 1930.2542 
 
Table 39 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with added resources 
(m=+2), and variable n=10. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b C 
M_n10+8m 240639.3250 0.4831 1819.6506 
 
Table 40 Coefficient deriving from the dynamic fit-nonlinear regression analysis of the models with added resources 
(m=+2), and variable n=10. 
Model (name) 
Parameters 
a b c 
M_n10+10m 260752.6464 0.5166 1982.0952 
 
 
